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ABSTRACT 
SARAH MARSH: The Regency Novel and the British Constitution: 
Austen, Brunton, Shelley, and the Culture of Romantic Decline 
(Under the direction of Jeanne Moskal) 
 
During the Regency period (1811-1820), Britons were faced at home with daunting 
political problems: a scandal-plagued royal family; ongoing war with France; a weak postwar 
economy; a complicated and relatively new union of Scotland with England and Wales; and 
an enormous new empire abroad that few understood and none knew how to manage. As a 
hedge against this apparent national decline, Britons made frequent recourse to an ideal of 
national cohesion they called the British “constitution”: in medicine, the constitution (or 
health) of British bodies; in domestic matters, the constitution of the British family; in 
science, the constitution of the British atmosphere and landscape; in politics, the constitution 
of the British polity out of the English, the Welsh, and the Scottish; in government, the 
constitutional monarchy comprising the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and the 
king; in jurisprudence, the body of parliamentary law known as the British Constitution. 
“Constitution” was for Britons a multivalent and powerful term that emphasized the 
interrelatedness of political, legal, social, environmental, and medical understandings of lived 
experience. And yet, as the nineteenth century moved into its second decade, Britons were 
nevertheless convinced that theirs was a national constitution on the verge of ruin. 
This dissertation assesses the interaction of British constitutions—physiological, 
legal, and national—with genre in the Regency-era novels of Jane Austen, Mary Brunton, 
	   iv	  
and Mary Shelley. These novels are no exception to the larger trend of Regency-era 
declinism; what makes these women’s fictive appraisals of Britain’s ruin so remarkable is 
how they use gender and genre categories to unsettle the seemingly stable idea of a British 
constitution. The novel was primed for this political work because it was the principal 
conduit through which Britons indulged their obsession with constitutional decline: 
eighteenth-century sentimental and gothic fictions almost universally feature as a plotline the 
constitutional ruin of heroines. In their Regency-era novels, Austen, Brunton, and Shelley 
seized upon this older tradition to level its sexual double standard: constitutional decline, 
they insist, inheres not in women’s bodies (as the sentimental and gothic traditions held), but 
in a social order—and a literary tradition—that maintained women and other disenfranchised 
groups in positions of precarious constitutional legitimacy. Taken together, the Regency-era 
novels of Austen, Brunton, and Shelley demonstrate that the British constitution—that old 
ideal of national cohesion—might be nothing more (and certainly nothing less) than Britain’s 
greatest national fiction. 
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Introduction: The Regency Novel and the British Constitution 
And thinks’t thou, Britain, still to sit at ease,  
An island Queen amidst thy subject seas,  
While the vext billows, in their distant roar,  
But soothe thy slumbers, and but kiss thy shore?  
To sport in wars, while danger keeps aloof,  
Thy grassy turf unbruised by hostile hoof?  
So sing thy flatterers; but, Britain, know, 
Thou who hast shared the guilt must share the woe.  
Nor distant is the hour; low murmurs spread,  
And whispered fears, creating what they dread;  
Ruin, as with an earthquake shock, is here […] 
—Anna Laetitia Barbauld1 
 
In 1811, the first year of the British Regency, Britons believed themselves in the 
midst of widespread national decline—the “earthquake shock” of “Ruin,” as Anna Laetitia 
Barbauld called it in her popular and inflammatory 1812 poem, Eighteen Hundred and 
Eleven. The Regency arrangement itself was perhaps the most obvious sign of national ruin 
that year: in July, the scandal-plagued and unpopular Prince Regent took the place of his 
mentally deranged father, King George III, whose recurring madness had made him unfit to 
rule. The medical and political deterioration of Britain’s royal family seemed emblematic of 
other national fissures: the relatively recent union in 1707 of Scotland to England and Wales 
had long been creating divisive political struggles in Parliament and abroad, particularly 
between the English and Scottish, throwing into question what it meant to be British. The 
eighteenth-century growth of industrialization and agrarian capitalism had produced a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Anna Laetitia Barbauld, Eighteen Hundred and Eleven, A Poem (London: J. Johnson & Co., 1812), ll. 39-49. 
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marked decline of titled families’ wealth, troubling traditional social arrangements of the 
British estate and destabilizing home markets. Domestic unrest followed: 1811 alone saw the 
Luddite rebellions and the rioting of weavers in Glasgow; later in 1819, in what would 
become known as the Peterloo Massacre, the Prince Regent’s cavalry charged a crowd of 
British citizens gathered in Manchester to demand the reform of parliamentary 
representation. Beyond the Channel, Napoleonic France’s meteoric rise to power in Europe 
threatened British national security as well as British claims to cultural and military 
superiority in the old world. By 1811, the American Revolution was more than 30 years old, 
as was the reality that Great Britain’s political influence and commercial opportunities in 
North America would be limited indeed; the War of 1812, just on the horizon, would certify 
those limits. Britain’s remaining imperial claims in North America, Africa, and Asia did not 
impart to Britons a comforting sense of global dominion, as is so often assumed, but what 
Linda Colley has called a worrying “collective agoraphobia”: how, wondered MP Edmund 
Burke, was a “‘strong presiding power, that is so useful towards the conservation of a vast, 
disconnected, infinitely diversified empire’ to be reconciled with the preservation of 
traditional British liberties?”2 Though many scholars suggest that it began much later in the 
nineteenth century with the eugenics programs of Max Nordau and Cesare Lombroso, which 
appeared in Great Britain as the public hygiene campaigns of the Victorians, Britain’s culture 
of declinism had an unmistakable purchase in the last half of the Romantic period, and 
particularly during the British Regency. 
As a hedge against these dire threats to their nation’s cohesion—the agoraphobia of 
empire, internal political fractures, and the prospect of being overrun by the French—Britons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 103, 105. 
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frequently made recourse to an ideal of national holism they called the British “constitution”: 
in medicine, the constitution (or health) of British bodies; in domestic matters, the 
constitution of the British family; in science, the constitution of the British atmosphere and 
landscape; in politics, the constitution of the British polity out of the English, the Welsh, and 
the Scottish; in government, the constitutional monarchy comprising the House of Lords, the 
House of Commons, and the king; in jurisprudence, the body of parliamentary law known as 
the British Constitution. “Constitution” was for Britons a multivalent and powerful term that 
emphasized the interrelatedness of political, legal, social, environmental, and medical 
understandings of lived experience—what William Wordsworth called “Unity entire” in his 
posthumously published poem, The Recluse (1888).3 The Oxford English Dictionary 
confirms these meanings: for Romantic-era Britons, “constitution” was, at once, the 
“physical nature or character of the body”; individual disposition or temperament; a civil or 
ecclesiastical “decree, ordinance, law, [or] regulation”; the “body of fundamental principles 
according to which a […] body politic is constituted and governed”; and the way anything 
was “constituted or made up”—a meaning “constitution” had enjoyed at least since 
Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night (1623), when Sir Toby jokingly refers to “the excellent 
constitution of [Sir Andrew Aguecheek’s] legge.”4 Less than two hundred years later, the 
Bard himself would be part of the national constitution; as Henry Crawford reports in Jane 
Austen’s Mansfield Park (1814): “Shakespeare one gets acquainted with without knowing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 William Wordsworth, Home at Grasmere: Part First, Book First, of The Recluse, ed. Beth Darlington (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1977), l. 170. 
4 “constitution, n.”. OED Online. September 2012. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39848?redirectedFrom=constitution& (accessed October 23, 2012). 
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how. It is part of an Englishman’s constitution. His thoughts and beauties are so spread 
abroad that one touches them every where, one is intimate with him by instinct.”5 
The notion of “constitution” was itself “every where” in British political, medical, 
and social discourse, as any number of titles from the period demonstrate: an Essay on the 
Constitution of England (1766) and An Account of the Constitution and Present State of 
Great Britain (1779?), both anonymous; Alexander Wight’s A Treatise on the Laws 
Concerning the Election of the Different Representatives Sent from Scotland to the 
Parliament of Great Britain, with a Preliminary View of the Constitution of the Parliaments 
of England and Scotland (1773); William Pulteney’s An Appeal to Reason and Justice, in 
Behalf of the British Constitution (1778), which found American independence a clear 
“Violation of the Rights of British Subjects”; and John Barker’s Rise and Progress of a 
Pestilential Constitution (1795?) are just a few titles of the many.6 More often than not, 
conservative treatises like these celebrated the “ancient” nature of the British constitution, 
beginning with Magna Carta, stressing that constitutional stability, which had its proper 
material foundation in the land, was the essential unifying feature of British society and 
government. As political theorist J. G. A. Pocock has written, the Augustan mind conceived 
of “real property” as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Austen’s fiction is quoted from The Novels of Jane Austen, 6 vols., ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1923-74), p. 338. 
6 William Pulteney, An appeal to reason and justice, in behalf of the British constitution, and the subjects of the 
British empire. In which the present important contest with the revolted colonies is impartially considered, the 
inconsistency of modern patriotism is demonstrated, the supremacy of Parliament is asserted on Revolution 
Principles, and American independence is proved to be a manifest violation of the rights of British subjects. To 
which is added, an appendix, containing remarks on a pamphlet intitled, ‘thoughts on the present state of affairs 
with America.’ (London: W. Nicoll, 1778) Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Univ Of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill Davis. 2 Nov. 2012. 
<http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGroupN
ame=uncbrcr&tabID=T001&docId=CW3305396602&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCOArticles&version=1.
0&docLevel=FASCIMILE>. 
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stable enough to link successive generations in social relationships belonging 
to […] the order of nature. Such a government would tend to be a 
commonwealth (with monarchy) of independent proprietors with a balanced 
and ancient constitution, fortified by immemorial customs which helped to 
keep the parts independent and in place; it would be patriotic in defense, but 
would avoid war and empire.7 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, it was of course impossible to believe 
that Britain’s government was avoiding war and empire; furthermore, the ancient “balance” 
of the British constitution seemed eroded as well, particularly with the apparent 
constitutional weakness of King George III. Radical political commentators, most notably 
William Godwin in his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), thus reconceptualized 
British political freedom at the level of individual constitutions: on his anarchic program of 
human perfectibility, Britons might throw off the corrupted ancien régime slowly but 
inevitably as they exceeded the bodily limitations of their own physiological constitutions, 
producing a new race of healthy, just, and reasoning people. For others like that arch-
declinist Thomas Malthus, however, the die already had been cast: in An Essay on the 
Principle of Population (1798), he refuted Godwin’s position by arguing that Britain’s linear 
population increase inevitably would be fraught with disease, famine, and moral vice: the 
problems of individual Britons’ constitutions, brought on by the land’s failure to support its 
inhabitants, would produce an inevitable decline of the British nation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 458. 
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This Romantic-period notion of impending constitutional decline owed much of its 
cultural prevalence to what J. G. Barker-Benfield (and others) have called the eighteenth-
century culture of sensibility. The word “sensibility,” J. G. Barker-Benfield explains, 
denoted the receptivity of the senses and referred to the psychoperceptual 
scheme explained and systematized by Newton and Locke. It connoted the 
operation of the nervous system, the material basis for consciousness. During 
the eighteenth century, this psychoperceptual scheme became a paradigm, 
meaning not only consciousness in general but a particular kind of 
consciousness, one that could be further sensitized in order to be more acutely 
responsive to signals from the outside environment and from inside the body. 
[…] While sensibility rested on essentially materialist assumptions, 
proponents of the cultivation of sensibility came to invest it with spiritual and 
moral values.8 
“This,” Barker-Benfield continues, “was a gendered view 
of the nerves: not only were women’s nerves interpreted as 
more delicate and more susceptible than men’s, but 
women’s ability to operate their nerves by acts of will 
(part of Newton’s account) was seriously questioned” 
(xviii).  Because of their persistent situation in the home, 
women were believed to inherit or acquire on a Lockean 
program “constitutional delicacy” or “delicate 
constitutions,” less fit than male constitutions for life in the world, an idea which Mary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. xvii. 
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Wollstonecraft had decried in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). The connection 
between sensibility and female constitutions is dramatized in this 1789 stipple engraving by 
Richard Earlom titled “Sensibility.”9 The female figure’s apparent identification with the 
hothouse mimosa on the right suggests the degree to which female sensibility was an 
aesthetic and emotive mode produced by controlled indoor spaces, most commonly the 
British home. The pensive expression of the personified Sensibility sets her and the hothouse 
plant distinctly apart from, and yet threatened by, the uncultivated outdoor space in the 
middle- and background of the engraving.  
For Romantic-era Britons, sensibility emerged as a troubling paradox in which the 
sensitive, finely tuned, and healthy constitution—normally the constitution of a delicate but 
beautiful woman—was perpetually at risk of being overwhelmed and ultimately ruined by its 
ineluctable sympathy with the environment and other human beings. This paradox produced 
a broader confusion in Britain about sensibility’s relationship to social progress: was 
sensibility a weakness? Was it effete, too apparently French, the luxurious preserve of 
Britain’s indulgent upper classes, and thus a symptom (or a cause) of Britain’s decline? Or 
was sensibility a constitutional strength of Britons who were more attuned to their 
environment and the suffering of others—and thus better poised to usher Great Britain 
through a new era of social renewal and the global extension of British liberty? 
This study argues that the Regency-era novels of Jane Austen, Mary Brunton, and 
Mary Shelley engaged this paradox by revising the conventions of the eighteenth-century 
novel of sensibility, the primary cultural medium through which Britons living before and 
during the Romantic period played out their national obsession with the sensibility of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Image from Richard Earlom after George Romney, “Sensibility,” 1789, The Wellcome Library, London. 
Accessed 1 November 2012. http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/mod/oucontent/view.php?id=397289&section=2.2. 
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constitutions. Pioneered by Samuel Richardson, Laurence Sterne, Henry Mackenzie, and 
Frances Burney, the novel of sensibility emphasized the action of decaying human 
constitutions in the production of plotlines, most commonly the narrative of “virtue in 
distress” in which a sensitive woman with a healthy and moral but delicate constitution was 
ultimately ruined by the sexual advances of a rake like the villain Lovelace in Samuel 
Richardson’s wildly popular Clarissa (1748). Moreover, the novel of sensibility and its 
macabre twin, the gothic novel, were intended to produce constitutional responses in their 
readers, normally categorized under the rubric of sympathy, both moral and physiological 
(Barker-Benfield 15-36). These were genres that not only represented Britons’ declining 
constitutions, therefore, but affected them intimately, leading Wordsworth famously to 
lament in his 1800 “Preface” to Lyrical Ballads the “outrageous stimulation” promulgated by 
“frantic novels, sickly and stupid German tragedies, and deluges of idle and extravagant 
stories in verse.”10 But as this study argues, Austen, Brunton, and Shelley enacted in their 
fictions not “outrageous stimulation,” but a new set of relations between the British novel 
and Britons’ constitutions, which revealed contradictions inhering in the very old, and still 
very powerful, idea of constitution itself. 
The revelation of these contradictions in their fiction was a tremendous imaginative 
undertaking by these three novelists because the notion of a British constitution had for years 
insinuated itself not only into the novel’s form but every aspect of Britons’ lives. The key to 
avoiding bodily constitutional ruin, most Britons had long agreed, was to form a strong 
constitution in childhood and then fastidiously maintain its strength through programmatic 
temperance. In his Discourse on the Temperate Life (1550), for example, Luigi Cornaro 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 William Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads and Other Poems, 1797-1800, eds. James Butler and Karen Green 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 747. 
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argued that, under a regimen of limited food and drink, he had repaired a constitution ruined 
in youth by overindulgence. He urged his readers that they, too, could achieve remarkably 
advanced age: on his plan, anyone could live to be 100 years old; those with particularly 
robust constitutions could expect to survive healthfully 20 years more. Though this “paragon 
of health passed away prematurely in 1565, at the disappointing age of 98,” his work went 
through more than 50 editions in English translation and was read avidly by health conscious 
Britons during both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.11 This clear interest in health, 
amounting often to obsession, was the clearest symptom of widespread anxiety that even the 
most rigid programs of constitutional maintenance might be insufficient to ensuring the 
health of Britons and, by extension, the endurance of their body politic. 
The coextensive nature of bodily and political constitutions in Romantic-era Britain is 
perhaps most clearly illustrated by James Gillray’s 1804 colored etching, “BRITANNIA 
Between DEATH and the 
DOCTOR’S,”12 a satire on 
William Pitt’s return to political 
power in Parliament in 1804. The 
“doctors” surrounding Britannia 
offer her a variety of antidotes to 
her constitutional distress. Prime 
Minister Pitt holds aloft a “Constitutional restorative,” his own spindly constitution a 
reminder that austerity was a republican virtue. He treads into the open mouth of the portly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Roy Porter, Bodies Politic: Disease, Death and Doctors in Britain, 1650-1900 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2001), pp. 82-84. 
12 Image from Roy Porter, Bodies Politic: Disease, Death, and Doctors in Britain, 1650-1900, p. 99. 
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MP James Charles Fox, an avid abolitionist and radical supporter of the American and 
French revolutions, signaled by the Phrygian cap in his left hand. Fox offers Britannia a 
bottle labeled “Republican Balsam” while spilling to the floor a bottle of “Whig pills,” two 
dice suggesting the political risk of Fox’s outspoken support of the French revolution and 
political radicals at home, and, more obviously, his significant role in settling the Prince 
Regent’s enormous gambling debts.13 On the far left is Henry Addington, Prime Minister 
from 1801 until 1804, who had held a hard line against Napoleon’s aggression in Europe and 
was more conservative on domestic issues, particularly Catholic emancipation, than both Fox 
and Pitt. Addington accidentally drops a “Composing draft” over the balcony as Pitt boots 
him from Britannia’s sick room, invoking the contentious unseating of Addington’s 
government in 1804 by Pitt and his supporters when Addington began to lose political 
ground on the questions of income taxation and the Irish militia, who were unserviceable and 
threatening domestic unrest.14 In his left pocket, Pitt holds a copy of The Art of Restoring 
Health, a reference to one of two important Romantic-period medical texts: it may be George 
Wallis’s The Art of Preventing Diseases, and Restoring Health (1796), a popular guide 
promising to “keep the constitution in, or bring it to, a state of health.”15 But Pitt’s pocket 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 L. G. Mitchell, “Fox, Charles James (1749–1806),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2007 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/article/10024, accessed 2 Nov. 2012]. 
14 J. E. Cookson, “Addington, Henry, first Viscount Sidmouth (1757–1844),” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2009 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/article/150, accessed 2 Nov. 2012]. 
15 George Wallis, The art of preventing diseases, and restoring health, founded on rational principles, and 
adapted to persons of every capacity. By George Wallis, M. D. Editor of the last Edition of Motherby’s Medical 
Dictionary, Sydenham’s Works, with Notes, &c. &c. Second edition. With considerable alterations and 
additions (London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1796) Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Univ Of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill Davis. 31 Oct. 2012. 
http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGroupNa
me=uncbrcr&tabID=T001&docId=CW3308768082&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCOArticles&version=1.0
&docLevel=FASCIMILE, p. 4. 
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reading may refer more insidiously to a treatise on constitutional maintenance by the French 
doctor, M. Flamant, The Art of Preserving and Restoring Health that had been “faithfully 
translated” into English in 1697 and widely read by Britons ever since. Thus Gillray suggests 
not one but two French presences in Britannia’s sick room: one in the hip pocket of the Prime 
Minister, who had long been criticized for his misplaced optimism about Britain’s war effort 
and, in 1805, would fail to secure a European coalition against the French, leaving Britain 
alone “to fight the best Battle We can with our own Strength.”16 The more obvious French 
incursion in Britannia’s sick room is Napoleon himself, caricatured as Death behind 
Britannia’s throne, representing a nearer threat than any of her distracted “doctors” perceive. 
Britannia’s failing constitution—political and physiological—is the centerpiece of 
Gillray’s satire, suggesting how clear it was to Romantic-era Britons that the physiological 
conditions of the body had real meanings for the body politic. Invoking the common 
Romantic-period mistrust of physicians, Pitt, Addington, and Fox are portrayed as quacks 
more interested in peddling their own political “cures” than in improving the condition of 
their patient, Britannia, whose fainting posture in Napoleon’s presence is a clear parody of 
novel of sensibility heroines, who succumbed in droves to the sexual advances of untoward 
men (not only is Napoleon skeletal in Gillray’s etching; he also is naked). One of the ironies 
of the image—which Gillray actually may have intended, given Pitt’s longtime bad health—
is that shortly Pitt himself would find his own constitution in utter ruin under the stress of 
governance. After taking the waters at Bath for a period, he returned to his rented villa on 
Putney Heath, were he died on the morning of January 23, 1806 (Ehrman and Smith, par. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Pitt qtd. in J. P. W. Ehrman and Anthony Smith, “Pitt, William (1759–1806),” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2009 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/article/22338, accessed 31 Oct 2012]. 
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66). The macabre caption of Gillray’s cartoon, “Death may decide, when doctor’s disagree,” 
levels a harsh critique of Parliament’s ability effectively to deal with Napoleon by evoking 
the Romantic-period commonplace that doctors’ remedies often were—in reality for Prime 
Minister Pitt as in fiction for heroines like Clarissa—useless when Britons faced the decline 
of their own constitutions. 
As Roy and Dorothy Porter note, this “analogy” between Britons’ physiological 
constitutions, the political constitution of the British nation, and the body of law known as 
the British Constitution “rang loud and true.”17 But as this study will demonstrate at length, 
the relationship in Romantic-era Britain between individual constitutions and the British 
Constitution amounted to much more than mere analogy: healthy British constitutions were 
critical to preserving traditional British liberties in the midst of an expansive imperial 
enterprise and the ongoing struggle with Napoleonic France. Most obviously, the male 
citizens of the British nation who had been invalided or killed in these two causes had to be 
replaced if Great Britain was to maintain constitutional security for its citizens at home and 
cultural ascendency across the globe. “Rule Britannia, rule the waves / Britons never will be 
slaves,” went James Thomson’s popular national song in which Great Britain, embodied as 
the constitutionally robust figure of Britannia, guaranteed the constitutional freedom of all 
Britons through sea power—and the traders and military members that sea power persistently 
mobilized to the empire, where they frequently were killed, injured, or invalided by disease 
(qtd. in Colley 11). At home, healthy male constitutions were required under primogeniture 
for the transfer of wealth and political power between generations; healthy female 
constitutions were required to bear and raise healthy male heirs to legal age. Robust British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Roy and Dorothy Porter, In Sickness and in Health: The British Experience 1650-1850 (New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988), p. 28. 
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constitutions were, therefore, not just analogies or metaphors or any other rhetorical figure: 
they were a material necessity of Romantic-era life. 
Thus, to a degree historians and literary critics have not yet realized, Romantic-era 
life, thought, and writing were deeply structured in Britain by the individual constitution’s 
relation to the constitution of the state. The work of Michel Foucault, and plenty of 
subsequent scholarship relying upon it, helpfully explicates the complex relations between 
the physical body and the body politic. This study contributes to that field of knowledge by 
clarifying that Romantic-era Britons believed that their bodily constitutions were produced 
primarily (though not exclusively) by Britain’s climate and geography. The constitutions of 
Britons were nationalized during the period—not yet by the clinic, asylum, and prison (which 
were slightly later innovations of the Victorians)—but by the eighteenth-century rise of 
British climate science. In 1776, for example, the vicar Gilbert White published his Natural 
History and Antiquities of Selborne, in which he catalogued the weather patterns of his parish 
in an effort to counteract “superstitious prejudices […] too gross for this enlightened age.”18 
Similar efforts among country parsons and agricultural writers would follow: William 
Marshall, in his Experiments and Observations (1779) hoped to remove interpretations of the 
British climate “from the hands of vulgar Error” (qtd. in Golinski 64, Marshall’s emphasis). 
At the turn of the century, scientists including Joseph Priestley, David Hartley, and Thomas 
Beddoes emphasized the reliance of human constitutions upon British aerial environments 
then being investigated in a number of British laboratories: Thomas Beddoes’s Pneumatic 
Institution in Bristol was and is the best-known of these, but, as critic Larry Stewart has 
shown, a number of similar endeavors sprang up in London and elsewhere during the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Qtd. in Jan Golinski, British Weather and the Climate of the Enlightenment (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), p. 64.	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eighteenth century, a testament to the crucial role British atmospheric science played in 
popular understandings of constitutional health at the beginning of the Romantic period.19 In 
a letter to Frances Wedgewood, for example, Erasmus Darwin lamented, “I have been lying 
on the sofa in a state of utter torpor. I mean to go out today to see if I am well or not […]. If 
the present beautiful weather continues I shall be compelled to go and be happy in the 
country but at present I prefer being miserable in London.” (Qtd. in Golinski 137) Darwin’s 
remark clarifies two critical points about the formation of Britons’ constitutions: Darwin 
relies on the local British weather (not the state or state-sanctioned institutions) to tell him 
whether he is “well or not,” and he situates wellness not in the obviously nationalist location 
of the British capital, but more colloquially “in the country”—a common belief during a 
period when the noxious airs of London were thought to debilitate human constitutions. 
Wordsworth would rework this popular medical concern as a Romantic ideal in his relocation 
of an essential, healthy Britishness from the city to the healthier airs of the countryside: the 
“correspondent breeze” from The Prelude (1850) is not only the Paraclete, therefore, but a 
biomedical idea central to Britons’ conceptions of their constitutional health and subjective 
experience.20 
Individuals thus had some control over the formation of their constitutions—such as 
in whether they would, as Erasmus Darwin, “go and be happy in the country” or “prefer 
being miserable in London,” but external conditions were, for many, as yet highly 
deterministic. Again, the notable exception is Godwin, whose radical program in Political 
Justice held that Britons could use their reason to live beyond the constitutional determinism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Larry Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian 
Britain, 1660-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
20 William Wordsworth, The Fourteen-Book Prelude, ed. W. J. B. Owen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1985), l. 43. 
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of their environment. But most disagreed; as Edmund Burke explained in his influential A 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757): the 
“ill effects of bad weather appear often no otherwise, than in a melancholy dejection of 
spirits, though without doubt, in this case, the bodily organs suffer first, and the mind through 
these organs.”21 For Burke as for Darwin, the environment was the first cause, an idea that 
encouraged the development of the eudiometer and other instruments supposed to measure 
the breathability of the air; these were perhaps the clearest attempts of the period to bring 
Enlightenment science to bear on Britons’ medico-political need to manage their bodily 
constitutions by regulating interaction with external factors. 
Romantic-period discourses on constitution evolved from and often re-inscribed the 
Renaissance model of “geohumoralism,” a term coined by Mary Floyd-Wilson to describe 
the system of knowledge under which early modern subjects understood their bodies’ 
relationship to the world: 
[d]erived from the classical texts of Aristotle, Galen, Vitruvius, Pliny, and 
others, geohumoralism […] aimed to comprehend (and estrange) the northern 
and southern climatic extremes that bordered the Mediterranean. The same 
classical tripartite scheme that constructed ancient Greece and Rome and the 
civilized middle between the barbaric lands north and south also determined 
the logic of geohumoralism.22 
That logic held that the body’s proportions of the four humors described by the physician 
Galen—black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm—were inflected by local geography and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (London: 
R. and J. Dodsley, 1757), p. 281. 
22 Mary Floyd-Wilson, English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 2. 
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climate. Classical and Renaissance practitioners did not agree, however, on exactly how local 
factors influenced the humors’ proportions: many posited that the body’s humoral 
composition counterbalanced its environment, so that cold, wet locales would give rise to 
heated constitutions. In fact, Hippocrates’s Airs, Waters, Places was the only major classical 
text to suggest that the relationship between environmental factors and humoral constitution 
was analogous—with the cold, wet English climate producing cold, wet, and thus phlegmatic 
English subjects (Floyd-Wilson 25). What was agreed upon, however, was that humors’ 
relative proportions in the body produced an individual’s health and temperament, or her 
constitution, and so individual constitutions reflected or refracted their local environments, 
producing not just major differences among the English, Scottish, and Welsh, but differences 
within national and ethnic groupings (such as the Lowland and Highland Scots) that 
depended upon latitude, longitude, and proximity to water, mountains, and urban centers. 
Because being white and British during the Renaissance was not, as Floyd-Wilson 
explains, “a badge of superiority but cast one instead on the margins as uncivil, slow-witted, 
and more bodily determined than those people living in more temperate zones,” it was “to the 
English people’s advantage to challenge and revise a body of knowledge” that suggested 
their position on the apparent geohumoral margins of civilization (5). The wild success of 
these predecessors in revising that body of knowledge, casting themselves as geohumorally 
central instead of marginal, is why mid-eighteenth-century Britons were convinced that their 
constitutions, seasoned at home in cold, wet Britain, were a global geopolitical asset—
particularly against the allegedly frog-fed, extravagant, and thus weakly constituted French. 
As early as the late seventeenth century, in fact, the geohumoral theory of Airs, Waters, 
Places had been fully transvalued by Britons: once a producer of marginal, intemperate 
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constitutions according to Hippocrates, the cold, wet weather of the British Isles was now 
billed as the best way to season strong, vigorous constitutions. The medical historian Thomas 
Brown has shown that part of this transformation in British physiology was owing to the 
work of the Dutch botanist and physician Herman Boerhaave, who emphasized the role of 
the body’s solid components rather than the liquid elements emphasized in humoral theory. 
Boerhaave’s English apostles Stephen Hales and John Stuart advocated attention to the 
body’s “fibres” and their thermodynamic response to external stimulus from the atmosphere; 
thus could the London practitioner, Bernard Lynch, claim that Britain’s cold and wet climate 
kept the body’s fibers in a “continual oscillatory motion,” producing “tension of the fibres 
and the whole nervous system.” Hardened northern constitutions like these would be 
softened and inflamed by hotter atmospheric conditions; as Lynch believed: “when a warm 
weather suddenly succeeds the cold weather, it relaxes the fibres and the vessels […] and 
lymph may admit the blood, which is an inflammatory state.”23 Like their early modern 
forebears, Romantic-era Britons thus expected their constitutions to be ruined by travel to 
other latitudes; critically, however, the precise mechanism of this ruination had been 
substantially revised, with the precepts of Newton’s thermodynamics slowly and erratically 
taking over the explanatory power humoral medicine once had held in the popular 
imagination. 
Thus, healthy constitutions were best maintained by staying at the latitude of one’s 
birth. As John Locke wrote in Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1696), the inhabitants 
of Malta seasoned their children to promising effect by forcing them to go naked in the heat 
until their tenth year; the English might expect the same good results if they took care to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Brown and Lynch qtd. in Vladimir Janković, Confronting the Climate: British Airs and the Making of 
Environmental Medicine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 24-25. 
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“accustom [themselves] from [their] Infancy,” to the climate and geography of England. 
“Give me leave therefore to advise you,” he continued to his readers, “not to fence too 
carefully against this our Climate.”24 On Locke’s expansive and widely read view of the 
subject, English infants required the damp, bracing weather of their homeland in order to 
become healthy children; over-heated birthing rooms, swaddling, and the administration of 
warming alcoholic tonics was not just ill-advised but dangerous, tending to produce harmful 
increases in body temperature and, eventually, a debilitating dependency on medicines. 
Instead, Locke urged, English children should go barefoot in the cold, sleep in chilly 
bedrooms without too many blankets, bathe in cold water, and wear shoes that leaked water 
when it rained. Large differences between indoor and outdoor temperatures would shock the 
child’s constitution and decrease its strength, so homes should remain cold in the winter and 
warm in the summer: as close to the English out-of-doors as possible. Just as land ownership 
formed the material basis of the British government’s constitutional authority, so the British 
atmosphere was, on Locke’s view, the material foundation of all Britons’ physiological 
constitutions. 
Locke’s late seventeenth-century regimens for constitutional hardening enjoyed an 
enduring vogue throughout the eighteenth century and beyond: Sir John Hill, under the nom 
de plume of Seymour, cautioned in his On the Management and Education of Children 
(1754) that “Delicacy is the Parent of a thousand Mischiefs,” and, in the early nineteenth 
century, William Cobbett’s popular conduct manuals advocated that children should grow up 
“in the fresh air, getting abundant exercise; nurses’ cordials and doctors’ powders” would 
compromise the constitution indefinitely (Hill and Cobbett qtd. in Porter and Porter 29). In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (London: C. L. Clay and Sons, 1892), p. 2.  
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Lyrical Ballads (1798), Coleridge and Wordsworth famously Romanticized these hardening 
regimes as part of their growing interest in primitivism: Wordsworth’s Old Cumberland 
Beggar and Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, members of the lower orders who had indeed lived 
hard, had stronger constitutions than the cosseted ruling classes. According to Wordsworth’s 
“Preface” to Lyrical Ballads, these rustics were a fitter subject for poetry because they spoke 
a “real language” and had more “vivid sensation[s]” (741). Wordsworth’s subversive 
implication was that commoners living on and with the land had a higher claim to natural 
authority than those who legally owned it. 
The Romantic-era understanding that British constitutions were produced by local 
atmospheric conditions gained enormous credence as Britain’s imperial project increasingly 
required Britons to leave home for different climates, particularly tropical ones. Here they 
died of so-called tropical diseases disproportionately to their homebound compatriots, or they 
returned home with their constitutions in ruin. With germ theory nearly a century away, the 
medical and cultural explanation for colonial disease was clear: British constitutions 
seasoned in northerly climes, and sensitive to their immediate surroundings, could not 
possibly remain healthy in so foreign a set of topographic and climatic conditions. 
The epidemiological reality, of course, was that Europeans of all nations were, in 
their overseas colonies, coming into contact with pathogens and parasites to which they had 
no biological immunity, just as they were introducing European illnesses to native peoples of 
the so-called new world. As Alan Bewell has written, 
[c]olonialism may not have created new pathogens, but it did bring people 
who had previously been isolated into contact with each other and with 
diseases that were new to them. Precolonial peoples inhabited unique disease 
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environments, ecologies that had been built up through the interaction of 
human beings and microbes over vast spans of time. (2) 
In what was the actual collision of disease environments, Romantic-era Britons saw the 
incompatibility of their constitutions with new localities in the tropics—the torrid zone, as 
they called it—producing what Bewell, in his inspiring study, calls a “relational or 
differential” model of disease (19, Bewell’s emphasis). On this model, Britons formed 
conceptions of their own disease susceptibility in a global context by casting the 
“pathogenic” tropics in contradistinction to the “healthier” latitudes of the north, where they 
had seasoned their constitutions in childhood. But as Bewell shows, the realization that 
Britons died disproportionately in the tropics did little to curtail Britain’s colonial activities 
there. One of the most catastrophic examples of this occurred during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, 
when the British, emboldened by recent military success in the West Indies, sailed on 
Cartagena, Columbia against the Spanish. Arriving in March of 1741, they had taken one of 
the forts protecting Cartagena by April. The assault was abandoned, however, when fever 
decimated the British ranks: of the 12,000 soldiers originally enlisted for the expedition, only 
3, 569 sailed from Cartagena; less than a third of those who remained were healthy enough 
for service. In A History of the British Army (1899), J. W. Fortescue recounts the horrible 
scene: 
[d]ay after day the sailors rowed ashore to bury their boats’ loads of corpses, 
for there was always order and discipline in the ships of war; but the raw 
soldiers simply dragged their dead comrades on deck and dropped them 
overboard […]. So after a few hours the bodies that had sunk beneath the 
water came up to the surface again and floated, hideous and ghastly beyond 
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description […] while schools of sharks jostled each other in the scramble to 
tear them limb from limb. (Qtd. in Bewell 75) 
As Bewell notes, colonial disease often was a political scandal for British military and 
political leaders, which was handled at home with silence; but the enormous losses at 
Cartagena, which effected the downfall of Robert Walpole’s ministry, forced Parliament to 
reconsider its policy of imperial aggression in environments inhospitable to British 
constitutions (73). 
But Britons who lived their whole lives at home suffered as well. Domestic illness, 
Romantic-era Britons believed, was largely owing to constitutions compromised from birth 
by over-indulgent parenting or later in life from exposure, an important corollary to the idea 
of constitution during the Romantic period, which included going out in bad weather, 
courting the company of immoral society, leading a life of acute hardship, or, oppositely, 
indulging oneself with the luxuries of French fashion, rich food, and strong drink. Most 
forms of constitutional exposure could be categorized under the heading of intemperance, 
which had strong moral overtones for Romantic-era Britons, particularly for Scots as we will 
see in the case of Mary Brunton, who believed that their Calvinist self control was 
fundamental in preventing bodily indulgence and thus promoting constitutional balance and 
wellbeing. 
Vigilance was critical, for when one’s constitution was eroded or destroyed by 
exposure, it was widely regarded as beyond repair. In 1795 the Gentleman’s Magazine 
provided this versified advice: “‘Tis easier to deplete the loaded frame,/Than when 
exhausted, to recruit the same” (qtd. in Porter and Porter 34). And the morbidly obese Bath 
physician George Cheyne emphasized, as he well himself knew, that “[i]t is most certain that 
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‘tis easier to preserve Health, than to recover it; and to prevent Diseases, that to cure 
them”—certainly true in an era when, medical historians tend to agree, medicine was often as 
likely to make things worse as to make them better.25 Romantic-era Britons thus lived with 
the perverse success of geohumoral thought: the white, cold, damp British constitution—
resuscitated during the Renaissance and refigured as biomedically superior to other national 
bodies—had become an impossibly high standard that revealed to Britons their inevitable 
decline. 
In the absence of alternative remedies for this decline, constitutional maintenance 
persisted in Romantic-period Britain as a grave matter of national importance: there was no 
end of tonics, pills, balms, and advice on repairing constitutions fallen ineluctably into ruin. 
Romantic-era Britons consumed diet books and health care manuals as readily as we do in 
the twenty-first century, and, propelled by the culture of sensibility’s emphasis on managing 
the body’s delicate sensitivities, they were among the first generations of Britons widely to 
participate in the commoditization of indoor comfort—an expectation across classes that, 
contrary to Locke’s recommendations, indoor spaces should be made distinct from the 
outside, the basis of Caroline Bingley and Louisa Hurst’s outrage in Pride and Prejudice 
(1813) that Elizabeth Bennet has arrived at Netherfield with her petticoats “six inches deep in 
mud” (36). Albeit slowly and unevenly, the weather was becoming a matter of personal 
convenience that could be controlled within the domestic spaces of an increasingly urbanized 
Britain; it was no longer a ubiquitous set of conditions that, in the seventeenth century, had 
more fully circumscribed agricultural practices and the rhythms of daily life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 George Cheyne, Essay on Health and Long Life (London: Strahan and Leake, 1734), p. 2, Cheyne’s 
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Thus, the maintenance of Britons’ constitutions—and ultimately the maintenance of 
the British constitution—was a responsibility that fell primarily to women who worked in 
what feminist scholars have called the “separate sphere” of the British home. The anxieties 
attending domestic constitutional maintenance were nowhere more pronounced than in 
eighteenth-century debates about maternal nursing. Against earlier practices of hand-feeding 
infants and, for upper-class Britons, employing wet nurses, mid-eighteenth-century medical 
literatures had begun to extol the universal virtues of maternal nursing, particularly in 
preventing the fatal condition of “milk fever,” an infection of breast tissue caused by blocked 
milk ducts.26 In his widely read Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Midwifery (1752), Dr. 
William Smellie observed that women “of an healthy constitution, who suckle their own 
children, have good nipples, and whose milk comes freely, are seldom or never subject to this 
disorder; which is more incident in those who do not give suck.” (Qtd. in Kipp 39) More 
consequential was a developing belief that children took on the constitutional 
characteristics—“mental, physical, emotional, [and] racial”—of the women who breastfed 
them, making lower-class nurses a threat to aristocratic constitutions. Though these 
superstitions were largely dispelled by the turn of the nineteenth-century, some 
commentators (probably encouraged by the fact that urban wet nurses were linked in popular 
and medical discourses to syphilis transmission) still feared constitutional pollution by 
“corrupted” nurses. William Roscoe asked, for example, in The Nurse, A Poem (1798): 
“What secret taint, what dread contagion runs / Thro’ Britain’s noble but degenerate sons?” 
For Roscoe, the answer was evident: 
‘Tis from his nurse your offspring draws disgrace, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Julie Kipp, Romanticism, Maternity, and the Body Politic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 
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And thence adulterates his generous race. 
‘Till the kind father sees with wondering eyes 
A motley offspring round his table rise; 
Unlike the parent stock from whence they sprung 
And various as the breasts on which they hung. (Qtd. in Kipp 45) 
 
In Roscoe’s view, the degeneracy of Britain’s nobility was owing to noblewomen’s 
constitutionally irresponsible decision not to nurse their own children. 
After a child was weaned, constitutional maintenance in the British home continued: 
in the preparation of meals; the cleaning, beautification, and organization of indoor space; 
and the readying of male and female constitutions by toilette and dress before they went out 
into the world to court marriage partners, which would determine the constitution of the next 
generation of Britons. To make these matters more complicated, Britain’s marriage market 
had grown increasingly competitive during the period: the supply of eligible young men had 
been drastically diminished by colonial engagements and the ongoing war with France. (Jane 
Austen’s own sister, Cassandra, faced spinsterhood and relative poverty following the 
overseas death of her fiancé, Tom Fowle, a chaplain in the British army.) Those titled young 
men who avoided military service often were faced with incomes eroded during the 
eighteenth century by the rise of a mercantile class, sheer mismanagement of their estates, 
and the eventual onset during the Regency of post-war inflation: to marry for money had 
become a common necessity for women and men alike. As Mrs. Bennet often attests loudly 
in Pride and Prejudice, the Regency-era domestic sphere, with its increasingly insufficient 
resources, was becoming absurdly unequal to the maintenance of British families through 
advantageous marriages—especially families from the landed gentry like the Bennets, who 
were constituted under primogeniture by daughters without birthright. Accordingly, this is 
how the narrator of Pride and Prejudice explains the Bennets’ predicament: 
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When first Mr. Bennet had married, economy was held to be perfectly useless; 
for, of course, they were to have a son. This son was to join in cutting off the 
entail, as soon as he should be of age, and the widow and younger children 
would by that means be provided for. Five daughters successively entered the 
world; but yet the son was to come; and Mrs. Bennet, for many years after 
Lydia’s birth, had been certain that he would. This event had at last been 
despaired of, but it was then too late to be saving. (308) 
The brother-less Bennets’ loss of their financial virtues on the marriage market is Austen’s 
more pragmatic variation on eighteenth-century heroines of sensibility, whose degraded 
physiological constitutions likewise ruined them for marriage. To real Regency-era women in 
the precarious but common position of the Bennet sisters, financial decline—resulting from 
the arbitrary lack of a male sibling—was much more than fiction. 
Thus Austen—and, in their different ways, Brunton and Shelley—located in the 
eighteenth-century novel of sensibility a generic scaffold on which to dramatize the 
contradictions inhering for women in the traditional notion of a British constitution. The first 
chapter of this study, “‘Unaffected Prose’: Constitutional Maintenance and Austen’s Early 
Heroines” argues that, while Austen richly parodied in Sense and Sensibility (1811) and 
Pride and Prejudice the novel of sensibility’s treatments of female constitutions, she was 
also profoundly aware of the social liability posed to women whose constitutions had been 
ruined by the physical coercions of men either through venereal disease, extra-marital 
pregnancy, physical violence, or all three. Austen’s solution to this problem in her early 
novels is something she calls “unaffected prose,” or the ability of heroines to steel their ways 
of speaking—their textual constitutions—against the deleterious discursive effects of social 
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and physiological exposure. Strong bodily and textual constitutions allow Austen’s early 
heroines (particularly Elizabeth Bennet) to transcend Regency-era declinism through the 
comedic narrative of companionate marriage. 
This study’s second chapter, “Scottish Constitutions in Brunton’s Self-Control and 
Discipline,” considers how the Scottish novelist used the victim-rake dyad of the novel of 
sensibility as a metaphor for the constitutional relationship she observed between a feminized 
Scotland and masculine England, particularly in their imperial relationship in North America 
and in the pseudo-colonial conditions that persisted during the Regency in the Scottish 
Highlands. But for Brunton, like Austen, constitution is more than a metaphor: politicized 
English incursions into Scottish life persistently produce diseased and debilitated Scottish 
constitutions among Brunton’s characters, suggesting that the alleged constitutional “union” 
between Scotland and England was much weaker in the early Regency than many English 
writers of the period were able or willing to acknowledge. 
The third chapter of this dissertation, “‘That Mixture of Character’: Constitutional 
Instability in Austen’s Sanditon” considers the profound ambivalence Austen finally brought 
to bear in 1817 on the comedic plotlines she had lately been perfecting in Persuasion. The 
deflation of feudal incomes by new market pressures and the post-Waterloo economic flat-
line make socially advantageous, companionate marriages a structural impossibility in 
Austen’s Sanditon—a constitutional dead end for Britain’s young women signaled by the 
fragment’s utter lack of suitable husbands. The heroines Charlotte Heywood and Clara 
Brereton instead find themselves among a set of mercenary hypochondriacs who split time 
between taking the air at Sanditon, a fictional seaside resort, and reading sentimental novels 
from its lending library. The solipsism of these characters overruns the manuscript, thus 
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enacting Austen’s harshest critique of the cult of sensibility and the literature it produced: too 
much moral sensitivity to badly written literature, like too much bodily sensitivity to the 
environment, makes real sympathy impossible and produces hypochondria, that pathetic 
condition in which narrative becomes completely unhinged from constitutional symptoms. 
Though Sanditon is unfinished, it remains Austen’s clear assessment that excessive 
sensibility was a course of both narrative and national dissolution. 
Finally, this study will consider the end of the British constitution as Mary Shelley 
envisioned it in Frankenstein (1818). With his deeply fragmented body that is composed of 
parts from inside and outside the human species, Shelley’s Creature becomes British 
literature’s first constitution-less being. Accordingly, he has no race, he has no class, he has 
no nation, and certainly he has no family worthy of the name. “He” may not even have a 
gender, as some feminist and queer theorists have argued. This constitution-less condition is 
produced, on Shelley’s view, by Victor Frankenstein’s highly irregular practice of medicine, 
which catastrophically leaves moral sympathy out of the doctor-patient relationship, turning 
the Creature into a monster. This marks a critical distinction between Shelley and Austen on 
the question of sensibility’s social uses: Austen remains suspicious of sympathy’s capacity to 
affect national cohesion and social progress. But Shelley insists that sympathetic discourse—
like the kind she gives the Creature in the center-most narrative of Frankenstein—is not only 
necessary but the period’s greatest innovation in promoting individual and national well-
being, a position she dramatizes negatively when Victor Frankenstein’s failed sympathy with 
the Creature results in domestic tragedy across households and the miscarriage of criminal 
justice in Britain and Switzerland. 
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Austen, Brunton, and Shelley are critical to this study because each wrote of a 
different but crucial aspect of Britain’s Regency-era constitution. Austen examines in her 
novels the complex social and political challenges facing England’s gentry; thus (and though 
it may be an oversimplification to say so) Austen stands in as this study’s representative 
English author. Mary Shelley, also English, offers a more cosmopolitan view of British 
constitutions in her continental (and ultimately global) novel, Frankenstein, which she 
conceived while she was herself abroad in Europe. In order make claims about a “British” 
constitution, and not just an English one, the work of Mary Brunton provides a Scottish 
perspective on Britain, which reveals particular political fissures between Scotland and 
England that Austen and Shelley engage more peripherally: Austen in staging various 
elopements at the Scottish border; Shelley in Victor Frankenstein’s brief visit to the Orkney 
Islands, where he plans to construct a female companion for the Creature. 
Together, the Regency-era novels of Austen, Brunton, and Shelley comprise an early 
chapter of Britain’s nineteenth-century auto-ethnography, which reassessed in fiction the 
meanings of the British constitution. Though they came to different conclusions about what 
ailed Britain, these three authors diverted attention from the popular Regency fear of a 
declining national constitution and redirected it toward inequities the British constitution, 
traditionally conceived, held for women (and, on Brunton’s sometimes more comprehensive 
view, other disenfranchised groups like Highland Scots and African slaves). Most important, 
these women’s fictive appraisals of British constitutions—bodily constitutions and the legal 
constitutions of British subjects under the marital, property, and criminal laws of the British 
Constitution—showed that, while British literature was not to become the province of “Unity 
entire” as Wordsworth had once hoped for poetry, the novel was suited by its comparative 
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unruliness to exploring why constitutional wholeness consistently eluded Britons. For as 
Austen, Brunton, and particularly Shelley momentously suggest in their novels, the British 
constitution—that material necessity of Romantic-period life—might be nothing more (and 
certainly nothing less) than Britain’s greatest national fiction.
  
 
CHAPTER I 
“Unaffected Prose”27: Constitutional Maintenance and Austen’s Early Heroines 
In late July of 1809, Jane Austen wrote a poem to her brother, Frank, to celebrate the 
occasion of his oldest son’s birth. It begins: 
My dearest Frank, I wish you joy 
Of Mary’s safety with a Boy, 
Whose birth has given little pain, 
Compared with that of Mary Jane.— 
May he a growing Blessing prove, 
And well deserve his Parents’ Love!— 
Endow’d with Art’s & Nature’s Good, 
Thy name possessing with thy Blood, 
In him, in all his ways, may we 
Another Francis William see!— 
Thy infant days may he inherit, 
Thy warmth, nay insolence of spirit;— (Letters 264-65) 
 
Austen’s attention in these lines to her nephew’s inheritance of his father’s name, looks, and 
temperament signals at once her fondness of her brother, nostalgia for their childhood 
together, and confidence that certain physiological and psychological elements of the Austen 
family constitution—“Art’s & Nature’s,” “Blood,” “infant days,” “warmth,” and “insolence 
of spirit”—will be passed from father to son. The maintenance of the Austen family 
constitution in little Frank’s person is, in Austen’s poem, critical to his parents’ domestic 
happiness; this is made plain in the poem’s rather ungainly comparison of Frank’s blessed 
birth to the “pain” caused in 1807 by the arrival of Frank’s older sister, Mary Jane, whose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Jane Austen, Jane Austen’s Letters to Her Sister Cassandra and Others, ed. R.W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1952), p. 266. 
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birth left their mother “so ill as to alarm [the family] extremely.”28 Because sons who lived to 
adulthood were critical to the British system of inheritance under primogeniture, the birth of 
a healthy boy was an especially happy occasion, which would ensure the consolidation of 
family wealth, land, and power. More broadly, primogeniture was vital to the constitution of 
the British government as well; in his Principles of Political Economy, Thomas Malthus 
explains: “[t]here is reason to think that the British constitution could not be maintained 
without an aristocracy; and an effective aristocracy could not be maintained without the right 
of primogeniture.”29 As J. A. Downie has written, the “aristocracy” of which Malthus writes 
included in Austen’s lifetime the landowning nobility—who were responsible for the 
maintenance of the British Constitution in the House of Lords—as well as the landed 
gentry.30 Britain’s non-aristocratic classes also were structured under the same general 
principle of primogeniture: their fortunes were sometimes smaller, and titles and 
parliamentary representation were not at stake, but other familial assets—reputation, health, 
and wealth—always hung in the balance as one generation gave way to the next in the person 
of each family’s heir. As biographer Claire Tomalin explains: Jane Austen was thus 
“conventional enough” to acknowledge that her new nephew “mattered more” than his older 
sister to the maintenance of the Austen family’s constitution (214). 
These conventional assumptions about familial constitution underwritten by the 
sexual politics of primogeniture are enacted in Austen’s poem by the heroic couplets, which 
rhyme “joy” with “boy” and “pain” with her niece’s (and own) name, “Jane.” In the poem’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Claire Tomalin, Jane Austen: A Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), p. 203. 
29 Thomas Malthus, Principles of Political Economy (London: W. Pickering, 1836), p. 582. 
30 J. A. Downie, “Who Says She’s a Bourgeois Writer? Reconsidering the Social and Political Contexts of Jane 
Austen’s Novels,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 40, no. 1 (Fall 2006), pp. 69–84. 
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final stanza, however, Austen points up these contrivances of the verse form by comparing it 
to the prose of her sister’s letter, now lost, which presumably was mailed with the poem. 
Austen writes: 
    As for ourselves, we’re very well; 
As unaffected prose will tell.— 
Cassandra’s pen will paint our state, 
The many comforts that await 
Our Chawton home, how much we find 
Already in it, to our mind; 
And how convinced, that when complete 
It will all other Houses beat 
That ever have been made or mended, 
With rooms concise, or rooms distended. (Letters 266) 
 
Cassandra’s “unaffected prose,” unlike Jane’s poem, will “paint”—as only prose can, is the 
suggestion—how the two Austen sisters do in their new home at Chawton. Drawn more 
quietly here is a comparison between the noisy nursery of Frank and Mary’s home and the 
quieter “comforts” of the Chawton house, where there was little expectation of a new 
generation of Austens: Cassandra’s intended husband, Tom Fowle, had died of fever in St. 
Domingo twelve years earlier while serving as an army chaplain to a regiment deployed to 
fight the French in the West Indies; Tom Lefroy, Jane’s only serious attachment so far as is 
known, had by then been married for 10 years to a Wexford heiress, with whom he had 
fathered seven children (Tomalin 108, 122). The newborn Francis William Austen 
represented, therefore, not only his parents’ hope for the next generation of Austens, but his 
aunts’ as well. 
The inaugural crisis of Jane Austen’s first two published novels, Sense and Sensibility 
and Pride and Prejudice, is the absence of a son and heir like the baby Frank in the 
Dashwood and Bennet families: the Bennet estate at Longbourn will be entailed away from 
the five Bennet daughters upon their father’s death, and the three Dashwood sisters are left 
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essentially penniless when their father dies and their half-brother, John Dashwood, inherits 
the family estate at Norland. Each novel is tasked, therefore, with providing a narrative of 
how familial and class constitutions are maintained among female siblings without brothers. 
This chapter assesses how the politics of constitutional maintenance interact with genre in 
Austen’s early novels, demonstrating that the resilient constitutions of Austen’s heroines—
registered textually as “unaffected prose”—resolve the constitutional dilemma of the missing 
boy. 
§ 
Though Jane Austen uses the word “constitution” only 24 times in her entire oeuvre, 
her narrators and characters very frequently make recourse to the idea, which encompassed 
for Austen an individual’s physiological and psychological health as well as a family’s 
financial security, collective moral strength, physical well-being, and social respectability: 
that is, constitution represented the political efficacy of both the individual and the family, 
which was transmitted to the next generation by—and thus absolutely dependent upon—the 
family’s legal heir. The imperatives of constitutional maintenance facing the Austens and 
every other British family of the Romantic period were writ large in the highly publicized 
story of the Hanoverian monarchy, the British royals whose turbulent family affairs 
amounted precisely to national politics. While Jane Austen was revising Sense and 
Sensibility and rewriting Pride and Prejudice on the eve of the British Regency, the 
Hanovers were, as Kristin Flieger Samuelian observes, suffering under the convergence of 
two ongoing constitutional crises: namely, the “sexual and fiscal misconduct of [George IV,] 
the Prince of Wales,” and King George III’s “bouts of dementia, the first of which occurred 
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without warning in 1788.”31 Additionally, Caroline of Brunswick—who, in the absence of “a 
suitable alternative German princess” had been selected as George IV’s wife—had by this 
time been separated from her husband for more than a decade.32 The Prince of Wales, who is 
said to have been in an advanced stage of inebriation at the royal wedding, and for most of 
the honeymoon, had been married secretly to the widow Maria Fitzherbert since 1795, an 
illegal union under the Royal Marriage Act, due to the bride’s Catholicism. George married 
Caroline legitimately—but merely as one of several conditions of his father’s helping him 
out of dire financial straits. Out of these unfortunate political circumstances, and mutual 
personal disgust, grew an intensifying rift between the royal husband and wife, and, in a will 
composed just before the 1796 birth of their only child, Princess Charlotte, George IV 
declared Mrs. Fitzherbert his only true wife, leaving “to her who is call’d the Princess of 
Wales” just one shilling (Smith, par. 4). Even at this somewhat early stage of the Hanoverian 
drama, therefore, Caroline and George IV’s faithless marriage raised serious questions about 
the stability of the royal family’s constitution and, consequently, their authority to govern. 
The couple’s separation was official in 1796, with Caroline removing first to Carlton 
House, and then to a rented home near Blackheath. This removal, however, did not limit her 
social valences, and Caroline is reported to have hosted during this period political men 
including Pitt, Eldon, Charles Grey, Spencer Perceval, Sir Thomas Lawrence and George 
Canning, allegedly conducting affairs with both Lawrence and Canning. In 1800 she met 
Admiral Sir Sidney, with whom she is believed to have had a third affair. Through him she 	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also was acquainted with Sir John and Lady Douglas, who would be her friends until a 
falling out in 1803, when Lady Douglas is supposed in 1802 to have been circulating rumors 
that Caroline secretly had borne a child outside of her marriage. Lady Douglas was probably 
lying, but public suspicion was aroused nevertheless by Caroline’s tendency to “adopt stray 
children” including one William Austin, who “was reputed to be her natural child.” (Smith, 
par. 5) In 1806, these allegations led to an official inquiry by the Crown known as the 
“delicate investigation,” which was an effort to expose the details of Caroline’s affairs and 
reported pregnancies so that George IV reasonably could divorce her before ascending the 
throne; Caroline’s sympathizers responded with equally detailed accounts of the Regent’s 
flagrant sexual misconduct. Lynn Hunt’s observation of monarchial power in early modern 
and enlightenment France—that hereditary monarchies required the mutual reproductive 
“functioning” of the king’s and queen’s bodies—is why real or perceived infidelities of 
George IV and Caroline of Brunswick were so destructive to public faith in the familial 
constitution of the royals: without the joint fidelity of the future king and queen, Great 
Britain could not be assured a legitimate heir to its throne.33 
The Hanovers’ apparent constitutional frailties were further complicated in 1810 with 
King George III’s renewed lapse into insanity, a private medical event that became fraught 
with public confusion. As Samuelian asks: 
Was the King mad or simply ill? Was his condition permanent or an episode? 
Moreover, how was the dementia to be interpreted? Was it, in the language of 
contemporary medical discourse, the result of an overtaxed system—a stamp 
of kingship, perhaps, but to that extent treatable? Or was it rather hereditary 	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lunacy, a family malady, equally significant of royalty but intractable? In 
either case, was it to be understood as transformative, occasioning an abrupt 
change of government during a period of increasing national and international 
upheaval? Or did it simply indicate a corrupt, vitiated or defunct system—a 
diseased body politic? (7) 
Just as the reproductive bodies of the Regent and his wife directly affected the Hanoverian 
succession and the political stability of Great Britain, so did the constitutional health of the 
King become an indicator of national wellbeing. The King’s recurred dementia also had 
weakened Caroline’s position at court, as she always had enjoyed her uncle’s favor; the 
queen, conversely, sided with her son. Caroline eventually would be excluded from court 
entirely, and it was only with great difficulty that she was able to visit her only daughter, 
Princess Charlotte. Later that year, Caroline left England for the continent, from whence 
reports of her intrigues were regularly dispatched to London by the Prince Regent’s paid 
spies (Smith, pars. 6, 7). All of this was done with a forward eye to a divorce trial, which 
commenced in 1820, when, at the death of his father, George IV was crowned king and 
Caroline returned to London, where she intended to be crowned queen but was barred from 
entering Westminster Abbey for the coronation. 
As this major constitutional upheaval dominated the national stage, Austen was 
exploring the maintenance of constitutions within a more local scope: “3 or 4 Families in a 
Country Village,” as she wrote famously to her niece, Anna (Letters 401). In Sense and 
Sensibility, begun in 1797, we learn that Marianne Dashwood “has not [her sister] Elinor’s 
constitution,” according to their stepbrother, John—an observation which underwrites the 
novel’s larger juxtaposition of the sisters’ characters: Elinor is sensible, contemplative, and 
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guarded to the point of repression—and her discourse in the novel exemplifies the 
“unaffected prose” Austen wrote of to her brother. Marianne, on the other hand, “has not 
such good health as her sister,” “is very nervous,” maintains clear imaginative commitments 
to romance, and is consistently more affected than Elinor in her self-expression (237). A 
strong constitution, at least in John Dashwood’s view, is equivalent to the kind of self-
possession that Elinor exercises for much of the novel and that Marianne sees, at least at first, 
as a deplorable form of insincerity. Fanny Dashwood, John Dashwood’s rapacious wife, also 
has a “good” constitution—one that permits her quick recovery from shocking news that her 
brother, Edward Ferrars, is engaged to the moneyless Lucy Steele instead of to “some Lord’s 
daughter,” who would have improved the Ferrars’s family constitution considerably (265, 
258). Elinor’s strong constitution likewise enables her to bear this same news—that Edward, 
whom she loves, is betrothed to another—in dignified silence for four months. “‘I would not 
have you suffer on my account,’” Elinor says to her constitutionally weaker sister, Marianne, 
in explanation of her secrecy: “‘I assure you,” she continues, “‘I no longer suffer materially 
myself.’” (263) Elinor’s use of the word “materially” is telling here, for it suggests that both 
the psychological and somatic elements of her constitution have suffered, and that she did not 
wish to transfer this suffering to her sister, whose constitution is more susceptible to 
emotional turmoil and its physiological consequences. Elinor’s capacity to bear her suffering 
in silence frequently has been interpreted as a “masculine” quality of her character, a reading 
underwritten by gendered conceptions of the nerves advanced in the eighteenth century by 
leading exponents of Newton and Locke. 
Elinor’s fear that she will transmit her pain to Marianne is grounded more broadly in 
the culture of sensibility’s intense preoccupation with physiological and psychic pain and the 
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possibility that human sympathy might transmit pain between bodies. “By the late eighteenth 
century,” Stephen Bruhm writes, “the physical had become one with the metaphysical in the 
medical body. What comes to be valorized by late eighteenth-century moralists as 
‘sympathy,’ then, is physiologically based.” 34  Janis Caldwell clarifies this point: 
[i]n the eighteenth century, as physical science gained authority, mechanical 
explanations were offered for sympathy, and a crude materialism began to 
stand in for the previously occult attributes of sympathy. […] David Hartley 
in psychology used the rhetoric of “vibrations” and “impressions” to describe 
the communication of physical units of feeling. Tiny packets of information 
“impressed” themselves on the senses, and set up vibrations in the “aether,” a 
supposedly airy substance flowing through the nerves.35 
Caldwell notes further that many of those who advocated a physiological view of sympathy 
also supported a belief in social sympathy, or “the literal transmission of sympathy from 
body to body” (31). For example, in A Treatise of Human Nature David Hume suggests that 
“a transition of passion” constitutes an act of moral sympathy (qtd. in Caldwell 32). And 
Robert Whytt, the eighteenth-century physician and staunch materialist, believed that moral 
feelings were as catching as disease:  
[t]here is a remarkable sympathy, by means of the nerves, between the various 
parts of the body; and now it appears that there is a still more wonderful 
sympathy between the nervous system of different persons whence various 
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motions and morbid symptoms are often transferred, without any corporal 
contact. (Qtd. in Caldwell 32) 
Adam Smith argued, however, in refutation of Hume’s and Whytt’s models of social 
sympathy, that fellow feeling was “not contagious,” that the five senses were the sole source 
of physiological pain, and that imagination alone permitted humans to understand the pain of 
others (Caldwell 33). Austen consistently complicates these theories of sympathy in Sense 
and Sensibility: Elinor does not at first reveal the truth of Edward and Lucy’s engagement 
because she knows that Marianne’s sensibility has powers of pathologic proportion, which 
eventually do overthrow her constitutional health. Though Elinor later tells Marianne this 
information, we learn from Marianne that she never has exercised the sympathy Elinor 
believes her to possess: “But you,” Marianne explains to Elinor, “—you above all […] had 
been wronged by me. I, and only I, knew your heart and its sorrows; yet, to what did it 
influence me—not to any compassion that could benefit you or myself” (346). That is: 
Marianne’s sensibility has no “benefit” to herself or others. This deep ambivalence about the 
social functions of sympathy is a powerful undercurrent in Austen’s fiction, which, as we 
will see in this study’s third chapter, became a foundational motif of her final fragment, 
Sanditon. 
As we have previously observed, the eighteenth-century culture of sensibility found 
its clearest expression in a literature of sentimentality, commonly the novel: “[t]he novel was 
first in establishing ‘sentimental fashion’ […] because ‘the disconnection of its form from 
precedent […] allowed it to explore most extravagantly the powers of a language of feeling’” 
(Mullan qtd. in Barker-Benfield xix). In Sense and Sensibility, Austen adapts the novel’s 
discourse yet again to juxtapose Marianne’s sentimental “language of feeling” with Elinor’s 
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“unaffected prose,” and the plot of the novel is constituted largely by the complex 
interactions of these two narrative modes with Elinor’s anti-sentimentalism (her “sense”) 
finally, though imperfectly, subsuming Marianne’s sentimentalism (her “sensibility”). As 
Marilyn Butler has written: 
[w]riters of the 1790s [including the apprentice Jane Austen] looked back on 
their [sentimentalist] predecessors of the earlier generation, and saw 
subversion in work that in its day was at most mildly reformist. Even 
progressives in 1790 had their doubts about some of the disturbing 
implications of mid-century psychology [most famously, Wollstonecraft’s 
rejection of the eighteenth century’s gendered nervous system]. But by far the 
most numerous and influential of the attacks on sentiment came from the 
swelling ranks of political and religious orthodoxy. With some justice, and 
much exaggeration, the sentimentalists came to be read as moral relativists 
who threatened to undermine established religion and society. The anti-
sentimental writing of Jane Austen has been taken as primarily a burlesque of 
a style; but essentially it was the absorption of the earlier movement.36 
In Sense and Sensibility, for example, Austen absorbs the eighteenth-century sentimental 
tradition both by burlesquing it in Marianne’s character and acknowledging its power in 
Regency culture: Marianne’s sensibility, after all, has real consequences for her physiological 
constitution. In fact, Austen’s uncharacteristically serious treatment of Marianne’s illness is 
probably the clearest indicator in her early oeuvre that she could not simply parody the 
implications eighteenth-century psychology still held in Regency-era life. 	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While sense and sensibility are, in Austen’s view, important regulators of individual 
constitutions, pride and prejudice maintain the corporate constitutions of family and class, 
chiefly through the institution of marriage. Acute social, financial, and psychological 
pressures attend corporate constitutional maintenance, as is demonstrated by the difficulties 
of Austen’s heroines on the marriage market. These difficulties become perhaps most clear in 
Pride and Prejudice when Elizabeth Bennet, a member of the lesser gentry, aspires to marry 
Fitzwilliam Darcy, the richest man in Austen’s oeuvre: “Are the shades of Pemberley to be 
thus polluted,” exclaims Darcy’s wealthy aunt, Lady Catherine de Bourgh, at this prospect 
(357). The obstacle Lady Catherine sees to a marriage between Elizabeth and her nephew is 
clarified by her belief that Darcy should instead marry her daughter, Anne: “My daughter and 
my nephew are formed for each other,” Lady Catherine insists to Elizabeth, “[t]hey are 
descended, on the maternal side, from the same noble line; and, on the father’s, from 
respectable, honourable, and ancient—though untitled—families. Their fortune on both sides 
is splendid.” (356) In Lady Catherine’s view, Elizabeth is an ineligible match for Darcy not 
because of her family’s relative poverty, but because (especially since Lydia’s scandalous 
elopement) the Bennets do not enjoy the constitutional purity represented by the Darcy and 
de Bourgh pedigrees, whose ancient Norman surnames, noble blood, and “honour” are 
augmented by enormous wealth. Lady Catherine’s argument to Elizabeth is essentially 
Edmund Burke’s from Reflections Upon the Revolution in France (1790). Both Burke and 
Lady de Bourgh (we should note Austen’s echo of Burke’s own Norman surname) situate 
property as the only material reality capable, in Pocock’s phrase, of “spanning generations 
and permitting the living to succeed the dead in a real and natural order,” thus preserving the 
ancient balance of the British constitution in which the de Bourgh and Darcy families enjoy a 
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mythologized “ancient” ethnicity—and the consolidation of wealth with the constitutional 
purity such an ethnicity represents (463). 
Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice, like all of Austen’s major novels, are 
set at the end of one generational cycle and at the cusp of the next, when these mythologized 
ideals of class and familial constitutions are at their most unstable: nubile daughters enter the 
marriage market to be courted by eligible bachelors, often under the conflicting pressures of 
both families’ expectations. “For the landed families, the goal was to protect family estates 
against attrition through debts or taxation,” Mary Poovey explains. “For families of the 
middle classes, the immediate goal was to acquire land, and […] establish the family name as 
‘one of England’s first’” through the acquisition of a title.37 As the eighteenth century wore 
on, the influx of wealthy tradesmen’s daughters into the marriage market drove up the price 
of husbands and decreased the value of marriageable women (Poovey 12-13). The difficult 
financial positions of Austen’s early heroines fall in line with this history: as members of the 
lesser gentry—neither the titled aristocracy nor the newly wealthy mercantile classes—they 
often are outmatched by men and outdone by other women on the marriage market. And yet, 
precisely these market pressures allow Austen’s heroines fuller knowledge of themselves. 
Elizabeth’s famous description of newfound self-understanding—“Till this moment I never 
knew myself”—is in fact her response to Darcy’s revelation of George Wickham’s past, 
which exposes Wickham’s “hatefully mercenary” attentions to the wealthy Miss King (208, 
207). As J. A. Downie has observed, “much of the frisson of Emma,” is produced as well by 
the aristocratic heroine’s responses “to people like the Westons, the Eltons, the Coles, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen (Chicago: The University of Chiacago Press), pp. 11-12. 
	   43	  
above all, decayed gentlewomen like Miss Bates and her niece, Jane Fairfax,” whose 
financial situations are similar to those of the Bennet and the Dashwood sisters (80). 
These formative pressures of the marriage market, while advancing the 
characterological development of Austen’s heroines, also produce the major ruptures in the 
novels’ social fabric, like Lady Catherine’s high-handed objection to what she supposes is 
Elizabeth’s engagement to Darcy—ruptures that are figured as conflicts between individual, 
familial, and class constitutions. This discursive technique is made possible because Austen 
often signifies class in the novels not only by wealth but by health. Invalids like Emma’s Mr. 
Woodhouse and Pride and Prejudice’s “sickly and cross” heiress, Miss Anne de Bourgh, 
constitute Austen’s clutch of sensitive hypochondriacs, whose self-styled or rumored (but 
likely not actual) bad health is a product of their free time and rampant consumerism (158). 
Gerald Newman convincingly has argued that this upper-class malaise—a dubious effect of 
the culture of sensibility—was, in the late eighteenth century, seen not only as a blight to 
individual and family constitutions, but as the root cause of Britain’s national constitutional 
decline and attendant political turmoil.38 Thus in Austen’s work only the very foolish are 
likely to provide sympathy for the overwrought sensibilities of hypochondriacs: “She is a 
most charming young lady, indeed,” Mr. Collins boasts to the Bennets of Anne de Bourgh. 
He continues: 
Lady Catherine herself says that, in point of true beauty, Miss de Bourgh is far 
superior to the handsomest of her sex; because there is that in her features 
which marks the young woman of distinguished birth. She is unfortunately of 
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a sickly constitution, which has prevented her making that progress in many 
accomplishments which she could not otherwise have failed of. (67) 
Anne’s “sickly constitution,” in Collins’s ingratiating rhetoric, is subordinated to her noble 
“features,” showing that, for him and his patroness, “distinguished birth,” marked on the 
surface, is more important than the substance of health and “accomplishments.” Austen of 
course rejects this view in Pride and Prejudice first by giving it to Mr. Collins and finally by 
awarding Darcy to the constitutionally healthy Elizabeth Bennet, who reads extensively, 
walks everywhere, and plays well at the pianoforte. Though George C. Grinell recently has 
argued persuasively that hypochondria became a powerful Romantic-period rhetoric for 
understanding institutional pressures on the individual body, Austen tends to relegate this 
entire discourse to caricature.39 Austen’s letters to Cassandra about their mother’s 
hypochondria parallel the novels’ disdain for suspected malingerers: “My mother continues 
hearty, her appetite & nights are very good, but her Bowels are still not entirely settled, & she 
sometimes complains of an Asthma, a Dropsy, Water in her Chest & a Liver disorder.” 
(Letters 39) In this litany we hear perhaps a subtle parody between sisters of their mother’s 
complaints: as James Thompson observes, in her fiction as in life, “Austen it seems has no 
compassion for sickness that lacks symptoms.”40 
When Jane Austen glances in the novels “across the gulf,” in Virginia Woolf’s 
phrase, to the working classes, it is to note symptoms of their failing constitutions.41 The very 
poor often become visible exclusively through their fevers, their coughs, and their 	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consumptions: Fanny Price’s humbler beginnings in Mansfield Park register in the foul air of 
Portsmouth, where her unhealthy relatives live in squalid conditions; the poor become visible 
in Emma when Emma and Harriet venture outside Highbury to visit “sickness and poverty 
together” (86). The melodramatic tableau of Eliza Brandon and Eliza Williams in Sense and 
Sensibility equates constitutional decay with social decline. The unwell poor, like wealthy 
hypochondriacs, have in Austen very little chance of recovery, or of characterological 
development. 
But between the very wealthy and the very poor in Austen’s oeuvre there are a set of 
characters whose constitutional health is more variable, more egalitarian, and more involved 
in the novels’ narrative development. It is from this group that Austen draws her heroines, 
whose individual constitutions are responsible for their recovery in times of illness as well as 
their social elevation in marriage. Accordingly, the major illness episodes of the early novels 
are initiated by social pressures, which attend a marriage market stilted by rank and wealth: 
Marianne’s putrid fever in Sense and Sensibility is an effect of Willoughby’s abandoning her 
for Miss Grey’s £50,000, and Jane comes down with a bad cold in the opening chapters of 
Pride and Prejudice because her fortune-hunting mother sends her out in the rain to 
Netherfield, the home of Charles Bingley, in the hope that Jane will marry him, thereby 
gaining his £5,000 per annum. Even Harriet Smith’s sore throat in Emma occasions her 
disappointment over Mr. Elton, though their mismatched social rank has yet to be exposed. 
That thwarted marriage prospects tend to produce illness highlights a clear relationship in 
Austen’s fiction between constitutional health and social advancement. 
As medical historians Vladimir Janković and Roy and Dorothy Porter have argued, 
late eighteenth-century understandings of health situated exposure—to bad air, to dampness, 
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to excessive warmth, to the weather outside—as the chief threat to individual constitutions. 
With the eighteenth-century invention of indoor comfort, and its aggressive 
commercialization, Britons became increasingly able to control their contact with the 
elements: “[e]ntrepreneurs responded by providing better sash windows, improved heating 
methods, and newly introduced ventilation. The general public gradually took to using 
umbrellas and rainproof garments.” (Janković 3) Letters between Jane and Cassandra Austen 
attest to the very normal, even mundane, practice of managing one’s contact with the out-of-
doors: frequently dinner plans are rearranged and social engagements canceled because “the 
weather [was] too bad”; alternatively, favorable conditions encourage ventures beyond the 
home: “cloudy and perfectly cool” mornings, for example, make for “very pleasant” driving. 
(Letters 7) The necessity of constantly managing one’s exposure to all these disease-inducing 
conditions was underlined by the sheer commonness of poor health during the period: “Every 
body is ill,” Keats explained straightforwardly to his sister Fanny in 1820.42 
Exposure, then, was the primary means by which one’s constitution could be 
destroyed. As Roy and Dorothy Porter note, “[a]ltitude, the lie of the land, exposure to winds, 
the composition and porosity of the soil, landscape features such as rivers, forests, lakes, and 
mountains, proximity to the sea—all these were believed to impinge on health, and thus 
critical when choosing a residence or travelling” (In Sickness and in Health 156). We can 
see, therefore, that Marianne is taking a great personal risk when she, in her dejection over 
Willoughby in the final volume of Sense and Sensibility, goes walking in those “most distant 
parts” of the woods around Cleveland, where “the grass was the longest and wettest.” (305-6) 
Austen’s contemporaries in fact believed that 	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[t]racts of marshy ground were particularly to be avoided: Romney Marsh, the 
Thames flats, and the Fens were notorious for ague or marsh fever. Elevated 
land, by contrast, was seen as relatively healthy, away from the miasmas 
exuded by standing waters, and fanned by refreshing summer breezes. (Porter 
and Porter 156) 
Austen, too, knew the necessity of constitutional maintenance: she reports to her sister 
Cassandra that the Austens’ neighbor, Mrs. Lefroy, traveling in Bath, has called on the 
Mapletons, and found their son, Christian, “still in a very bad state of health, consumptive, 
and not likely to recover.” (Letters 28) This attitude appears in the fiction as well. John 
Dashwood explains to Elinor that Marianne will never regain her youthful “bloom” after her 
constitution has been ruined by fever: 
[a]t her time of life, any thing of an illness destroys the bloom for ever! Hers 
has been a very short one! She was as handsome a girl last September, as I 
ever saw; and as likely to attract the men. There was something in her style of 
beauty to please them particularly. I remember Fanny used to say that she 
would marry sooner and better than you did […]. I question whether Marianne 
now, will marry a man worth more than five or six hundred a-year, at the 
utmost, and I am very much deceived if you do not do better. (227, Austen’s 
emphasis) 
Here, Marianne’s decline is not merely the failure of her constitution; rather, her destroyed 
bloom at this critical “time of life”—that is, the intergenerational period while Marianne is 
seeking a husband—will cause her market value, in pounds, to plummet considerably. As 
John Mullan has argued, the “precariousness” of this intergenerational period is owing partly 
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to eighteenth-century medical understandings of menstruation, which in unmarried women 
signaled a “condition in the bodies of those for whom womanhood [did] not mean the life of 
the fertile, domesticated, married female,” but rather existence in a “palpitating, sensitized 
body […] caught in the difficult area between childhood and marriage.”43 This “difficult 
area” was fraught with private physiological dilemmas (mainly the possibility of 
unsanctioned pregnancy) and public market pressures. “John Dashwood’s direct calculations 
of Marianne and Elinor’s prospects (their exchange value in marriage)” operate, Thompson 
notes, according to “a principle of economic competition in a sexual marketplace” (26). The 
female British body thus enters the political economy, where its levels of physiological 
exposure—and thus, its constitution—produce its market value. 
The concept of exposure also has critical social valences in Austen’s oeuvre. 
Frequently characters are said to have their feelings or understanding exposed publicly: 
Elinor Dashwood, for example, refuses to expose herself or Edward Ferrars to the distress of 
“Marianne’s mistaken warmth” before Marianne knows that Edward is engaged to Lucy 
Steele, and not to her sister (245). Darcy admits to Elizabeth during their verbal sparring at 
Netherfield that he has sought to avoid “those weaknesses that often expose a strong 
understanding [his strong understanding, that is] to ridicule.” (57) At the Netherfield ball, 
Mr. Collins approaches Darcy in conversation, and Elizabeth is “vexed” to see Collins 
“expose” himself in such a way that, through their family connection, exposes her as well to 
Darcy’s “unrestrained wonder.” (98) Who is able to expose whom in these scenes tells us a 
great deal about the social hierarchies produced by individual, class, and familial 
constitutions: Elinor is sensible enough to control her levels of exposure; similarly, Darcy is 	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aware of his potential for exposure, and he studiously avoids all possibility of it; Elizabeth, 
bound as she is to Collins as his cousin, has no power to affect her own exposure in this 
instance, just as she is powerless to limit her family’s exposure when Lydia elopes with 
Wickham. While individuals can exercise some control over their own constitutional 
exposure, Austen acknowledges that they nevertheless have little power over exposure 
effected by members of their families. 
More often, however, the term “exposure” is used in the novels to connote the 
potentially compromising display in public of romantic attention; thus, it is a requisite social 
danger borne primarily but not exclusively by the women in Austen’s novels as they enter the 
marriage market. Yet necessary as it is, exposure is strictly to be avoided: “Austen certainly 
does not recommend imprudent or premature display of affection,” Thompson notes, 
“Marianne Dashwood’s openness with Willoughby being the obvious case in point.” (55) Mr. 
Bennet’s famous last words to Elizabeth—before Lydia leaves for Brighton, from whence 
she scandalously will elope with Wickham—suggest both the peril and necessity of social 
exposure: “Lydia,” explains Mr. Bennet with a note of doom he cannot hear, “will never be 
easy until she has exposed herself in some public place or other, and we can never expect her 
to do it with so little expense or inconvenience to her family as under the present 
circumstances.” (230) Austen herself knew well the consequences of exposure. In the earliest 
of her surviving correspondence, composed in January of 1796, she wrote to Cassandra: 
You scold me so much in the nice long letter which I have this 
moment received from you, that I am almost afraid to tell you how my Irish 
friend and I behaved. Imagine to yourself everything most profligate and 
shocking in the way of dancing and sitting down together. I can expose 
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myself, however, only once more, because he leaves the country soon after 
next Friday, on which day we are to have a dance at Ashe after all. He is very 
gentlemanlike, good-looking, pleasant young man, I assure you. But as to our 
having ever met, except at the three last balls, I cannot say much; for he is so 
excessively laughed at about me at Ashe, that he is ashamed of coming to 
Steventon, and ran away when we called on Mrs. Lefroy a few days ago. 
(Letters 1-2, Austen’s emphasis) 
While it is difficult to gauge the tone of this private correspondence, we can say with some 
certainty that the giddy hyperbole of the passage’s opening lines gives way to an embarrassed 
reserve at having overexposed herself, and Tom Lefroy, to the company at Manydown 
House, where she stood up to dance with him not once, the letter intimates, but three times. 
Of this same letter Claire Tomalin also notes Jane’s “provocative” revelation to Cassandra in 
a subsequent passage that she and Tom Lefroy have discussed Tom Jones together, letting 
her sister know “just how free and even bold their conversation has been” (117). There is an 
open-ended but palpable kind of disappointment at the conclusion of the above quoted 
paragraph, however, for Jane and Tom have had only public meetings at the balls at Ashe; 
something like a threat of further exposure seems to have prompted Tom to flee the more 
intimate scrutiny of his aunt’s drawing room in Steventon, and Austen never reports another 
significant interaction with him. 
 Lurking behind this peculiar threat of exposure in the mere sitting down and standing 
up with a dancing partner is the pariah of the fallen woman, whose lapse in sexual propriety 
and, normally, extramarital pregnancy represent an absolute social failure, which 
compromises individual, familial, and class constitutions. Mr. Collins’s letter to Mr. Bennet, 
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for example, castigates Lydia for her disappearance, unmarried, into London with Wickham: 
“this false step in one daughter,” Collins writes, “will be injurious to the fortunes of all the 
others; for who, as Lady Catherine herself condescendingly says, will connect themselves 
with such a family?” (297) We have come to expect and discount this moralizing position 
from Collins, but the constitutional consequences of a misstep like Lydia’s are in fact very 
real: even with Darcy’s intervention—and his laying by of a considerable amount of 
money—Lydia is significantly distanced from her family following her elopement, the novel 
finally suggesting that she never will be fully recuperated to life at Longbourn. 
The fallen woman is the antithesis to a figure Poovey famously has called “the Proper 
Lady.” By the end of the eighteenth century, the Proper Lady was a “comforting and salutary 
figure” whose “desires bent gracefully to her master’s will” (3). The Proper Lady was not, in 
Poovey’s view, merely an invention of male desire, but an ideal of female delicacy adopted 
by men and women alike: the early English feminist, Mary Astell, “proposed her female 
seminary,” Poovey explains, “in part to shelter heiresses ‘till a convenient Match be offer’d 
by her Friends […] Modesty requiring that a Woman should not love before Marriage, but 
only make choice of one whom she can love hereafter.’” (Qtd. in Poovey 3-4) Here modesty 
requires not only the suppression of passion but the avoidance of exposure literally, through 
confinement. 
Exposure was a critical social index during the period because, in a time when 
paternity was impossible to establish absolutely, female chastity was the sole guarantor of a 
constitutionally pure male line, as in the royal case of George IV and Caroline of Brunswick. 
Thus, female chastity also was essential—under the old Roman system of coverture and the 
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new system of capital—for the rightful consolidation of a man’s wealth and power, whether 
or not he was to be king: 
[e]specially for Protestant members of the rising middle classes, property was 
a visible sign of a man’s inner worth. And, for everyone, property was the 
source of present income, the measure of social prestige, the basis of political 
power, and the legacy that carried a man’s name beyond his grave. (Poovey 5) 
Malthus argued that these financial imperatives were underwritten by powerful psychic 
drives: “the desire to realize a fortune as a permanent provision for a family is perhaps the 
most general motive for the continued exertions of those whose incomes depend upon their 
own personal skill and efforts.” (471) Under these economic, cultural, and psychological 
pressures, wives who were unfaithful to their husbands posed a distinct “challenge” to the 
delicate web of familial, class, and national constitutions (Poovey 5). In Émile, Rousseau 
puts this fine point on the idea: 
[c]an any position be more wretched than that of the unhappy father who, 
when he clasps his child to his breast, is haunted by the suspicion that this is 
the child of another, the badge of his own dishonour, a thief who is robbing 
his own children of their inheritance. Under such circumstances the family is 
little more than a group of secret enemies, armed against each other by a 
guilty woman.44 
Johnson would put the matter more directly to Boswell: “[w]e hang a thief for stealing a 
sheep; but the unchastity of a woman transfers sheep, and farm, and all, from the right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, trans. Barbara Foxley (New York: Dutton/Everyman, 1974), pp. 324-25. 
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owner.”45 In Malthus’s view, the maintenance of land among the aristocracy—which 
depended absolutely upon the chastity of women—was tied intimately to national 
constitutional maintenance: “[i]t is an historical truth which cannot for a moment be 
disputed,” he writes, vaguely echoing Pride and Prejudice’s famous opening sentence, “that 
the first formation, and subsequent preservation and improvement, of our present 
constitution, and of the liberties and privileges which have so long distinguished Englishmen, 
are mainly due to a landed aristocracy.” (437) Thus, female chastity—figured as Poovey’s 
Proper Lady—becomes critical to national systems of inheritance, and to the British 
constitution itself; the fallen woman becomes a public threat. 
 In Austen’s oeuvre, this threat is realized most explicitly in Colonel Brandon’s back 
story in Sense and Sensibility of Eliza Brandon and of her daughter, Eliza Williams, which he 
relates to Elinor in hope of lessening Marianne’s regret over Willoughby, following his cruel 
abandonment of her. The first Eliza is Brandon’s young love who, after their interrupted 
elopement, becomes the unhappy wife of Brandon’s older brother, takes up with another 
man, and finally divorces her husband, resorting at last, is the implication, to prostitution; as 
Brandon explains to Elinor: “I could not trace her beyond her first seducer, and there was 
every reason to fear that she had removed from him only to sink deeper in a life of sin.” (207) 
After Eliza Brandon dies of “a consumption” with Brandon attending at her bedside, Brandon 
adopts Eliza’s three-year-old daughter, Eliza Williams, as his ward (207).46 But she, “the 
offspring of [her mother’s] first guilty connection,” also is doomed to a life of disgrace: on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 James Boswell, Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides, ed. Allan Wendt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin/Riverside, 
1965), p. 250. 
46 Marie McAllister has argued that this “consumption” is Austen’s euphemism for syphilis. While the medical 
diagnosis of fictional characters is technically problematic, McAllister’s assessment that constitutional decline 
springs from sexual impropriety is correct. Marie E. McAllister, “‘Only to Sink Deeper’: Venereal Disease in 
Sense and Sensibility,” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 17.1 (2004), pp. 87-110. 
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holiday in Bath with a friend, Eliza meets and runs away with Willoughby, who later leaves 
her “in a situation of utmost distress, with no creditable home, no help, no friends, ignorant 
of his address!” (208, 209) While constitutional purity is heritable according to characters 
like Lady Catherine de Bourgh, Brandon’s story suggests that the variety of constitutional 
decline represented by the fallen woman is multigenerational as well. 
These stories of female exposure—Eliza Brandon’s catastrophic marriage and her 
daughter’s affair with Willoughby and resulting pregnancy—often have been regarded by 
critics as “melodramatic, digressive, structurally problematic,” and interpreted variously as 
“an echo of Clarissa, as a doubling of the Marianne plot, as a lens through which to view 
Brandon or Marianne or Willoughby or Elinor or Edward (or Jane Austen herself),” as well 
as “a metaphor for death by venereal disease.” (McAllister 87-88) These readings can be 
consolidated by seeing the tableau of the two Elizas as Austen’s purposeful bracketing, or 
“absorbing,” to use Butler’s term, of the fallen woman narrative in order to replace it with a 
new form represented at large by Sense and Sensibility and, later, by Pride and Prejudice, in 
which constitutionally-sound heroines live beyond the end of the novel in spite of their own 
exposure—to the emotional pain of unrequited love and the social disgraces of disappointed 
marriage prospects. This absorption of clichéd eighteenth-century forms is a compositional 
method Austen had been practicing at least since 1789, when she began her critique of gothic 
novels in Northanger Abbey. 
The fallen woman narrative abounded in the literature of sensibility before and during 
the period of Austen’s life. Most often, as we have noted, the fallen woman was—before her 
constitutional decline—a figure of “virtue in distress, the virtue a woman’s and the distress 
caused by a man” (Barker-Benfield xviii). These men were, like Austen’s John Willoughby 
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and George Wickham, “liars, cheats, frauds, hypocrites, rogues, and sadists”—figures of 
sexual violence against whom Mary Wollstonecraft had warned in A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, where she denounced conceptions of human desire underwritten by 
women’s identification with the victim in the “victim/rake dyad” (Barker-Benfield 221). 
Samuel Richardson’s 1748 novel, Clarissa, represents the most popular and extensive 
treatment of this theme, in which the plot’s persistent action is Clarissa’s constitutional 
decline and ruin at the hands of Lovelace. Some cult of sensibility readers, like Anna Laetitia 
Barbauld, found Clarissa’s distress enjoyable—even inspiring. Writing in 1773, Barbauld 
explains: 
[a]mid scenes of suffering which rend the heart, in poverty, in a prison, under 
the most shocking outrages, the grace and delicacy of her character never 
suffers […]: [her] charm prevents her from receiving a stain from anything 
that happens; and Clarissa, abandoned, and undone, is the object not only of 
complacence, but veneration. (Qtd. in Barker-Benfield 339) 
The important paradox of Barbauld’s formulation is that though Clarissa’s psychic and 
physiological distress—which includes being raped by Lovelace—“rend[s] the heart” of the 
reader, Clarissa’s “character never suffers.” Barbauld’s elision of Clarissa’s constitutional 
ruin is one that Austen would qualify in her representation of Marianne Dashwood, who, as 
we will see, makes only a limited physical and social recovery from her role as a heroine of 
sensibility. 
Other examples of the fallen woman are plentiful: the anonymous 1732 novel, Love à 
la Mode: or, the Amours of Florella and Phillis, follows the spectacular decline of Phillis, 
who is forced into prostitution following her kidnapping and rape, finally dying of “a 
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Consumption”—but not before a deathbed speech in which she warns other young women of 
the perils of prostitution, which can lead only to “Ruine and Death.”47 Elizabeth Helme’s The 
Farmer of Inglewood Forest, originally published in 1796, was another popular novel 
featuring the degradation of Emma, a farmer’s daughter who, following her seduction by a 
profligate married man, becomes a prostitute, and later gives birth to the sickly daughter of 
one of her customers, “an emaciated debauchee”: “I began to find my health uncommonly 
disordered, as well as that of my child,” Emma relates, “and soon discovered that her pure 
blood was contaminated as well as my own, in consequence of the acquaintance I had so 
lately formed.”48 As with Austen’s Elizas, a damaged constitution is passed from fallen 
mother to daughter; in Emma’s case, however, it is explicitly a blood-borne affliction, 
suggesting a materialist conflation of the moral with the physiological, one of the hallmarks 
of the cult of sensibility. In 1800 Emma’s story was republished with the superadded tale of 
Kitty Clark, who, according to the work’s lengthy title, “Left her Uncle’s House, and entered 
into a Licentious Course of gay Living with a Noble Lord: After whose Death she underwent 
a variety of Scenes; and at length died an object of the utmost Misery, and universal 
Detestation.”49 Like the gothic novel, overwrought material like this was, for Austen, an 
invitation to travesty. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Love à la Mode: or, the Amours of Florella and Phillis (London: J. Roberts, 1732), p. 56. 
48 Elizabeth Helme, The Farmer of Inglewood Forest; Or, an Affecting Portrait of Virtue and Vice (London: G. 
Virtue, 1825), p. 417. 
49 The history of Emma […] To which is added the life of the abandoned Kitty Clark […] (London: S. Fisher 
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In response to this invitation Austen produced a measured narrative mode that 
burlesqued the cult of sensibility while acknowledging the power of its cultural currency. As 
Colonel Brandon tells Elinor the overblown story of the two Elizas in Sense and Sensibility, 
he is made noticeably uncomfortable by its clichés and melodrama, as well as the strange role 
these discursive modes are suddenly playing in his formerly decorous relationship with the 
Dashwoods: “[y]ou will find me a very awkward narrator,” he confesses to Elinor at the 
outset. But he also has no other available genre in which to tell the Elizas’s stories: “I hardly 
know where to begin,” he adds, and so the narrative commences (204). After Brandon 
narrates a potboiler series of events to Elinor’s uncharacteristically stagy gasps and 
exclamations, he concludes his tale of woe with nothing less than a duel between himself and 
Willoughby: “Eliza had confessed to me, though most reluctantly, the name of her lover; and 
when he returned to town […] we met by appointment; he to defend, I to punish his conduct. 
We returned unwounded, and the meeting, therefore, never got abroad.” (211) Austen is just 
barely taking Brandon seriously here, and even Elinor sighs “over [his] fancied necessity of 
this.” (211) Placed suggestively at the very end of Brandon’s story, Austen’s ambiguous 
“this” comes to signify both the duel and the entire sensational tableau. The real necessity of 
Brandon’s narrative digression, however, is that it allows Austen to, in the remaining pages 
of Sense and Sensibility, draw Marianne as a revision to the fallen woman represented by the 
two Elizas. That Austen intends Marianne as a programmatic variation on this theme is 
signaled subtly at the beginning of the novel when “a false step” (41) on wet grass causes 
Marianne literally to fall down a hill, where she meets Willoughby for the first time. “False 
step” is the phrase both Mary Bennet and Mr. Collins will use in Pride and Prejudice to 
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describe Lydia’s scandalous elopement with Wickham, which initiates her fallen condition 
(289, 297). 
Austen poses Marianne even more overtly as a revision of the Romantic figure of 
Crazy Jane, the Anglo-Irish stereotype of the jilted woman pining unto death for love that 
Wordsworth explored with the figure of Martha Ray in “The Thorn” and that Yeats would 
immortalize a little more than century later in his poetry. For the Romantics, Crazy Jane—
sometimes adapted as Crazy Kate or Crazy Ann—was closely related to the figure of “virtue 
in distress” and, according to Elaine Showalter, the “most popular of the wronged Romantic 
madwomen.”50 Originally a gothic character developed by Matthew “Monk” Lewis in a 1793 
ballad, she is “a poor servant girl who, abandoned by her lover or bereft of him through 
death, goes mad as a result” (Showalter 11). Around 1800, an anonymous tune called “The 
Birth of Crazy Jane” and a number of variations on it appeared in London, detailing the 
springtime birth of a beautiful girl, Jane, who comes of age in grace and beauty until the 
autumn of her life when new sexual knowledge occasions a “true fondness unrequited” and 
her “faithful passion slighted,” which ultimately drives the “hapless” heroine to “frenzy.”51 
Though Crazy Jane almost never represents the acute sexual impropriety of the fallen 
woman and its direct threat to the British constitution, her symptoms suggest a “sexual 
identity” consistent with what Eve Sedgwick famously has called “the masturbating girl,” an 
eighteenth-century female figure who exhibits symptoms of autoeroticism. In 1758, Samuel 
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Tissot describes these symptoms as “the impairment of memory and the senses,” “inability to 
confine the attention,” and “an air of distraction, embarrassment and stupidity.”52 Crazy 
Jane’s sexual “frenzy,” madness, and consequent wandering also situate her distinctly outside 
of familial, class, and national constitutions—and sometimes even as a woman apart from 
herself. Doomed to isolation and grief, exposure is her chronic condition, and, like the 
autoerotic described by Tissot, Crazy Jane becomes, in Eve Sedgwick’s phrase, a figure of 
“amnesia, repetition or the repetition-compulsion, and ahistorical or history-rupturing 
rhetorics of sublimity” (820).  
The Oxford English Dictionary’s first two senses of onanism are important to 
clarifying the relationship among Marianne Dashwood, Sedgewick’s “masturbating girl,” and 
the British constitution: the first definition is masturbation and the second is coitus 
interruptus, both stemming from Onan’s non-reproductive sexual act in the Old Testament, 
which, in its failure of levirate marriage obligations, disrupts the constitution of the tribes of 
Judah.53 Sedgwick’s argument about autoeroticism in Sense and Sensibility is important, but 
onanism’s latter definition also is consistent with Crazy Jane’s (and Marianne Dashwood’s) 
sexual dilemma, for it denotes the discontinuation of a sexual—or potentially sexual—
relationship. Crazy Jane’s sexual interruption, like Onan’s, means total separation from the 
tribe: Romantic artists Thomas Barker, George Shepheard, and Richard Dadd thus painted 
Crazy Jane alone, exposed to the weather on an inhospitable British landscape with her hair 
and dress in varying degrees of disarray. Most tellingly, George Shepheard’s 1815 painting 
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53 “onanism, n.” OED Online. June 2012. Oxford University Press. 
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situates a Crazy Jane figure, “Crazy Kate,” overlooking the ocean, sitting precariously at the 
nation’s edge, gazing longingly out to sea to that which is not Britain.54 
Signaling the popularity of this myth, spin-off literary works about the death and 
haunting of Crazy Jane would follow Lewis’s ballad, perhaps most famously in Sarah 
Wilkinson’s 1813 chapbook The 
Tragical History of Miss Jane Arnold, 
Commonly Called Crazy Jane, and Mr. 
Henry Perceval, Giving an Account of 
Their Birth, Parentage, Courtship, and 
Melancholy End, Founded on Facts, in 
which Jane pines melodramatically, and 
at length, for her lost love: “[s]he would 
sing the most plaintive airs, and converse with those who addressed her about her lover. She 
would dress her head with willow straw, and wild flowers, disposed in a fanciful style; and 
this seemed to be the only amusement that soothed her mind.” (Qtd. in Showalter 13) Clearly 
Austen places Marianne in this role the day after her parting with Willoughby; the details are 
so exact, they are worth quoting fully: 
[Marianne] was awake the whole night, and she wept the greatest part of it. 
She got up with a headache, was unable to talk, and unwilling to take any 
nourishment; giving pain every moment to her mother and sisters, and 
forbidding all attempt at consolation from either. […] When breakfast was 
over she walked out by herself, and wandered about the village of Allenham, 	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indulging the recollection of past enjoyment, and crying over the present 
reverse for the chief of the morning. The evening passed off in the equal 
indulgence of feeling. She played over every favourite song that she had been 
used to play to Willoughby, every air in which their voices had been oftenest 
joined […]. She spent whole hours at the piano-forte, alternatively singing and 
crying; her voice often totally suspended by her tears. (83) 
Marianne, like Crazy Jane, is a direct descendent of Shakespeare’s lovesick and deranged 
Ophelia, who often appeared on the Romantic stage with twigs and straw in her hair, 
suggesting her exposure to the elements and, therefore, an explicitly public form of 
melancholy, in which only the out-of-doors—the moors, fields, cliffs, and beaches—are large 
enough to contain the despondent heroine’s grief (Showalter 11). It is perhaps not by 
accident that the actress Kate Winslet has played both Ophelia and Marianne Dashwood in 
our own time.55 
Like the fallen woman and Crazy Jane, Marianne’s physiological and social exposure 
always are yoked: her twisted ankle occasions her introduction to the libertine Willoughby; 
his final betrayal, which breaks Marianne’s heart and momentarily forecloses her prospects 
of social advancement through marriage, leads to the fever that almost kills her. The clearest 
instance of Marianne’s social exposure, however, comes at a London party, where the 
Dashwood sisters meet Willoughby after a long period of his silence to Marianne. 
Willoughby, recently disinherited of the estate at Combe Magna by his cousin, Mrs. Smith, 	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for his liaison with Eliza Williams, and at the party with his wealthy new fiancée, Miss Grey, 
“evidently struggl[es] for composure” when Marianne finally approaches him. As 
Willoughby oscillates between poise and alarm, Marianne indulges her characteristic 
“wildest anxiety,” finally turning “dreadfully white” until she sinks into a chair (177). 
Marianne’s social exposure, in this case to Willoughby, produces a quick physiological 
decline. As John Wiltshire notes, Marianne “reacts with the characteristic bodily intensity 
which abolishes awareness of others, recklessly displaying herself as a woman, rather than 
conducting herself as a lady.”56 With an eye to the genres in which Austen is working here, 
we also should say that Marianne recklessly is displaying herself in this scene as the 
mythologized figure of Crazy Jane, rather than conducting herself as Poovey’s emotionally 
reserved, unexposed Proper Lady. 
 Elinor’s role in this episode is markedly less visible. As critics often have observed, 
Elinor’s point of view is, throughout the novel, nearly as omniscient as the narrator’s; in this 
scene, she performs the same action as the narrator, watching Willoughby’s “expression 
becoming more tranquil” just as the narrator, a paragraph later, will observe how “his 
complexion changed, and all his embarrassment returned.” (177) Elinor remains calm 
through the whole of the episode, and though she expects “every moment to see [Marianne] 
faint,” she endeavors to “screen” Marianne “from the observation of others, while reviving 
her with lavender water.” (177) Here, limiting Marianne’s exposure to the crowd—especially 
to Willoughby and his fiancée—is coextensive with her medical revival, and both tasks fall 
upon the constitutionally sound, narratively authoritative Elinor. When Marianne insists on 
speaking further with Willoughby in front of the party’s crowd, Elinor answers her without 	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flourish: “No my dearest Marianne, you must wait. This is not a place for explanations.” 
(177) Here, Austen situates Elinor’s “unaffected prose” as a crucial way to limit Marianne’s 
social exposure and manage her constitutional health. 
This scene also represents the implosion of the Dashwoods’ expectations that 
Willoughby and Marianne will marry and stabilize the family constitution, significantly 
disrupted by the death of the girls’ twice-married father, who, in bequeathing his estate to 
John Dashwood, the son of his first marriage, cannot provide lawfully for the children of his 
second. John, instead, is tasked by his dying father with providing for his half-sisters’ 
comfort—but when John moves to do this with a gift of £3,000, his mercenary wife, Fanny, 
argues that to do so would “impoverish” their little boy “to the most dreadful degree,” 
particularly considering that the Miss Dashwoods “were related to him only by half blood, 
which she considered as no relationship at all.” (8) Fanny Dashwood’s math reveals a strictly 
hereditary understanding of familial constitutions, not unlike Lady Catherine de Bourgh’s, 
which does not admit “half blood” siblings. Like his father before him, John Dashwood 
understands that the absence of a male heir is itself a kind of constitutional exposure of the 
first order—but he hasn’t the moral, or rhetorical, wherewithal to contravene his wife and 
protect the constitutional interests of his half-sisters. He does, however, spend much of the 
novel encouraging others, particularly Elinor, to manage her family’s (and by extension, his 
family’s) reputation and finances—elements critical to their collective constitution. 
Elinor’s role as caretaker of the Dashwood family constitution is reified in the 
episode of Marianne’s dire illness in the novel’s third volume. Having further indulged the 
role of Crazy Jane in her despondent walks through the grounds of Cleveland, “especially in 
the most distant parts of them, where there was something more of wildness than in the rest,” 
	   64	  
(305-6) Marianne contracts what eventually is pronounced a putrid fever by Mr. Harris, the 
physician who is called to her bedside. When the doctor breathes word that Marianne’s fever 
may be infectious, the Palmers leave Cleveland immediately with their infant son (a proper 
protection of their own family’s constitution), and Elinor is left, with Mrs. Jennings and 
Colonel Brandon, as Marianne’s constant nurse, and the director of the entire household. As 
Marianne’s illness progresses, Mr. Harris at first predicts her improvement, declaring “his 
patient materially better. Her pulse was much stronger, and every symptom more favorable 
than on the preceding visit.” (310) While Elinor cheerfully accepts the diagnosis, however, 
Mrs. Jennings and Colonel Brandon remain convinced that Marianne is living out the 
mythology of Crazy Jane: the lovesick Brandon, perhaps more melodramatic even than 
Marianne, cannot “expel from his mind the persuasion that he should see [her] no more.” 
(309-10) Just paragraphs later, the positivist medical narrative is overthrown as Marianne 
slips precariously toward the genre Mrs. Jennings and Colonel Brandon expect themselves to 
be populating: “Marianne, suddenly awakened by some accidental noise in the house, started 
hastily up, and, with feverish wildness, cried out,—’Is mamma coming?’” (310-11) 
Marianne’s delirium finally rouses even Elinor’s belief that this is indeed the tragedy of 
Crazy Jane, and she dispatches Colonel Brandon to Barton to collect Mrs. Dashwood, 
picturing her mother’s grief at the loss of her middle daughter. Strangely, even Austen’s 
narrator seems caught by these scenes in a moment of uncharacteristic earnestness, observing 
(as Poe would famously) the tragic nature of “the early death of a girl so young, so lovely as 
Marianne.” (313) This is not the constitutionally-sound, “unaffected prose,” which we have 
come to rely upon from Elinor and the narrator. 
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It is finally Marianne’s body, her physiological constitution, that brings the novel out 
of the melodrama into which characters and narrator alike have fallen: “[a]bout noon, 
however, [Elinor] began […] to fancy, to hope she could perceive a slight amendment in her 
sister’s pulse. […] Half an hour passed away, and the favourable symptoms yet blessed her. 
Others even arose to confirm it. Her breath, her skin, her lips, all flattered Elinor with signs 
of amendment.” (314) Just as Elizabeth Helme’s fallen woman, Emma, sees her sexual 
impropriety written in the contamination of her own and her daughter’s blood, the resiliency 
of Marianne’s constitution is, in Keats’s phrase to John Hamilton Reynolds, proven upon her 
pulse. It is highly unusual for Austen to focus this way on the activity of Marianne’s heart, as 
Charlotte Brontë famously elaborated in a letter to W. S. Williams: 
[Austen’s] business is not half so much with the human heart as with the 
human eyes, mouth, hands, and feet; what sees deeply, what speaks aptly, 
moves flexibly, it suits her to study, but what throbs fast and full, though 
hidden, what the blood rushes through, what is the unseen seat of Life and the 
sentient target of death – this Miss Austen ignores.57 
And yet it is the unexpected resiliency of Marianne’s material constitution—that “unseen seat 
of Life and sentient target of death”—that provides the fully embodied circumstance under 
which Austen rewrites the myth of Crazy Jane mythology and the lurid tale of the fallen 
woman. 
 Quite unlike these two stock figures of sentimental literature, Marianne recovers from 
her illness to marry Colonel Brandon and live in an emotionally stable way past the end of 
the novel, reconstituted as a daughter to Mrs. Dashwood and a sister to Elinor and Margaret; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The Brontës: Their Friendships, Lives and Correspondence, eds. T. J. Wife and J. A. Symington (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 99, Brontë’s emphasis. 
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rather remarkably, Marianne’s social reputation, Mary Waldron notes, is not permanently 
damaged by her connection with Willoughby.58 Marianne thus will help to compose the 
larger social circles surrounding Colonel Brandon’s estate, taking on the role of Delaford’s 
benevolent mistress. But the Brandons’ marriage is, as Waldron explains, not without 
complication, for in addition to living with the legacy of past romantic connections, the 
Brandons also will have to take care of Eliza and Willoughby’s illegitimate child, a fully 
embodied reminder of Marianne’s and Brandon’s heartbreak. As Waldron explains, this is 
the 
harsh outer world of “sense” where romantic love has no legitimacy, where 
feminine “softness” and vulnerability are exploited, where bastards do not 
conveniently die, where deathbeds are sordid and ugly, where idle young men 
take their sanctioned pleasures without responsibility, and where, above all, 
virtuous and compassionate men like Brandon may make the wrong decisions 
in their efforts at damage limitation and fail to prevent disasters. (80) 
As for Willoughby—the cruel jilter, disappeared lover, and wicked libertine (usually 
a dead or missing person called Henry in the Crazy Jane myth)—he will pour himself full of 
porter and reappear in the middle of the night to deliver to Elinor a full explanation of his 
crimes. This, Austen’s reproof of Willoughby, is set in a sentimentalist discourse that has 
become embarrassingly conscious of itself: during his speech to Elinor, Willoughby regularly 
acknowledges how pathetic is his own recourse to the clichés of sensibility, noting his 
idiom’s insufficiency even to the standards of Marianne, who has not been known for her 
reserved verbiage: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Mary Waldron, Jane Austen and the Fiction of Her Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 
83. 
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[m]y feelings were very, very painful. Every line [of Marianne’s 
correspondence], every word, was—in the hackneyed metaphor which 
[Marianne] […] would forbid—a dagger to my heart. To know that Marianne 
was in town was, in the same language, a thunderbolt. Thunderbolts and 
daggers! (325) 
Willoughby is made here to account for his shortcomings as a man and a narrator, Austen’s 
clearest rejection of the moral relativism of the language of sensibility. As Sedgwick writes: 
“the empathetic allo-identifications that were supposed to guarantee the sociable nature of 
sensibility could not finally be distinguished from an epistemological solipsism, a somatics 
of trembling self-absorption” (820). And yet, with the complexity that is a hallmark of 
Austen’s fiction, Elinor is unable to denounce Willoughby’s egomania completely. 
At first, Elinor rejects Willoughby’s moral relativism by skillfully dismantling the 
fallen woman narrative Willoughby seeks to tell of Eliza Williams. When he begins to urge 
that part of the fault was Eliza’s “passions” and lack of “understanding,” Elinor reminds him 
that Eliza’s constitution—“any weakness, any natural defect of understanding on her side”—
cannot excuse his behavior, suggesting that though Elinor strives always to command her 
own constitution with sense, she does not hold this as a moral standard for others; rather, 
Willoughby’s selfish advances are, in Elinor’s view, solely responsible for Eliza’s decline 
(322). Thus is Willoughby—rake to Eliza’s fallen woman and jilter to Marianne’s Crazy 
Jane—restored to the text, where he is exposed as the morally relativist engine of these two 
stock plots that, before Sense and Sensibility, would have assigned Marianne to insanity on 
the fringes of society or a moralizing descent into the grave. Willoughby’s final saccharine 
assertion—that he had in his misery “seen Marianne’s sweet face as white as death,” an 
	   68	  
apparition like the haunting Crazy Jane—falls so falsely that Elinor does not even gesture 
toward a response (327). 
The significant lack of generic precedent for Willoughby’s reappearance in the novel 
accounts, I believe, for the strange “croud of ideas” Elinor feels following Willoughby’s 
departure: she “dread[s]” the “performance” of his story to Marianne so much that she 
“wishe[s] Willoughby a widower,” free to participate with Marianne in a romantic plot of 
forgiveness, followed by traditional procreative and dynastic narratives within the comedic 
structure of marriage (333, 335). Elinor’s ongoing musings about a possible reconciliation 
between her sister and Willoughby—and her strange, eroticized “pang” for him—suggest 
how difficult it is for Elinor to accept the reality of male exposure, which is the logical 
outcome of her anti-sentimentalist moral position (339). Though Marianne’s recovery and 
Willoughby’s reappearance go a long way toward reworking the mythologies of Crazy Jane 
and the fallen woman, Elinor’s inability fully to embrace Sense and Sensibility’s generically 
new outcome suggests how difficult—or perhaps impossible—it was for Austen’s early anti-
sentimental novel fully to absorb the old sentimentalist forms. 
Like Willoughby, Marianne, too, is made to account for the constitutionally 
precarious role she has played in her own melodrama. Following her recovery, she 
categorizes her previous behavior as “self-destruction” and Willoughby’s conduct as “acting 
a part.” Rhetorically, she asks: “What, in a situation like mine, but a most shamefully 
unguarded affection could expose me to——,” her long pause suggesting the fate of Eliza 
Williams; her own narrowly-avoided death; and of course her bitter heartbreak. In a process 
normally categorized under the rubric of discipline, Marianne also revises her stance on 
romantic affection and its public demonstration, promising herself to a monastic regimen of 
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exercise and “serious study” as soon as she is further recovered. As for her remembrance of 
Willoughby, “it shall be regulated,” she vows, “it shall be checked by religion, by reason, by 
constant employment.” (345-47) Having taken such a risk with Willoughby, Marianne 
commits herself to the strictest kind of constitutional maintenance. 
 This regimen, and her marriage to the older, rheumatic Colonel Brandon, has been 
called a punitive end for Marianne: “it is common,” Thompson notes, “to find muted 
expressions of disappointment at what happens to Marianne, disappointment that she has to 
be penalized with Colonel Brandon, chastised under a policy of reduced expectations” (150). 
Waldron, however, argues that Sense and Sensibility nevertheless unites Marianne to “the 
nearest approach to a romantic figure among the men” of the novel (82). It is largely 
Austen’s point to leave this matter unsettled: though Marianne’s constitution has enabled her 
to survive Willoughby’s jilting and her own excessive sensibility, and though she has married 
a man worth far more than John Dashwood’s low estimation, her character cannot be fully 
recuperated from its exposure, and she faces a long series of reversals: 
Marianne Dashwood was born to an extraordinary fate. She was born to 
discover the falsehood of her own opinions, and to counteract, by her conduct, 
her most favourite maxims. She was born to overcome an affection formed so 
late in life as at seventeen, and with no sentiment superior to strong esteem 
and lively friendship, voluntarily to give her hand to another!—and THAT 
other, a man who had suffered no less than herself under the event of a former 
attachment, whom, two years before, she had considered too old to be 
married,—and who still sought the constitutional safeguard of a flannel 
waistcoat! (378) 
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The ambivalent tone here is important, not to mention somewhat unaccountable, given what 
we noted earlier as the narrator’s genuine concern for Marianne at the most acute moments of 
her illness. It may be that Marianne’s recovery and marriage finally suggested to Austen 
merely a trifling counterpoint to what was a real and tragic change in the Austen family 
constitution. As Austen began revising the epistolary novel Elinor and Marianne into Sense 
and Sensibility in November of 1797, the Austens still were reeling from the death of 
Cassandra’s intended husband, Tom Fowle, of which they had received news in May of that 
year. “But,” Tomalin postulates, “there was no screaming in agony or refusing to eat; 
religion, reason and constant employment were Cassandra’s resource. ‘Jane says that her 
sister behaves with a degree of resolution & propriety which no common mind could evince 
in so trying a situation,’ wrote [their cousin] Eliza to a friend.” (126-27) Though biographical 
readings are limited, it seems possible that Austen saw in her beloved sister, who suffered 
grief quietly, a real and appealing alternative to the Crazy Jane mythology. 
More broadly, while she acknowledges in Sense and Sensibility the real power of the 
cult of sensibility, Austen’s ambivalent final treatment of Marianne defuses that 
sentimentalism in two critical ways. The first is Austen’s subtle erasure of a sexual double 
standard. Willoughby and Brandon suffer in the novel just as much as Marianne and certainly 
much more than Elinor—and so Austen implicitly insists, against the eighteenth-century 
gendering of perception, that women do not necessarily suffer more from the ravages of their 
nervous constitutions. Some may object to this, citing the fact that only Marianne becomes 
actually sick; but, in the context Austen provides, Colonel Brandon’s rheumatism also is the 
long-lasting effect of his relationship with Eliza Williams just as Willoughby’s drunkenness 
and derangement are direct outcomes of his real regret over Marianne. Second, and most 
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important, Austen demonstrates that the psychic and physiological suffering showcased in 
eighteenth-century literature of sensibility is infinitesimally close to the hard realities of life 
produced by the constitutionally precarious world of the British Regency. Ultimately, Austen 
handles the eighteenth-century sentimentalist mode in Sense and Sensibility by demonstrating 
its critical but ultimately very small differences from lived life. Those very small differences 
inhere primarily in the highly individuated textual constitutions—by which I mean the 
ultimately un-formulaic characters—of Elinor and Marianne. 
 In Pride and Prejudice, however, Austen largely avoids the hard realities of a 
constitutionally vulnerable heroine like Marianne Dashwood, producing what Austen herself 
called in an 1813 letter to Cassandra the “playfulness and epigrammatism” of the novel’s 
“general style” (Letters 300). By further reworking the stock characters of the fallen woman 
and Crazy Jane, Austen raises the constitutionally sound heroine as an absolute hedge against 
a familial constitution exposed by the lack of a male heir. The ascendency of the 
constitutionally sound individual, realized imperfectly in the Dashwood sisters, is 
accomplished absolutely in Jane Bennet and her younger sister, Elizabeth, who are not just 
revisions but Austen’s clearest anti-types to the passive Crazy Jane and the pathologic fallen 
woman. 
Austen invokes the constitutional implications of the Crazy Jane myth comically, or 
at least unseriously, in the first volume of Pride and Prejudice as Jane Bennet falls ill when 
her fortune-hunting mother sends her out in the rain to Netherfield, the home of Jane’s suitor, 
Charles Bingley. Mrs. Bennet’s ridiculous hope—very like a bad sentimental plotline—is 
that a coming rainstorm will prolong Jane’s stay and give her time to secure Bingley’s 
affections. Jane has been invited to Netherfield, however, not by Bingley, but by his sisters, 
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Louisa and Caroline, who are determined to convince Jane during her visit that her family’s 
constitution—“such a father and mother, and such low connections”—disqualifies her from 
marrying their brother (36). As Downie reminds us, the Bingley sisters are apt to forget their 
own constitutional problem, “that their brother’s fortune and their own had been acquired by 
trade”; the Bennet sisters—as daughters of a gentleman—ought to be relatively 
unobjectionable by the Bingleys’ alleged measure (Downie 72; Pride and Prejudice 15). But 
as we will see, only wealthy aristocrats with family ties to the nobility—Fitzwilliam and 
Georgiana Darcy—will do for Caroline and Louisa’s plan for their family’s social elevation. 
Jane’s simultaneous exposure to bad weather and the Bingley sisters’ designs lead 
overnight to her illness, and in the morning she writes to Elizabeth that she is “very unwell.” 
(31) But, in a reversal of the London ball in Sense and Sensibility, the tableau is designed not 
to underline Jane’s overwrought sensibilities and fragile constitution, but to confound the 
wishes of Mrs. Bennet and the Bingley sisters: Jane’s illness requires that she spend six 
nights at Netherfield—but her headache and sore throat prevent her from seeing Bingley at 
all; Elizabeth’s visit to her sick sister, however, goes a long way toward convincing Bingley 
and Darcy alike that they have met their matches in the Bennet sisters, with or without the 
constitutional purity their snobbish relatives seem to require. 
In the episode of Jane’s illness, the critical elements of the Crazy Jane narrative—
exposure, disappointment, illness, and estrangement—are recast as a parody. Jane 
dispassionately attributes her illness to “getting wet through,” and straightforwardly reports 
to Elizabeth in a short letter that “excepting a sore-throat and headache, there is not much the 
matter with me.” (31) Upon hearing this news, Mr. Bennet provokes his wife with a sarcastic 
allusion to Crazy Jane, teasing: “if your daughter should have a dangerous fit of illness, if she 
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should die, it would be a comfort to know that it was all in pursuit of Mr. Bingley, and under 
your orders.” Ignoring sentimentalist plotlines that frequently carried away characters on 
much less, Mrs. Bennet retorts: “people do not die of little trifling colds.” (31) And rather 
than wandering the moors or surveying the edge of the ocean in unkempt dress and tousled 
hair, rather than exhibiting the autoerotic tendencies of confusion and stupidity, Jane Bennet 
convalesces comfortably in the company of her sister in an upstairs bedroom at Netherfield—
the estate of which she will one day be mistress. In short: Crazy Jane, in Pride and Prejudice, 
stays home at the manor. 
These family homes and the land surrounding them, the most visible form of real 
property in Austen’s novels, are crucial in Pride and Prejudice to her representation of 
competing constitutional interests—a point of comedy when we are treated to Mr. Collins’s 
absurdly high-flown assessments of staircases, windows, chimney pieces, and closets. In 
more serious moments, the Bingley sisters extrapolate Jane’s unsuitability to marry their 
brother partly from the Cheapside locations of her relatives’ London homes. An even more 
startling threat to Caroline Bingley’s interests lies in Darcy’s notice of Elizabeth Bennet 
during her nurse’s errand to Netherfield, as Caroline plans to unite the Bingley and Darcy 
families—through her own marriage to Darcy, her brother’s marriage to Georgiana, or both. 
Nothing less than Darcy’s great estate at Pemberley is at stake here: 
“Charles,” [Caroline says,] when you build your house, I wish it may be half 
as delightful as Pemberley.” 
“I wish it may.” 
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“But I would really advise you to make your purchase in that neighbourhood, 
and take Pemberley for a kind of model. There is not a finer county in 
England than Derbyshire.” 
“With all my heart: I will buy Pemberley itself, if Darcy will sell it.” 
“I am talking of possibilities, Charles.” 
“Upon my word, Caroline, I should think it more possible to get Pemberley by 
purchase than by imitation.” (38, Austen’s emphasis) 
Caroline’s advice about purchasing in Darcy’s “neighbourhood” is a thinly veiled indication 
of whom she thinks her brother ought to marry, her figure of speech underwritten by the 
connection women often represented to land during the period and the political authority this 
land invested in its (male) proprietor. Georgiana Darcy’s dowry of £30,000 easily would 
provide for the maintenance of a second estate in Derbyshire, close to the estate of her 
brother, where the Bingleys would be joined to the Darcys geographically and politically as 
stewards of the Derbyshire countryside and the local body politic. Thus, the “possibilities” 
Caroline speaks of here are not “purchase” or “imitation,” as her dissembling brother 
suggests, but a share of the Darcy family’s civic power and influence—a tantalizing political 
prospect for Caroline to which the Bennet sisters each pose a threat. 
 Pemberley represents, to Caroline Bingley as to Lady Catherine de Bourgh, the 
breeding, gentility, and wealth of the Darcy family. More generally, Pemberley is—in the 
novel, and in contemporary fetishism surrounding Pride and Prejudice—the English manor 
par excellence, standing for the undiluted constitution of an ancient English clan. Together, 
the home and surrounding estate embody the sum total of the Darcy family’s political and 
dynastic ambition; even its library “has been the work of many generations.” (38) The Darcy 
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line itself is enshrined in the estate’s gallery, where Darcy’s portrait hangs among other 
family likenesses. “Do let the portraits of your uncle and aunt Phillips be placed in the 
gallery at Pemberley,” Caroline Bingley says to Darcy, joking that Elizabeth’s working-class 
relatives, the attorney Phillips and his wife, will one day be Darcy’s, too. “Put them next to 
your great-uncle the judge,” she continues, with a sneer: “[t]hey are in the same profession, 
you know, only in different lines.” (52-53) In Caroline Bingley’s view, like Lady 
Catherine’s, the specter of class transcendence threatens not just the mythic constitutional 
purity of the Darcy line, but the distinguished role the Darcy family has played in the highest 
levels of British jurisprudence and, thus, in the maintenance of the national Constitution. 
 In opposition to Pemberley Austen sets darkest London, a clear example of what 
Gerald Newman has identified as the Romantic-period relocation of Englishness from the 
capital to the surrounding countryside. Although the city fleetingly is represented in Pride 
and Prejudice as a place of learning and high society (it is, after all, the home of Georgiana 
Darcy as well as the Darcy-Bingley refuge from the country), its commercial districts in 
Cheapside, where the Gardiners live, are acknowledged—by the Bennets themselves and 
many of the novel’s other families—as one of the darkest marks on the Bennet family’s 
constitution. This is how Elizabeth assesses the likelihood that Bingley will visit Jane at the 
Gardiners’ London home: 
that is quite impossible; for [Bingley] is now in the custody of his friend, and 
Mr. Darcy would no more suffer him to call on Jane in such a part of London. 
[…] Mr. Darcy may perhaps have heard of such a place as Gracechurch 
Street, but he would hardly think a month’s ablution enough to cleanse him 
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from its impurities, were he once to enter it; and depend upon it, Mr. Bingley 
never stirs without him. (141, Austen’s emphasis) 
The “impurities” Elizabeth ironizes here are the same as her supposed constitutional 
“inferiority,” which Darcy raises to her during his first disastrous proposal (189). This 
language of dirt and cleanliness suggests how material (and how like his Aunt de Bourgh’s) 
are Darcy’s objections to the Bennet family constitution—and how thoroughly Elizabeth 
understands, and is offended, by these objections. In spite of her mocking tone, Elizabeth’s 
anger betrays her own internalization of the social hierarchies the Darcys and Bingleys 
presume, and underlines her understanding of how the spatial and social politics of the city 
support the maintenance of the aristocracy’s constitution, though it is consolidated elsewhere 
in what Raymond Williams has identified as the “neo-pastoral” of “the country-house, and its 
estate.”59 
Just as the Crazy Jane narrative is marginalized in Pride and Prejudice by Jane’s 
relatively unserious illness at Netherfield, the fallen woman narrative is effectively 
neutralized in the novel by Austen’s setting it both in London, and, in the figure of Georgiana 
Darcy, inside the sacrosanct halls of Pemberley itself—for George Wickham, the facsimile of 
John Willoughby, has eloped not only with Lydia Bennet, but, in symmetry with the Elizas of 
Sense and Sensibility, with Georgiana Darcy as well. As a daughter of aristocratic privilege, 
“[r]egard” for Georgiana’s “credit and feelings” prevent “any public exposure” of her 
elopement, and all information concerning it—apart from Darcy’s revelation of these 
circumstances in his letter to Elizabeth—is kept a secret within the family: Darcy, Georgiana, 
and their cousin, Colonel Fitzwilliam, are among the few characters who know the full 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 22. 
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story—and the political leverage represented by the Darcy family keeps Wickham, and his 
accomplice Mrs. Younge, silent as well (202). 
Notably, the Bennet family’s less powerful constitution is not as capable of 
containing the news of Lydia’s similar false step. Upon reading a letter from Jane detailing 
Lydia’s elopement, Elizabeth surprisingly reveals all to Darcy, explaining that her sister’s 
actions “cannot be concealed from anyone” (277). As we have observed earlier, Lady 
Catherine visits Elizabeth on the basis of having heard the news, and a letter from Mr. 
Collins to Mr. Bennet details his happiness that “Lydia’s sad business has been so well 
hushed up,” but admits concern “that their living together before the marriage took place 
should be so generally known” (363). If the busybody Collins knows, Austen implies, the 
matter has not been, nor will it ever be, “hushed up,” and Austen’s narrator finally confirms 
that “in spite of her youth and her manners, [Lydia] retained all the claims to reputation 
which her marriage had given her” (387). The reluctance of Mr. Bennet (and Elizabeth and 
Jane) to receive her and Wickham at Longbourn, as well as Lydia’s nearly full removal from 
the novel to the north in Newcastle, suggest that Lydia and Wickham widely have come to 
represent the most dubious element of the Bennet family constitution. 
However, this doubling of the fallen woman narrative in the Darcy and Bennet 
families is precisely how Austen situates the individual, represented by the constitutionally 
sound Elizabeth, above the political imperatives of familial and class constitution inherent in 
an estate like Pemberley. That his own respectable sister was once nearly seduced by a 
libertine produces Darcy’s quiet but powerful recognition that sentimental plotlines come 
often very close to realism. In turn, he cannot simply dismiss the Bennets’ plight as he might 
a lowbrow fiction. Instead, he feels real sympathy with Elizabeth when Lydia runs away with 
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Wickham—even though Elizabeth fully expects that Darcy will see the elopement as “proof 
of the [Bennet] family weakness”—that is, that Lydia, and the Bennets by extension are as 
Mr. Collins puts it “naturally bad” (278, 297). Though Darcy’s first unsuccessful proposal 
cites Elizabeth’s family as the chief obstacle to their union, his second proposal reveals that 
he no longer considers her as merely an extension of the Bennets. When Elizabeth thanks 
him on her family’s behalf for the critical role he has played in arranging Lydia’s marriage, 
he pointedly replies: “your family owe me nothing. Much as I respect them, I believe I 
thought only of you” (366). Here, Austen italicizes precisely the terms of familial and 
individual constitutions, respectively, highlighting Darcy’s subordination of the tribe to 
Elizabeth in a clear reversal of Lady Catherine’s aristocratic ideology of Pemberely, which 
would preserve the purity of the clan before all else. The Bennets, consequently, fade for 
Darcy into a kind of normalized respectability, as is evinced by his second proposal to 
Elizabeth, his encouragement of Bingley to propose to Jane, and his happy reception of the 
Cheapside Gardiners at Pemberley: “Darcy,” the narrator affirms in the novel’s final 
sentence, “really loved them” (388). Thus, Elizabeth emerges out of her family’s corporate 
identity—as well as from a long lineage of eighteenth-century heroines—as something 
entirely different. “I must confess I think [Elizabeth] as delightful a creature as ever appeared 
in print, and how I shall be able to tolerate those who do not like her at least, I do not know,” 
Austen would write in an 1813 letter to Cassandra, her italics setting Elizabeth apart from all 
her other heroines to date (Letters 76). 
§ 
Though we have been focusing on the medical and social meanings of constitution in 
Austen’s early work, it is worthwhile to broaden our view again to the national stage on the 
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eve of the British Regency, when the mythology of the fallen woman was alive and well in 
the figure of Caroline of Brunswick, though she was next in line to be Britain’s queen. 
Accordingly, Caroline’s every individual interest was absolutely subordinated to the 
constitutional politics of the royal family: even her efforts to visit their daughter, Charlotte, 
with whom she is known to have had a close relationship, were characterized by George IV 
as Caroline’s effort to “create discord or confusion in the Family” (Smith, par. 7). After the 
Regency arrangement had taken effect, competing accounts of the royal marriage were 
propagated freely in London as politicians jostled for position in the reconstituted 
Hanoverian monarchy: the Regent’s supporters within Tory leadership sought to expose 
Caroline as an adulterous queen—that most treasonous variety of fallen woman—and the 
Whigs were at pains to paint the Regent as the sole adulterous party, an unfeeling betrayer of 
Caroline’s innocence, and a cruel suppressor of Princess Charlotte’s interests. Charlotte 
Bury, novelist, diarist, and lady-in-waiting to Caroline, straightforwardly assessed the 
situation in January of 1813: 
[t]here are in the newspapers, daily, long histories written with intention to 
inflame the public with an idea of [Caroline’s] wrongs, and, above all, to 
make it clear that Princess Charlotte could reign to-morrow, if any 
circumstance was to unfit her father for so doing. This is the great point with 
the party out of office, and which men of ambition want to establish, in order 
to raise themselves.60 
When George IV finally ascended the throne upon his father’s death in 1820, legally making 
Caroline the Queen Consort, the King demanded his cabinet to introduce in the House of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Charlotte Bury qtd. in Stephen Behrendt, Royal Mourning and Regency Culture (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, Inc., 1997), p. 10. 
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Lords a bill that would strip Caroline of her title and rights, and end their marriage through 
an act of Parliament (Smith, par. 11).  
As Linda Colley notes, Caroline’s “trial,” as it became known, in the House of Lords 
was a grave matter: “[u]nder a fourteenth-century law which had never been repealed, 
adultery on the part of the queen consort was accounted treason; and some arch royalists 
suggested that Caroline might pay for her transgressions with her life” (271). Though the trial 
never got that far, Caroline’s potential fate nevertheless demonstrated that 
[o]nly in the bleakest way possible was a woman’s freedom of political action 
in Great Britain formally acknowledged. […] A female Briton could be 
punished for plotting against the state, but – in law – she could never play the 
part of an active patriot within it. (Colley 243-44) 
The legal encumbrances upon women Colley identifies here square very clearly with national 
mythologies of the marginalized fallen woman and wandering Crazy Jane: as feminist critics 
and historians long have recognized, women could be daughters, wives, and mothers—the 
legal property of their fathers and husbands within the British constitution; otherwise they 
became traitors to the state, traitors to their husbands (which amounted to the same thing), or 
madwomen. 
 However, as Colley further notes, “the law […] is rarely an adequate reflector of 
social realities,” and women certainly found ways to participate, however quietly, in the 
political valences of their worlds, and this is the Regency life—lived somewhere between 
absolutes—which Austen sought to represent in her early fiction (244). Sense and Sensibility 
and Pride and Prejudice were poised, therefore, to make new, more complicated claims for a 
woman’s role in the British constitution at a time when even a queen could be exposed as a 
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fallen woman in the popular imagination. Perhaps especially in the Princess of Wales’s 
highly polarizing case, Austen was intent to see complexities: “I suppose all the World is 
sitting in Judgement [sic] upon the Princess of Wales’s Letter” she wrote to Martha Lloyd in 
1813, in reference to a letter ostensibly written by Caroline but probably composed by 
Caroline’s attorney, Henry Brougham, which was intended to make Caroline’s case to the 
Regent and highlight his mistreatment of her (Samuelian 94-94). “Poor woman,” Austen 
continued, “I shall support her as long as I can, because she is a Woman, & because I hate 
her Husband—but I can hardly forgive her for calling herself ‘attached & affectionate’ to a 
Man whom she must detest” (Letters 504, Austen’s emphasis). While Brougham’s letter, in 
Samuelian’s view, “sentimentalizes” the Princess’s plight, and while pro-Regent media had a 
stake in labeling Caroline a fallen woman, Austen remains more comfortable standing in 
“support” of a woman she can, for other reasons, “hardly forgive” (95). Austen’s rather 
caustic “I suppose all the World is sitting in Judgement,” suggests her real dissatisfaction 
with political, legal, and social processes that would aim in a letter to expose the Princess of 
Wales—and with her the British constitution—to the sentimentalist absolutes of public 
judgment. 
§ 
While an index of individual and familial constitutions, exposure functions in 
Austen’s novels as an important structuring principle as well, which is best understood in the 
terms of Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogic theory of the novel. “The novel as a whole,” Bakhtin 
famously writes, “is a phenomenon multiform in style and variform in voice,” encompassing 
direct narration; free indirect discourse; quoted epistolary forms; authorial commentary on 
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philosophy, science, or history; and the quoted speech of the characters.61 In Bakhtin’s view, 
“the novel as a genre consists precisely in the combination of these subordinated, yet still 
relatively autonomous, [elements] (even at times comprised of different languages), into the 
higher unity of the work as a whole: the style of a novel is to be found in the combination of 
its styles; the language of a novel is the system of its ‘languages’” (484). In the current 
argument, for example, Austen highlights and subordinates by turns the popular forms of 
Crazy Jane and the fallen woman; thus are the voices of Austen’s characters, gossip about 
their social interactions, their letters to one another, and the free indirect discourse of the 
narrator highlighted and subordinated serially over the course of the novel. The formal result 
is that, at every moment, some discourse or other is being exposed at the level of the text, and 
so the dialogic structure of the novel not only frequently narrates but always enacts the 
concept of constitutional exposure. Austen is suspicious and often disdainful in her novels of 
highly public forms of textual exposure—the gossip of Mr. Collins comes to mind—which, 
like the “Princess of Wales’s Letter” open up characters unfairly to the “Judgement” of “all 
the World.” And yet, Austen also frequently accomplishes a more intimate form of exposure 
in which the interactions between important character dyads expose Austen’s chief actors to 
themselves: Elinor’s sense and Marianne’s sensibility constitute probably the clearest 
example of this effect, with the possible exception of Elizabeth’s pride and Darcy’s prejudice 
or Anne Elliott’s persuasion and Captain Wentworth’s—well—persuasion. 
The last and most important of this chapter’s claims is that textual exposure maintains 
a critical physiological dimension in Austen’s novels, suggesting that, for her, “constitution” 
was ultimately not a metaphor, but a body living a real life in the world of things. Marianne’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” The Novel: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory, 1900-2000, 
ed. Dorothy Hale (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 484. 
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self-knowledge of her moral failure to sympathize with Elinor, for example, is intimately tied 
up in her physiological recovery from fever: “Long before I was enough recovered to talk,” 
Marianne relates to Elinor, “I was perfectly able to reflect. I considered the past: I saw in my 
own behaviour, since the beginning of our acquaintance with [Willoughby] last autumn, 
nothing but a series of imprudence towards myself, and want of kindness to others.” (345) 
Marianne’s acknowledged imprudent exposure of herself and others, Sedgwick argues, is 
figured in Sense and Sensibility as a lack of will: “the particular muscle on which ‘will’ is 
modeled in this novel is a sphincter, which, when properly toned, defines an internal space of 
private identity by holding some kinds of material inside, even while guarding against the 
admission of others” (831). Though the “will” is more properly understood historically as the 
activity of a material nervous system rather than that of a muscle, Sedgwick is right to 
underline the physiological foundations Austen imagines for Marianne’s social and textual 
exposure.62 
Elizabeth Bennet’s maintenance of her constitution is an important counterpoint to 
Marianne’s—so successful, in fact, that it represents in Austen’s oeuvre a kind of ideal form, 
this example of which is worth quoting fully: 
Miss Darcy, on her brother’s entrance, exerted herself much more to talk, and 
Elizabeth saw that he was anxious for his sister and herself to get acquainted 
[…]. Miss Bingley saw all this likewise; and, in the imprudence of anger, took 
the first opportunity of saying, with sneering civility: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Understanding the will historically is, as Sedgwick explains, largely beside her argument. Disclaiming “a 
new-historicizing point that you can’t understand Sense and Sensibility without entering into the alterity of a 
bygone masturbation phobia,” Sedgwick focuses instead on “how destructively twentieth-century readings [of 
Austen] are already shaped by the discourse of masturbation and its sequelae: more destructively than the novel 
is, even though onanism per se, and the phobia against it, are living issues in the novel as they no longer are 
today.” (836) 
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“Pray, Miss Eliza, are not the ——shire Militia removed from Meryton? They 
must be a great loss to your family.” 
 In Darcy’s presence she dared not mention Wickham’s name; but 
Elizabeth instantly comprehended that he was uppermost in her thoughts; and 
the various recollections connected with him gave her a moment’s distress; 
but exerting herself vigorously to repel the ill-natured attack, she presently 
answered the question in a tolerably detached tone. While she spoke, an 
involuntary glance showed her Darcy, with a heightened complexion, 
earnestly looking at her, and his sister overcome with confusion, and unable to 
lift up her eyes. (269, Austen’s emphasis) 
Caroline Bingley’s veiled reference to George Wickham here exposes Elizabeth to Darcy’s 
notice, but hardly in the way she anticipates. Caroline’s “your family” is intended to 
emphasize Elizabeth’s membership in the Bennet clan, as well as their collective low 
connections in Meryton and elsewhere, which make her an ineligible match for Darcy. But 
because Caroline also accidentally touches the nerve of Georgiana’s past with Wickham (a 
past of which Caroline is ignorant63), she is doing more here to impugn the constitution of the 
Darcys than to sully that of the Bennets, an effect registered physiologically in Darcy’s 
altered complexion and Georgiana’s downcast eyes. Public exposure, Austen suggests in 
Caroline’s miscalculation, always carries with it a certain amount of unpredictable discursive 
slippage into other constitutions. Elizabeth’s response to this—no quoted speech, merely a 
nondescript “collected behavior” and “tolerably detached tone”—fixes Darcy’s thoughts on 
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her “more and more cheerfully.” (270) Elizabeth’s ultimate appeal here—to Darcy and to us 
readers—is her capacity to be entirely unexposed at just the right moments—so thoroughly 
constituted within herself by “unaffected prose” that not even the narrator intervenes.64 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 In this scene, Elizabeth becomes a figure for what D. A. Miller has called Austen’s “Style.” “Austen’s work,” 
Miller explains, “most fundamentally consists in dematerializing the voice that speaks it.” D. A. Miller, Jane 
Austen: Or, the Secret of Style (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 6-7. 
  
 
CHAPTER II 
Scottish Constitutions in Brunton’s Self-Control and Discipline 
When Queen Charlotte, the wife of King George III, died in 1818, she left to her 
children an extensive library, which included Jane Austen’s posthumous publications, 
Northanger Abbey and Persuasion (both published in December of 1817 under an 1818 
imprint); the latter named Austen as its author and included a correct list of her completed 
novels. The Queen’s librarian and the Christie’s cataloguer (and possibly the Queen herself) 
also had wrongly attributed to Austen two other novels: the formidably titled Self-Control 
(1811) and Discipline (1814), which were the first two publications of the Scottish novelist, 
Mary Brunton. As H. J. Jackson has written, this “is an intriguing error. It must signal the 
presence of qualities [in Brunton’s work] that contemporaries associated with Austen.”65 But 
similarities were not Austen’s concern; she was more worried about being surpassed by a 
superior literary talent. While she was in London in April of 1811, overseeing the publication 
of Sense and Sensibility, Austen wrote to Cassandra uneasily of Brunton’s first novel: “We 
have tried to get Self-controul, but in vain.—I should like to know what her Estimate is—but 
am always half afraid of finding a clever novel too clever—& of finding my own story and 
my own people all forestalled” (Letters 278, Austen’s emphasis). Although Austen would 
revise her concern about Brunton’s cleverness after reading Self-Control, this early letter to 
Cassandra reveals Austen in a bind over Brunton’s rise to fame on Britain’s literary scene: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 H. J. Jackson, “Raising the Unread,” Times Literary Supplement, no. 5375 (July 4, 2006), p. 14. 
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anxious that a comparison to Brunton will show the deficiencies of her own plots and 
characters, she nevertheless wishes to measure her work against the accomplishment of one 
of her most popular Scottish contemporaries. 
Austen was not the only English author of the period to compare herself to her 
northern compatriots. Writing in 1815 to R. P. Gillies, William Wordsworth lamented the 
“insupportable slovenliness and neglect of syntax and grammar, by which James Hogg’s 
writings are disfigured.” While such offenses are “excusable in [Hogg] from his education,” 
Wordsworth continues, “Walter Scott knows, and ought to do, better.” Finally, Wordsworth 
determines that “[t]hey neither of them write a language which has any pretention to be 
called English.” 66 Wordsworth’s assessment, Ian Duncan argues, “cuts across distinct if 
overlapping conceptions of […] British Romantic literature: as a market, in which Scottish 
writing enjoys a notable success, and as a canon, from which it must be purged – on the 
grounds of a national deficiency, a linguistic unfitness ‘to be called English.’”67 This 
“national deficiency” and “linguistic unfitness” appear because Hogg and Scott are set 
against a standard of Englishness—not a more expansive Britishness established by the 1706 
and 1707 Acts of Union, which had constituted the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of 
Scotland as Great Britain: a single state with a single Parliament under a single monarch. 
The tendency for “British” to be synonymous with “English” and for Scotland and 
Wales to be elided from Great Britain’s national constitution is not exclusive to Wordsworth: 
“the English and the foreign,” Colley notes, “are still inclined today to refer to the island of 
Great Britain as ‘England,’” and to think of Scotland, when they think of it, as something 	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altogether different, something altogether elsewhere (131). This peculiarity of Britain’s 
national constitution—an imperfect synecdoche in which an unrepresentative part stands in 
for the whole—has had considerable endurance in the British and American academies as 
well: “British Romanticism is English,” Duncan observes, “from Blake and Lyrical Ballads 
in the 1790s to Keats, Shelley, and Byron”; and “Scotland, neither English nor foreign, 
stands for an inauthentic Romanticism, defined by a mystified – purely ideological – 
commitment to history and folklore” (1). A case of Duncan’s point is Wordsworth’s well-
known poem, “The Solitary Reaper” (1803), in which an English speaker fancifully construes 
the song of a lone Highland woman whose Gaelic he does not understand. Traveling to 
Oxford from London in 1815, however, Brunton made this comparison: “[h]arvest does not 
seem the same cheerful season here as with us [in Scotland]! No bands of reapers! […] In a 
fine field of wheat, one man was cutting at one corner, and one woman at another!”68 
Brunton’s reference to the solitary English reapers is not strange; her journals are filled with 
similar observations of the English landscape and its inhabitants—but, especially given the 
points of her emphasis, one wonders if she had in mind Wordsworth’s poem and sought to 
demystify the Romantic English record of Scotland’s harvest. 
This view of Scotland as a Romantic theme park of tartans and misty glens—the 
kitschy vacation spot of the Wordsworths, J. M. W. Turner, and Queen Victoria and lately 
the setting of Walt Disney’s 2012 animated film, Brave—is not simply the product of 
imperial eyes. Many modern Scottish commentators agree that Scotland became “self-
divided” in the aftermath of the 1707 Union. Described in 1919 as “the Caledonian 
antisygyzy” by G. Gregory Smith, Scottish self-division was in this early assessment 	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characterized as a generic split between realism and fantasy in Scottish literary and historical 
traditions. In more recent interpretations of postcolonial scholars, Scottish self-division is 
geo-culturally contingent: the Lowland intelligentsia of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and St. 
Andrews are alienated by their progress from a more conservative and oftentimes backward 
Highland fringe, whose lives—characterized by economic hardship, political repression, and 
disease—were similar to those of British colonial subjects (Duncan 2). As in the Irish 
postcolonial struggle against the English, scholars often have interpreted English programs of 
“economic improvement” in Scotland as a form of political and cultural imperialism.69 
Many of Scotland’s internal divisions—which owed to the nation’s problematic 
constitution within Britain—were embodied in Mary Brunton’s family life. Her maternal and 
paternal grandfathers fought on opposite sides in the Hanoverian army’s repression of the 
Jacobites in the 1740s: while her mother’s father, Francis Ligonier, died shortly after Falkirk, 
probably of pleurisy contracted earlier in The ‘Forty-Five, William Balfour lived to know his 
grandchild, Mary, who was seven years old when he died.70 Brunton’s religious life in the 
Church of Scotland, particularly her marriage to Church of Scotland minister Alexander 
Brunton, raises another important ambiguity of Scotland’s constitution within Great Britain. 
Though recognized by the British state as the true Scottish church in the 1707 Act of Union, 
the Church of Scotland did not recognize the supremacy of the British monarchy or enjoy 
Parliamentary representation; rather, the Church created itself independently of the British 
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state in matters of doctrine, worship rites, and government, so its members constantly juggled 
allegiances to King and Kirk.71 
The complex national mythos of the self-divided Scot met with special political 
resistance in eighteenth-century England. A breed of English chauvinism promulgated by the 
Middlesex MP John Wilkes consolidated this divided Scottish identity and set a strident 
English nationalism against the whole, situating poor Highlanders, sophisticated Lowlanders, 
and every Scot between as part of the same inferior group (Colley 109, 115). In spite of 
persistent Wilkite assertions of English supremacy within the Union, some justifiable English 
anxiety remained about the widespread (and now well-documented) integration of talented 
Scottish men into Great Britain’s imperial administration. As critic Christopher Smout has 
explained, the long-alienated Scottish margin was beginning through military service and 
promotion in imperial institutions like the East India Company to have “a pull on the core, 
the tail ever so slightly beginning to wag the dog.”72 Here, the empire was critical, for while 
the island of Great Britain was (and is) considered “English,” the empire had always been 
“emphatically British,” and therefore a place where Scots could be coequals with the English 
in both prestige and profit (Colley 131). Mary Brunton’s father, Thomas Balfour, was part of 
this trend: after his matriculation at Aberdeen University and then Edinburgh University, 
where he studied medicine, Balfour became a British officer in the 9th Regiment of Foot, 
America. Like many Scots his age, Balfour’s enlistment was in response to the American 
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Revolution’s challenge to British (not Scottish) imperial claims in North America 
(McKerrow 21-2). 
But, as Leith Davis insists, the Britishness of the empire never turned the Scottish and 
the English into a homogeneous nation of Britons.73 Instead, the rise of Scottish men into the 
administration of the empire produced a real sense of competition between the English and 
the Scottish on Great Britain’s national and imperial stages (Colley 122). The market in 
novels was no exception, as Austen, again looking north to Scotland, noted in an 1814 letter: 
“Walter Scott has no business to write novels, especially good ones.—It is not fair.—He has 
Fame and Profit enough as a Poet, and should not be taking the bread out of other people’s 
mouths” (Letters 404). Austen’s complaint about Scott helps to contextualize her earlier 
interest in taking Brunton’s “Estimate”: Austen wished to know the competition her work 
would meet in a more comprehensive British marketplace. Writing to Cassandra in the fall of 
1813, having by this time read Self-Control several times, Austen acknowledged her initial 
concern about Brunton to have been unfounded: 
I am looking over Self Control again, & my opinion is confirmed of its being 
an excellently-meant, elegantly written Work, without anything of Nature or 
Probability in it. I declare I do not know whether Laura’s passage down the 
American River, is not the most natural, possible, everyday thing she ever 
does.—” (Letters 344) 
Here Austen is writing of Laura Montreville, Self-Control’s Scottish heroine, who indeed 
takes an improbable canoe trip in the novel’s third volume. The episode was a lightning rod 
for harsh criticisms, not least of all Austen’s: her words of almost sincere praise 	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(“excellently-meant, elegantly written”) are swiftly undercut by an assertion of absolute 
failure and then slightly tempered by humor. But there is something else in Austen’s tone—
the “I declare,” is where it is most audible—that suggests her relief that Brunton’s novel is 
unequal to her own. Austen must have needed her perverse comfort in “Laura’s passage 
down the American River,” because in 1814 she joked of it again to her niece, Anna Lefroy: 
to “redeem [her] credit” with an unnamed critic of the recently published Mansfield Park, 
Austen quips, she will write “a close imitation of ‘Self-control.’” “I will improve upon it;—” 
she continues, “my Heroine shall not merely be wafted down an American river in a boat by 
herself, she shall cross the Atlantic in the same way, & never stop till she reaches Gravesent 
[sic]” (Letters 423). This is faint praise, to be sure; but Austen’s tendency to return to Self-
Control suggests that Brunton remained for her a lingering specter on the national literary 
stage. 
Brunton, however, had beaten Austen to the punch at Self-Control, particularly 
Laura’s much-ridiculed American adventure. In April of 1811, when Austen was in London 
still searching out a copy of the novel, Brunton wrote to her friend, Mrs. Izett, of Self-
Control’s strengths as well as of the episode that later would catch the barb of Austen’s wit: 
“We have all heard of a ‘peacock with a fiery tail,’” Brunton explained, “but my American 
jaunt is this same monstrous appendage tacked to a poor little grey linnet” (xlviii). This 
lopsided bird is an apt figure for Self-Control’s picaresque form, as Brunton noted: 
I think the story of Self-Control is defective—it is disjointed—it wants unity. 
The incidents, particularly in the second volume, have little mutual 
connection. This appears to me the capital defect of the book. It is patch-
work—the shreds are pretty, and sometimes rich; but the joining is clumsily 
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visible. […] The American expedition, too,—though, in the author’s opinion, 
the best written part of the book,—is more conspicuously a patch, than any 
thing else which it contains. (xlviii, Brunton’s emphasis) 
The patchiness Brunton underlines here, while a straightforward reflection on Self-Control’s 
literary achievement, is also an incisive identification of the British constitutional dilemma 
that Self-Control persistently articulates: the novel is “disjointed,” to be sure—but its 
narrative discontinuities coincide with Laura’s crossings of national borders on Self-
Control’s international stage. The novel’s jarring fault lines between Scottish episodes, 
English episodes, and one North American episode suggest that Brunton at least intuits that a 
Scotswoman’s constitution—her legal status and her health—was highly contingent upon her 
place on Great Britain’s map: the political and juridical “patch-work” of Scotland, England, 
and North America. 
Brunton’s first two novels are thus important artifacts of Scots’—and particularly 
Scottish women’s—struggle legitimately to be constituted as part of Britain in the age of 
empire. The novels grapple specifically with the popular idea that Anglo-Scottish 
intermarriage, a figurative act of national unification, might increase Anglo-Scottish cohesion 
within the postcolonial Union, much as the Irish author Sydney Owenson had envisioned in 
the Anglo-Irish context with her 1806 novel, The Wild Irish Girl. In Self-Control, Brunton 
imagines a Scottish heroine whose constitutional status as a free-born British woman is 
compromised by an English colonel’s threats to marry her against her will and rape her, but 
Laura’s Scottish self control ensures her escape from sexual violence and finally her happy 
marriage in Britain to a virtuous, self-controlled Englishman, Montague De Courcy. Brunton, 
however, significantly revises this positive view of Anglo-Scottish intermarriage in her 
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second novel, Discipline. Ellen Percy, a wealthy English heroine, is married to a Scottish 
Highland clansman, a plot that reveals Scottish constitutions physiologically and morally 
compromised by the ugly offshore activity of British imperialism, specifically the Atlantic 
slave trade. Intermarriage remained an irresistible plotline for Brunton and a suggestive 
metaphor for British national cohesion—but, as she saw it, Anglo-Scottish marriage 
ultimately failed to produce a stable political union between Scotland and England: the 
inequities of the empire’s political constitution had become too acute. This chapter argues, 
that, as Brunton saw it, the limited and inconsistent constitutional rights of women and the 
nonexistent rights of African slaves across the British empire made impossible any 
meaningful political cohesion of the British state. 
§ 
Here, a (somewhat lengthy) synopsis will be useful for those unfamiliar with 
Brunton’s first novel; those acquainted with Self-Control can rejoin the argument on page 98. 
The story begins in Glenalbert, Scotland, where Laura—born in Scotland of English parents 
and raised as a Gaelic-speaking Scot in the Church of Scotland—is indelicately propositioned 
and then, a day later, properly proposed to by English rake-on-the-make, Colonel Villiers 
Hargrave. Laura’s father, Captain Montreville, ignorant of Hargrave’s untoward advance, 
encourages Laura to accept his suit, and Laura, after prayer and contemplation, establishes a 
compromise between her father’s and Hargrave’s wishes in which she promises to marry 
Hargrave if he can manage to behave well for two full years: this is a tall order for the 
pathologically licentious Hargrave, but Laura nevertheless considers herself engaged to him. 
It is important to note here the trouble Brunton takes throughout Self-Control to show Laura 
still very much in love with Hargrave, though she remains deeply disappointed in the failure 
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of his character. Anxious to be free from Hargrave’s company, but hopeful that he will 
reform himself, Laura discreetly departs for London with her father, who has business to 
transact there with a Mr. Baynard and a Mr. Warren concerning the annuity Laura will inherit 
on her father’s death. Laura’s mother, Harriet, is deceased, having died just three days before 
the beginning of the novel. 
Together, Laura and her father travel first to Edinburgh and then on to London, where 
their financial situation begins to deteriorate under the strain of city living. Laura thus 
decides that she will support her father by selling her paintings, and, while she is making 
enquiries and negotiating prices at local galleries, she meets Montague De Courcy, the 
novel’s quiet hero, who instantly falls in love with Laura. He also secretly begins buying 
Laura’s paintings in which all of the male figures resemble Hargrave, the man whose life De 
Courcy saved while they were serving together in the British army. We also learn that De 
Courcy’s father and Captain Montreville were longtime friends, and De Courcy begins 
regularly to visit the Montrevilles as a continuance of his deceased father’s friendship with 
the Captain but also to establish a relationship with Laura. 
Captain Montreville’s business in London has reached an impasse by this stage, and, 
in spite of De Courcy’s and Laura’s efforts to care for him, he begins to succumb to 
debilitating hypochondria and then eventually to two burst blood vessels, which ultimately 
kill him, leaving Laura to fend for herself in London with no ready money and a limited 
annuity. De Courcy is absent at this stage, suspicious of Laura’s ongoing commitment to 
Hargrave, whose character he knows to be seriously compromised: Hargrave, it is later 
revealed, has assaulted, raped, and finally abandoned a woman named Jessy Wilson, the 
young daughter of two of the De Courcy family’s servants. Montague De Courcy is raising as 
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his protégé Hargrave and Jessy’s illegitimate son, Henry, as Jessy died just a few days after 
giving birth. Because of its clear generic similarities to the story of the two Elizas from 
Austen’s Sense and Sensibility, the story of Jessy Wilson will become important later in this 
analysis. 
Impoverished, starving, and alone in London in the wake of her father’s death, Laura 
appeals to Lady Pelham, her mother’s sister, who lives in a fashionable part of the city. 
Because she has disowned her own daughter over a marriage she disapproved, Lady Pelham 
is able to focus all of her social and financial machinations on reconnecting Laura with 
Colonel Hargrave, who is one of Lady Pelham’s friends and confidants in a glittering London 
circle of intrigue and betrayal. In that vein, Hargrave has spent his absence from the end of 
the novel’s first volume seducing and impregnating a peer’s wife, Lady Bellamer, 
information that comes to light as Hargrave’s attempts to trap Laura become more devious 
and violent. Under the strain of his advances, Laura periodically takes refuge with the De 
Courcy family—Montague, his sister Harriet, and their mother—but Lady Pelham objects to 
these visits and contrives ways of derailing them so that Laura can be put into Hargrave’s 
company. Again, it is critical to note that Laura is still struggling in these pages with her 
feelings for Hargrave and her earlier promise to marry him; she also is beginning to 
recognize De Courcy’s virtue and intuit his love for her, but she regards him yet as a friend 
and brother. 
In the meantime, Hargrave’s grip on Laura tightens as he tries to ensnare her in 
gambling debts and has her falsely arrested. Each time, Laura escapes to the De Courcy 
home at Norwood. During one of these visits, Hargrave arrives and challenges his old friend, 
Montague De Courcy, to a duel under the assertion that De Courcy is trespassing upon his 
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“right” to Laura. De Courcy, refusing to fight, is nevertheless shot by Hargrave, though not 
mortally. Following this episode, Laura considers her engagement to Hargrave dissolved, and 
De Courcy, at length, proposes. Laura agrees that they will marry when she returns from a 
visit to Scotland to see her old friend, Mrs. Douglas. Fortuitously, Lady Pelham dies, 
bequeathing a significant portion of her fortune to Laura, but only on the condition that she 
marry Hargrave and become Lady Lincourt upon the death of Hargrave’s uncle, Lord 
Lincourt, whose title and fortune Hargrave is to inherit. Laura also will receive some portion 
of this inheritance from Lady Pelham if she marries some other peer of the realm, but she 
will be disinherited if she marries outside of the English aristocracy. 
In spite of the revelation of Lady Pelham’s will, Laura maintains her engagement to 
De Courcy as well as her plans to travel to Scotland, but before she can depart for her 
homeland Hargrave orders a brutal kidnapping that takes Laura across the Atlantic to Quebec 
and beyond to the wilderness of North America, where it becomes ominously clear that, 
though Hargrave is absent from these pages entirely, he intends to marry Laura against her 
will and rape her, probably, but not certainly, in that order. Starving, injured, disoriented, and 
in abject despair about the impending loss of her virtue, Laura manages to escape by canoe 
and, with the help of a Quebec family, boards a ship back to Britain to prepare for a life of 
confinement, as she imagines her engagement to De Courcy dissolved by the mere 
appearance of Hargrave’s sexual violation. Yet: a letter from Hargrave surfaces, notifying 
Laura that he has committed suicide and confirming that Laura remains a virgin. De 
Courcy—healed from his gunshot wound and as devoted to Laura as ever—arrives in 
Glenalbert and renews his proposals of marriage under the assurances of Hargrave’s letter. 
Finally, Laura and De Courcy marry. 
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Self-Control and the Constitutional Laws of Scotland, England, and North America 
Laura’s two major dilemmas, rape and marriage, were complicated constitutional 
matters after the Anglo-Scottish Union, especially for women. Both pivoted on women’s 
consent—either to sexual activity or a marital relationship—but the legal force of that 
consent varied as a British woman moved across national and imperial borders. Scottish, 
English, and imperial legislation play a critical role in Brunton’s conception of Laura’s 
character, particularly because Laura’s deteriorating legal status under the varying 
constitutional laws of Britain and its empire produces the steady decline of her bodily 
constitution. In this sense, Brunton is working in Self-Control to add realist elements of 
social criticism to the novel of sensibility and suggest that British constitutions might be 
produced not just by the climate, but also by the law. Her revisions of the eighteenth-century 
novel are not as programmatic as Austen’s, but the two contemporaries shared an impulse to 
demonstrate the often small differences between sentimental plotlines of decline and ruin and 
the lived lives of Regency-era women. 
Most eighteenth-century Scottish rape cases in the available record appeared in 
Scotland’s ecclesiastical courts: after the Union with England, the Church of Scotland 
maintained a strong hierarchy of church courts in every parish while the secular justice 
system of the British Crown was, in Scotland, more diffuse. During the period, Scottish law 
did not address the crime of rape unless the victim was propertied and had been abducted 
(like Laura) in the course of the crime’s commission; marital rape would not be criminalized 
in Scotland until 1982. For an indictment in a case of rape, an eighteenth-century Scottish 
victim was required to report her rape within 24 hours and to prove in court that she had cried 
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out for help while the crime was in progress. Without proof of these two elements, the Kirk 
considered a victim as guilty as her attacker because strict Calvinist interpretations of 
individual discipline suggested that a Scottish woman, through her self control, was 
responsible for preventing any sexual violence that might be committed against her person. 
In 1745, for example, the St. Cuthbert’s session disciplined Marion Mitchell for her “sin” 
with James Borthwick in spite of her insistence that she had been “compelled by him to this 
sin being alone in her house.” In January of 1747, Jane Menzies fled similar punishment in 
Aberdeen, though her rapist, a man named Polwarth, had “forced and ravished her, stopping 
her mouth with his Napkin.” If a woman could not properly discipline her body to prevent 
rape, the Kirk stepped in after the crime to perform that discipline for her, usually in the form 
of social disgrace such as appearing publicly in sackcloth.74 As in any case of rape, victims 
always faced the prospect of unwanted pregnancy and childbirth outside of wedlock, obvious 
further grounds for alienation and shame. 
Consistent with these stringent requirements of Scottish ecclesiastical law, Laura 
Montreville’s self control (or discipline; Brunton uses the words interchangeably) is her most 
reliable defense against the sexual advances of Colonel Hargrave. “In the character of Laura 
Montreville,” Brunton explained in Self-Control’s 1811 dedication to Joanna Baillie, “the 
[Calvinist] religious principle is exhibited as rejecting the bribes of ambition; bestowing 
fortitude in want and sorrow; as restraining just displeasure; overcoming constitutional 
timidity; conquering misplaced affection; and triumphing over the fear of death and of 
disgrace.”75 Brunton thus intends Laura as an exemplar of Calvinist virtue, particularly the 	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ideal “that a true church imposes proper discipline” on its individual members.76 According 
to Calvin, this kind of discipline ensured the church’s constitutional cohesion. As he writes in 
Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536): 
[i]f no society, nay no house with even a moderate family, can be kept in a 
right state without discipline, much more necessary is it in the Church, whose 
state ought to be the best ordered possible. Hence as the saving doctrine of 
Christ is the life of the Church, so discipline is, as it were its sinews; for to it it 
is owing that the members of the body adhere together, each in its own place. 
Wherefore, all who either wish that discipline were abolished, or who impede 
the restoration of it, whether they do this of design or through thoughtlessness, 
certainly aim at the complete devastation of the Church.77 
Calvin’s recourse to physiology—the “sinews” of discipline and the corporate “body” of the 
Church—is a common Christian metaphor for ecclesiastical constitution. But for real victims 
like Marion Mitchell and Jane Menzie and fictive ones like Laura Montreville, discipline had 
real physiological implications: the Scottish Church expected a woman to defend herself 
against rape by resisting her attacker and crying out against him, actions which required the 
physiological activity of her body. Modern readers tend to think of self control as an 
individual’s control over her emotions, as in Elinor’s persistent self-command in Sense and 
Sensibility. This definition is relevant, but for Romantic-era Calvinist Scots, self control had 
more explicitly to do with an individual’s ability to control her physiological constitution. In 
the case of rape, self control meant that a woman should use her physical body to protect her 	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sexual and reproductive body from violation and ruin. The constitutional law of the Kirk thus 
effected another form of Scottish self-division, in which Scottish women’s physiological 
constitutions could be strangely divided in themselves. 
Like Brunton and Laura herself, Colonel Hargrave sees Laura’s Calvinist self control 
as the chief obstacle to his designs on her, rendered here in the overwrought language of 
sensibility: “Good heavens, Laura,” he implores, “will you sacrifice to a punctilio—to a fit of 
Calvinist enthusiasm, the peace of my life, the peace of your own?”78 With its extended focus 
on a secular English assault on Scottish religious virtue, Self-Control is very like Sir Walter 
Scott’s The Antiquary (1816), which critic David Punter calls an exploration of “the history 
of Scottish Protestantism and […] attempts of the [English] authorities to suppress it.”79 
Brunton’s innovation in Self-Control is to assign gender to this Anglo-Scottish dichotomy in 
the figures of Hargrave and Laura, Brunton’s variation on what Barker-Benfield calls the 
“rake/victim dyad” of the novel of sensibility. But rape is not just Brunton’s metaphor for the 
relationship between a feminized Scottish Church and masculinist English authorities or, 
more generally, for a feminine Scotland and a masculine England. Because Hargrave attacks 
Scottish and English women (Laura and Jessy Wilson), rape also is properly understood in 
Brunton’s novel as the way British women’s physiological constitutions are sickened and 
ruined by the unwanted sexual advances of men. By subordinating a Scottish nationalist 
position to a broader feminist one, Brunton suggests, like Mary Wollstonecraft in Maria, or 
The Wrongs of Woman (1798), that British women—Scottish and English alike—may not 
have a country. 	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The steady deterioration of Laura’s physiological and legal constitution in spite of her 
Calvinist self control is the result of her increasing geopolitical exposure at the hands of 
Colonel Hargrave: while Laura is in London with her Aunt Pelham, for example, Hargrave 
pays a group of men to apprehend Laura, accuse her of an unpaid debt, and threaten her with 
imprisonment until she can produce the necessary sum. Hargrave’s sentimentalist plan is to 
intervene on Laura’s behalf, win her love through this rescue, and marry her. The ruse is 
effected by a false warrant for Laura’s arrest, as Brunton’s narrator explains: 
[t]he warrant was stamped and imposingly written upon parchment. With the 
tautology which Laura had been taught to expect in a law-paper, it rang 
changes upon the permission to seize and confine the person of Laura 
Montreville, as heiress of William Montreville, debtor to John Dykes of 
Pimlico. It was signed as by a magistrate, and marked with the large seals of 
office. (402) 
This is Self-Control’s most explicit example of English constitutional dominance over 
Laura’s Scottish person. The “imposing” features of a putative state document—the forged 
mark of the magistrate, and the official-seeming seals—conspire here to convince Laura of a 
debt she does not owe to a nonexistent Englishman, John Dykes. Though Laura begins this 
episode sure that her guilt is “impossible,” the forged warrant is enough to convince her 
otherwise, and Laura’s physiological constitution thus begins to fail: she becomes “pale” and 
“faint,” “almost sinking with horror” to the ground (401, 402). The power Laura imagines the 
English constabulary to exercise over her person overthrows bodily constitutional soundness, 
presaging the more acute constitutional decline she will undergo in North America, when her 
ability to control her self is removed entirely. Self-Control thus enters into what D. A. Miller 
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has called the novel’s “long tradition of portraying the police as incompetent or powerless”; 
with Self-Control’s (actually fake) police officers, Brunton underlines the fictivity of English 
law, which, instead of protecting Laura from Hargrave’s attacks, tends rather to aid and abet 
them.80 
Also underpinning this episode is Laura’s persistent inability to, as a Scot, understand 
the real meanings of English discourse—from Hargrave’s proposals to the machinations of 
her Aunt Pelham to the specious arrest warrant. Laura’s tendency toward misunderstanding, 
the novel repeatedly asserts, is the result of her sheltered upbringing in rural Scotland by an 
eccentric English father, where her first language is not English but Gaelic. Brunton also 
takes special care to show Laura being instructed by Captain Montreville (apparently in his 
own mood of national self-alienation) in a healthy set of prejudices against the English, 
specifically Londoners. When Laura asks what kind of man is her father’s London solicitor, 
Mr. Warren, for example, Montreville replies “contemptuously”: “Man! […] Why child, he 
is a creature entirely new to you. He talks like a parrot, looks like a woman, dresses like a 
monkey, and smells like a civet-cat. You might have lived in Glenalbert for half a century, 
without seeing such a creature” (67). Here is Brunton’s first substantive articulation of the 
idea that Britain’s unprincipled English element, found primarily in London, was responsible 
for the reflux of empire: on Montreville’s view, Mr. Warren becomes a kind of postcolonial 
chimera; instead of lion, goat, and serpent, however, Montreville’s monster comprises 
animals native to the tropics. Important in this passage is Montreville’s belief that colonial 
reflux has yet to reach rural areas of Scotland like Laura’s native Glenalbert. In her second 
novel, Discipline, this idea—that Scotland was a haven at risk for constitutional decline 	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because of its imperial relationship with London—would become a more central idea for 
Brunton, as we will discuss in the final section of this chapter. 
Laura’s nationalized naïveté and her prejudices against the English begin to fall away 
as she becomes more familiar with London life and develops a meaningful friendship with 
the Englishman Montague De Courcy, who is her equal in self control and religious devotion. 
As Laura navigates an international London art market in the sale of her own paintings, 
Brunton also approximates in Laura a fledgling cosmopolitanism in which Laura 
acknowledges both her English parentage and her Scottish upbringing, imagining herself a 
British subject: 
[t]he capital, with all its wonders, of which she had hitherto seen little, the 
endless diversity of character which she expected its inhabitants to exhibit, the 
conversation of the literary and the elegant, of wits, senators, and statesmen, 
promised an inexhaustible fund of instruction and delight. Nay, the patriotic 
heart of Laura beat high with the hope of meeting some of those heroes, who, 
undaunted by disaster, where all but honour is lost, maintain the honour of 
Britain, or who, with happier fortune, guide the triumphant navies of our 
native land. (381-82) 
The situation of the word “patriotic” is telling; with it, the narrator asserts not Laura’s 
Scottishness but her Britishness—her belief that she, together with the narrator and all 
Britons, shares ownership of Britain’s “triumphant” imperial navies and a British “native 
land.” Hargrave, too—who, with a Wilkite degree of English chauvinism tends to dismiss the 
Scottish as backward—nevertheless sees Laura’s developing British subjectivity as a 
significant legal obstacle to his designs on her. “To marry a free-born British woman against 
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her consent,” says Brunton’s narrator, explaining Hargrave’s calculations, “is, in these 
enlightened times, an affair of some difficulty” (432). 
And it was. As Rebecca Probert and Laura Leneman have shown, it was nearly 
impossible for a man to marry an English, Welsh, or Scottish woman against her consent in 
Great Britain. Almost all eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century English marriages were 
solemnized with the consent of both parties in the Church of England—both before and after 
the watershed Marriage Act of 1753.81 And yet, elopement and irregular marriage remained a 
national constitutional concern in Romantic-era Britain, arising primarily from the fact that 
north of the River Tweed a more permissive set of marriage laws and practices existed within 
the Church of Scotland, which, as we have seen, operated outside the strictures of the British 
state and, thus, the Anglican Communion. In addition to “regular marriage,” which in both 
Scotland and England required the posting of banns at the parish church and solemnization 
by a clergy member, there were three “‘irregular’ yet equally valid ways” for a couple to be 
wed in Scotland. These were, first, per verba de praesenti, in which an of-age couple beyond 
prohibited degrees of kinship could solemnly declare themselves husband and wife—without 
parental consent or the presence of witnesses—in order to constitute a legally binding union. 
The second irregular form was per verba de futuro subsequente copula, which was “a 
promise to marry in the future, followed by sexual intercourse.”82 One wonders if Hargrave’s 
first indecent proposition to Laura—that she “reward [his] lingering pains, and let this happy 
hour begin a life of love and rapture”—coupled to his initial, secret resolve never actually to 
marry her is perhaps Brunton’s subtle commentary on this practice (Self-Control 9). The third 	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irregular form of Scottish marriage, similar to twenty-first-century common law marriage, 
occurred when a couple cohabitated long enough to “produce a general belief ” that they 
were husband and wife.83 
Though they each required individual consent, none of these irregular Scottish 
marriage forms could be validly enacted in England or Wales, and so couples in need of a 
speedy or secret marriage often would elope to Scottish border towns to be wed. Gretna 
Green, the site of Lydia and Wickham’s illicit marriage in Pride and Prejudice, is probably 
the most famous of these constitutionally permissive locations, but other marrying points 
could be found almost anywhere a main road crossed the English-Scottish border. That Lady 
Catherine de Bourgh is scandalized by Lydia and Wickham’s “infamous elopement” to 
Scotland is historically accurate as well (Pride and Prejudice 253). Mary Brunton’s mother, 
Frances Balfour, and with her several of Brunton’s aunts, were shocked to learn of Mary’s 
own elopement with Alexander Brunton in December of 1798, especially because Frances 
had been planning to send Mary to London for the upcoming season under the care of her 
sister-in-law, Mary’s godmother, the well-connected Viscountess Wentworth. Made 
increasingly uneasy by her daughter’s developing friendship with Brunton (who was 
employed in the Balfour home as a tutor to Mary’s brothers, William and John), Frances 
arranged for Mary to visit her affluent Craigie relatives on the small island of Gairsay until 
her aunt could remove her to more acceptable society in the south. But it was too late: 
Alexander already had proposed, and Mary had accepted him; they eloped from Gairsay in 
the middle of the night by rowboat, and the couple were secretly married in Edinburgh under 
the regular form of the Church of Scotland, which required the consent of the betrothed, 	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but—luckily for Mary and Alexander—not that of their objecting parents. Not long after the 
wedding, Alexander became minister of the parish church at Bolton in East Lothian, where 
he publicly—though (perhaps in view of his own elopement) very reluctantly—denounced 
two of his congregants, William Bennet and Janet Guthrie, for their irregular marriage as part 
of his parochial obligation to congregational discipline (McKerrow 58, 63). In a similar if 
more ambitious vein, a Mr. W. Ness, grieved at “The Irregularities and Excesses” imputed to 
these irregular Scottish marriages, thus offered his services to the public: 
Mr W. Ness 
at the 
Blue Bell Inn, High Street, Berwick-upon-Tweed, begs to offer himself to the 
notice of the Public. He will, for the future, celebrate Marriages at the various 
Stations and on the Borders, from Lamberton Toll on the East to Gretna Green 
on the West, in a manner which must give general satisfaction. The strictest 
attention will be paid to decorum and the ceremony performed with as much 
solemnity as circumstances will admit. A correct Register will be kept and 
carefully preserved and the most honourable secrecy, when required, will be 
maintained. By this means Mr W. Ness hopes to restore to its pristine purity 
this ancient heirloom of our ancestors, and to render this primitive romantic 
Institution as reputable as it is popular, and as honourable as it is binding and 
Legitimate.84 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Qtd. in “Claverhouse,” Irregular Border Marriages (Edinburgh: The Moray Press, 1934), pp. 21-22. Clearly 
Mr. W. Ness believed that his advertisement would be far-reaching: “In the case of parties at a distance,” he 
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event of a conveyance being required, a small remittance should be forwarded.” (22) 
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Scotland becomes here not just the kitschy vacation spot of the Wordsworths, but—through 
the entrepreneurial aplomb of Mr. W. Ness—a place of magical paradoxes where marriage is 
at once secret and registered, romantic and binding, primitive and popular. 
If Scotland’s border with England was a zone of deregulated marriage practices, 
Britain’s colonies abroad were a veritable free-for-all. As Dorothy A. Mays has shown, the 
colonial governments of New England and the mid-Atlantic initially inherited their marriage 
practices from English ecclesiastical law, but—comprising religious dissidents who had little 
if any regard for the Church of England—tended to revise these practices considerably 
according to local social and religious needs. Influenced by Calvinist and Lutheran ideals, 
many congregations of the New England colonies treated marriage as contractual rather than 
sacramental, making divorces generally easier to obtain, and thus more common.85 
Conflicting interpretations of marriage (and of a woman’s role in it) coexisted among 
colonial New England sects and even individual congregations of the same sect.86 In southern 
colonies settled predominantly by Anglicans, on the other hand, Church of England authority 
persisted and regularized church marriages were the norm. Divorce, accordingly, was rare in 
the south until after the American Revolution, granted as it was only in cases of extreme 
physical abuse or flagrant adultery. Following American independence, some southern states 
maintained their prohibition on absolute divorce, the only form of separation in which the 
parties were permitted to remarry; South Carolina, for example, would not lift its ban on this 
form of separation until 1868 (Mays 111). As Peter Hoffer writes, this general prohibition on 
divorce owed in small part to southern colonies’ (and later states’) persistence in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Dorothy A. Mays, Women in Early America: Struggle, Survival, and Freedom in a New World (Santa 
Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2004), p. 111. 
86 Larry Eldridge, Women and Freedom in Early America (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 
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Anglican Communion, but it also was intended to protect the wealth of large plantation 
owners against dissipation in divorce settlements.87 On the other side of the Atlantic, Scottish 
and English laws were silent on the regulation of colonial marriage. The Marriage Act of 
1753, for example, emphasized that “nothing in this Act shall extend to that Part of Great 
Britain called Scotland […] nor to any Marriages solemnized beyond the Seas” (qtd. in 
Probert 235). Thus, when Laura is kidnapped to the wilderness of North America, she is 
removed beyond the jurisdiction of all these constitutional protections. 
 
 
Patchy Constitutions and Brunton’s Colonial Picaresque 
In the maintenance of laws that differed among Scotland, England, and its overseas 
colonies, the British state created its female subjects in a condition of, to borrow Brunton’s 
word, “patchy” constitutional legitimacy. While there is little evidence in the available record 
that this constitutional patchiness was a practical problem for most female Britons, who 
tended to move infrequently over national borders, it is nevertheless the precise constitutional 
dilemma that Brunton imagines Laura to face: while Laura protects herself from Hargrave in 
Scotland and England by refusing her consent to sexual activity and marriage, this protection 
ends when he kidnaps her to the North American wilderness, an extra-legal space that 
becomes a site of Laura’s psychic and physiological extremity. 
The episodes of Self-Control’s picaresque form are produced by the patchy 
constitutional legitimacy of its heroine. As Katie Trumpener has written, 
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[Romantic-period picaresque] fiction begins to codify the different British 
peripheries and colonies into distinctive “chronotopes.” Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
notion of the literary chronotope theorizes the spatial-temporal parameters that 
determine the worldview of a fictional genre and the rules of operation that 
establish the direction, the pace, and the meaning of the stories unfolding 
within it. (xii) 
 Brunton offers an important reworking of one overseas chronotope in the North American 
episode of Self-Control, which explicitly situates the precarious constitutional legitimacy of 
Laura Montreville as the product of English chauvinism. In the extralegal space of North 
America, Hargrave takes Laura to the brink of constitutional ruin, signaled by the dissolution 
(Laura imagines) of her engagement to Montague De Courcy and the increasing likelihood 
that she will be unable to refuse marriage and sexual intercourse with Hargrave. Brunton’s 
narrator is emphatic in these pages about Laura’s advanced condition of deterioration: 
Laura’s form is “wasted” and her mind delusional, signaling that a collapse of Laura’s 
physiology and psychology inheres in the absence in North America of her constitutional 
right to consent—that most literal form of her Calvinist self control (262). 
The highly overwrought prose of Self-Control’s American chronotope caught the 
attention of many readers other than Jane Austen. In her journal, a lady described Lord 
Byron’s response to the novel at a party, where Self-Control was being read aloud by some of 
the guests; coming in and out of the room, the journal recalls, Byron couldn’t help “smiling 
at ‘the cant of it,’ as he termed all the serious parts” (Jackson 14). Self-Control’s melodrama, 
while apparently amusing to Austen’s and Byron’s more ironical sensibilities, is Brunton’s 
serious effort to demonstrate her heroine close in North America not only to utter social ruin, 
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but to death, just as in Colonel Brandon’s melodramatic story of Eliza Brandon in Austen’s 
Sense and Sensibility. The important difference between Austen and Brunton is that, while 
Austen confines melodrama to Colonel Brandon’s character, Brunton allows it full run of the 
novel’s discourse, where it spills through the thoughts of Self-Control’s narrator and 
characters alike, a formal failure of containment which contributes to Laura’s agoraphobic 
sexual panic in the North America. Here Hargrave is everywhere at once: 
Laura looked round to observe whether any trace of Hargrave’s presence was 
visible. None appeared. She examined every recess and corner of her new 
abode, as one who fears the lurking assassin. She ascertained that Hargrave 
was not its inmate; and thanked Heaven for the prospect of one night of peace. 
It was in vain, however, that she tried to discover how long this reprieve might 
last. The servants either could not or would not give her any information. 
(474) 
Laura’s inability in North America to track Hargrave’s rape threat is a form of that 
“collective agoraphobia” exerted upon Romantic-era Britons by what Colley calls “the vast 
empire abroad […] which few of them properly understood” (105). Just as it is difficult for 
Laura to manage her personal constitution in the so-called new world, it was difficult for 
many Britons even to fathom the existence of a coherent British constitution across the 
enormous empire they had acquired in the Atlantic world on the eve of the British Regency. 
In spite of this national agoraphobia, Brunton remained certain that a Scottish, or British, 
global identity was possible: “I do not see,” she confided in Mrs. Izett of Laura’s journey to 
North America, “the outrageous improbability with which it has been charged” (xlviii). She 
was later pleased to learn that her fellow Scotswoman, Joanna Baillie, also approved the 
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novel’s overseas episode: “I am no less gratified,” Brunton wrote to Baillie in March of 
1811, “that you praise the American expedition, which is in equal favour with me” 
(McKerrow 93). Brunton’s object in Self-Control, which her countrywomen Baillie seems to 
have recognized, was to highlight the acute political and legal problems of British women’s 
global identity and show that these problems differed in degree, but certainly not in kind, 
from the difficulties British women already faced at home. 
 Colonial chronotopes, particularly the colonial gothic, often articulate “a growing fear 
in British society around 1800 of the consequences of the nation’s exposure to colonial 
societies, nonwhite races, non-Christian belief systems, and the moral evils of slavery.”88 The 
colonial roots of British constitutional decline seemed clear to many, as this excerpt from 
Edward Long’s Candid Reflections […] Upon the Negroe-Cause (1772) demonstrates 
explicitly: 
[t]he lower classes of women in England are remarkably fond of the blacks; 
for reasons too brutal to mention they would connect themselves with horses 
and asses if the law permitted them. By these ladies they generally have a 
numerous brood. Thus, in the course of a few generations more the English 
blood will become […] contaminated with this mixture […] this alloy may 
spread so extensively as even to reach the middle, and then the higher orders 
of the people, till the whole nation resembles the Portuguese and the Moriscos 
in complexion of skin and baseness of mind. This is a venomous and 
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dangerous ulcer, that threatens to spread its malignancy far and wide, until 
every family catches infection from it.89 
For Long, the constitutional threat to “every family” in England, and thus the English 
constitution itself, inheres in the imagined contamination of “English blood” with a 
“mixture” of English and “black” blood from the colonies, a physiological change that 
eventually will produce “baseness of mind” in all English people. But Brunton’s picaresque 
refuses this popular understanding of the imperial British constitution. While Laura sees 
North America as a landscape “of exile, of degradation, – of death,” the “three Indians” who 
assist Hargrave in his plan to marry and rape Laura are not themselves figures of sexual 
threat. Rather, they are represented flatly as Hargrave’s minions, and Laura remains 
essentially ambivalent toward them, with occasional flights of partiality. One of these men 
speaks to Laura in a comforting “broken French,” assuring her “that he [will] not hurt her,” 
and he assists Laura through the wilderness, saving her at one point from a rattlesnake. 
Eventually, Laura tires and allows him to carry her through the wilderness, though her British 
sensibilities are at first repulsed by “such a mode of conveyance” (472). While Mary Brunton 
never traveled to North America, and probably did not have contact with native North 
Americans, she had at least one encounter with two so-called “colonial others” in her home 
in Bolton parish. Alexander Brunton, who would one day become a Professor of Hebrew and 
Oriental Languages at the University of Edinburgh, took special interest in students visiting 
Britain from the Indian subcontinent, and he invited two “East Indians” to stay with him and 
Mary at their home in the parish manse. Mary Brunton spent many hours with these young 
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people, “caring for their material needs,” and assisting her husband in their religious 
education. As Alexander Brunton recorded: 
[f]or this important work she had greater facilities now than she had enjoyed 
at any former period: and she applied herself to it with all her characteristic 
ardour. […] The Shorter Catechism of our church was the form on which she 
grounded her instruction to her young pupils; and while, with anxious and 
successful assiduity, she accompanied its language to their capacity, she never 
failed to speak in warm admiration of the vigour and condensation of thought 
by which it is very peculiarly distinguished. (McKerrow 66-67) 
Through the lens of postcolonial cultural criticism, it is easy to see in the Bruntons’ efforts 
with their “young pupils” Britain’s imperial effort to Christianize its empire. And yet, these 
lines from Alexander Brunton also bespeak a kind of progressive postcolonial domesticity, in 
which four multilingual scholars were, at least by Alexander’s account, thriving together in a 
Calvinist classroom. It is particularly telling that Brunton was educating her pupils in “The 
Shorter Catechism,” which was widely believed to be the more complicated version of the 
Church of Scotland’s statement of faith. 
While Brunton uses Self-Control’s episodic form to portray the limits on women’s 
constitutions imposed by Britain’s patchy constitutional protections, her more compelling 
insight is to situate the origin of those limits not in the desolate “rank,” “desolate,” “dreary,” 
and “forlorn” landscape of North America, nor in Laura’s Indian captors, but in the 
machinations of two of the novel’s English characters: Colonel Hargrave—Laura’s 
“elegant,” “accomplished” lover, whose English “person [is, to Laura] symmetry itself”—
and Laura’s Aunt Pelham (7). As Hargrave divulges to Laura in this final, most sinister letter: 
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you must pardon me if I am explicit with you. I have known the disposition of 
Lady Pelham’s fortune from the hour when it was made. You know that with 
all my faults I am not sordid; but circumstances have rendered money 
necessary to me. Except in the event of Lord Lincourt’s death, I cannot return 
to England otherwise than as your husband. (478) 
Unlike so much of the colonial and postcolonial fiction of her time, Brunton’s work is not 
underpinned by the threat of contact with non-Christian religions, nonwhite races, and 
interracial sexuality, but by the unprincipled ambitions of an English dowager and a 
handsome English army officer in line for the peerage, who are exposed as the real cause of 
British constitutional decline. 
Like the “foreign Gothic,” Brunton’s colonial picaresque also is characterized by its 
use of a “third location” in which “the traumas and defeats of the past” are “reenacted under 
a different banner, reterritorialized into a phantom or simulacrum and thus recoded within the 
supposed logic of a foreign body” (qtd. in Punter 106-7). Brunton selects as a “third space” 
the extralegal territory beyond Britain’s North American empire, probably in present-day 
Canada. Taking pains to remove Laura from Quebec and Montreal, through “woods 
impervious to the light,” to a place where there is “no trace” of “human footstep,” Brunton 
has in mind not Britain’s settled North American colonies, but an unknown frontier beyond 
imperial borders, where, like Christ in the wilderness, Laura’s self control can be tested 
absolutely (471, 472). Laura’s American adventure appended to an otherwise British story 
thus becomes, as Brunton herself noted, precisely as conspicuous as a linnet with a peacock’s 
tail: a small, unassuming bird native to the British Isles encumbered on one end by exotic 
plumage known only to Britons from the very ends of their empire. 
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The traumatic national past reenacted in Self-Control’s “third space” is the story of 
Jessy Wilson, the oldest daughter of the De Courcy’s servants, John and Margaret, who is 
brutally raped by Hargrave and dies after giving birth to his illegitimate son, Henry. After 
Laura hears Jessy’s story from Margaret on a visit to the De Courcy home, it periodically 
haunts her memory, finally returning to terrorize her during her kidnapping to North 
America: 
[s]he suddenly remembered Jessy Wilson. Starting, with an exclamation of 
horror and affright, she sought some weapon which might dispense to her a 
death less terrible; and instinctively grasping her penknife, hid it in her bosom. 
The next moment she shrank from her purpose, and doubted the lawfulness of 
such defence. (466) 
Brunton’s doubling of Jessy and Laura’s stories demonstrates the fictivity of British law, 
which is exactly as effective in Britain at preventing Jessy’s rape and Laura’s false arrest and 
kidnapping as it is “beyond the Seas,” where it explicitly has no force; for Jessy and Laura 
after her, Brunton insists, the guarantees of the British Constitution ultimately make no 
difference. In the world of Austen’s Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice, English 
heroines are by and large protected against the sexual coercion of men by strong familial 
constitutions and their own health in the legally unambiguous, constitutionally stable English 
countryside. Though Marianne Dashwood and Lydia Bennet each come perilously close to 
constitutional ruin, the real fallen women of Austen’s early fiction remain offstage and highly 
coded under the generic signs of melodrama. In Self-Control, on the other hand, Brunton 
imagines a larger, more frightening global reality in which Laura and Jessy are afforded few 
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social and no legal protections from the advances of an English colonel, a figure of both 
military and sexual aggression. 
While Self-Control explores these serious fissures in British constitutional law, 
Brunton had by no means lost faith in the idea of Britain. By removing Laura to a “third 
space” of absolute constitutional distress, Brunton also establishes Britain as the homeland to 
which Laura safely can escape. Laura—whose first language is Gaelic; whose father strongly 
encouraged her in national prejudices against the English; and who has been assaulted for 
most of the novel by an Englishman—returns neither to Scotland nor to England, but to 
“Britain,” where she marries the Englishman, De Courcy, in a figurative act of national 
union. As we have observed in the previous chapter, Austen’s Marianne Dashwood and 
Lydia Bennet make limited returns to constitutional wholeness; Eliza Brandon does not 
return at all. Laura, on the other hand—her constitution much more compromised than 
Marianne’s or Lydia’s—experiences a full return to health and meaningful social life in 
Britain. Austen’s is a fiction of limited recoveries; Brunton’s is a fiction of absolute ones. 
This is why Austen—applying Aristotle’s requirement from the Poetics that tragedy, 
comedy, and epic should represent a series of probable events—found in 1813 nothing of 
“Probability” in Self-Control.90 As Austen saw it, and as her own novels bear out, a British 
woman’s ability to survive the events of Self-Control with her constitution fully intact was 
highly improbable and, as her joke to Cassandra suggests, ultimately not to be taken seriously 
as literature. As we have noted, however, Brunton did not see the “outrageous improbability” 
with which Self-Control’s American episode had been charged—and this is because Brunton 
believed absolutely, as Austen of course did not, in the real-world effects of a Calvinist ethic, 	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which are borne out quite explicitly in the structure and allusions of Self Control’s American 
episode. 
Having spent her first day in North America in transit and her second day confined in 
terror to Hargrave’s cabin, Laura awakes on her third day in the wilderness momentarily 
refreshed. After her attendant, Mary, brings her a small breakfast and notifies her that 
Hargrave is due to arrive in the evening, the two women go walking through the woods, 
where Laura’s 
eye rested as it fell, upon a track as of recent footsteps. They had brushed 
away the dew, and the rank grass had not yet risen from their pressure. The 
unwonted trace of man’s presence arrested her attention; and her mind, 
exhausted by suffering, and sharing the weakness of its frail abode, admitted 
the superstitious thought that these marks afforded a providential indication 
for her guidance. (483, my emphasis) 
As important echoes of Calvin’s teachings, the terms “superstitious” and “providential” 
deserve special attention here. Calvin held that “while some [religious people] lose 
themselves in superstitious observances, and others, of set purpose, wickedly revolt from 
God, the result is that […] all are so degenerate, that in no part of the world can genuine 
godliness be found” (Institutes 46). In calling Laura’s thoughts “superstitious” (the most 
common codeword for Roman Catholicism during the period), Brunton’s narrator disciplines 
them for what Calvin would call their inherent “ungodliness.” And yet, in spite of the 
superstition that flashes across Laura’s weakened mind, Brunton maintains her heroine as 
one of God’s elect: the “providential” crushing of the grass shows that Laura, like Christ, is 
not destined to die alone in the wilderness. 
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In what remains of the novel’s North American episode, Brunton rearranges the 
terrorizing elements of the American wilderness into a Calvinist fulfillment of Laura’s 
foreordained salvation. The “providential” “recent footsteps” that mark the path through the 
grass, for example, belong to her Indian captors, whose foreign “method of conveyance” 
once repulsed Laura so thoroughly. Following the footsteps, Laura comes upon a moored 
Indian canoe—the same one used to transport her in terror to Hargrave’s cabin—which she 
again boards on her journey homeward. Laura’s final passage over a waterfall (during which 
the canoe dangerously capsizes) secures her safety from Hargrave with the sacramental 
ablution of a baptism. Laura is not only Christ here, but Jonah: after three harrowing days of 
seclusion—not in Hell or the belly of the whale, but in the constitutional desert of North 
America—she is miraculously reconstituted as a British subject. That Self-Control becomes a 
Romantic-period allegory to both Old and New Testaments is highly consistent with 
Brunton’s professed purpose to provide Biblical guidance to young British women living in 
age of “lax morality” in the more palatable form of the novel: “[w]hen the vitiated appetite 
refuses its proper food,” she wrote in Self-Control’s preface to Joanna Baillie, 
the alternative may be administered in a sweetmeat. It may be imprudent to 
confess the presence of the medicine, lest the sickly palate, thus warned, turn 
from it in loathing. But I rely in this instance on the […] philosopher, who 
avers that “young ladies never read prefaces.” (vi) 
The novel’s retelling of the Bible—with a female Christ figure living under a Calvinist 
framework of self discipline—becomes on Brunton’s view a “medicine” to heal the ailing 
moral constitutions of Great Britain’s young ladies. 
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Many of Brunton’s contemporary readers were surprised to find such violent and 
sexually explicit themes in a novel claiming to elaborate the “religious principle” of its virgin 
heroine. As Jackson notes, “[o]ne of the hostile reviews asked rhetorically whether 
responsible parents would want their daughters ‘to take up a religious novel and read of 
rapes’” (14, anonymous reviewer’s emphasis). But the proximity of religion and sexual 
violence is largely Brunton’s point. Her solution to British women’s constitutional dilemmas 
is Calvinist discipline, through which women can control not only their own constitutions but 
the constitutions of men like Hargrave—without the legal protections of the British state. 
With what Jackson calls a “faith-based moral seriousness,” Brunton insists that women’s self 
control is necessary to a strong British constitution, particularly because of brutal global 
realities that many novelists of the period were content to either treat at a distance or leave 
entirely untouched (14). 
Thus, in spite of the nationalist divisions between Laura and Hargrave and the 
harrowing threats of Britain’s vast empire to Laura’s person, Laura finally marries safely and 
happily into one of England’s oldest families, who traces its lineage to William the 
Conqueror (93). Montague De Courcy, Laura’s English but Edinburgh-educated husband, 
shares her acquired sense of Britishness (98). Following their wedding, the couple divide 
their time between Glenalbert, Scotland and the De Courcy family home in England in a 
gesture of British self-identification. While perhaps less attractive to twenty-first century 
audiences than the companionate English marriages imagined by Austen, the “chastened 
affection, tempered desires, useful employment, and devout meditation” Laura and De 
Courcy share in marriage are Brunton’s vision of an explicitly British domestic fulfillment: 
by reinstating Laura to the constitutional protections of her homeland and adding the 
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constitutional protections of marriage, Brunton removes the constitutional threats presented 
to Laura by Hargrave in particular and the British empire in general (500). 
 
 
“A comparison of the two extremities of the island”91 
And yet in Discipline, her second and last completed novel, Brunton substantially 
revises Self-Control’s ideals of self control and Anglo-Scottish intermarriage in favor of a 
more clearly articulated—but finally deeply ambivalent—form of Scottish nationalism. 
Increasingly critical of the role played by wealthy English people in Britain’s national 
constitution, and increasingly sympathetic to the plight of the men and women of Scotland’s 
downtrodden Celtic fringe, Brunton proposes in her second novel a Calvinist program of self 
discipline for the reformation of an unprincipled leisure class she saw among the English in 
general, and in London in particular. This marked change in Brunton’s disposition toward the 
English seems to have grown out of a long holiday she and her husband took to England in 
1812, just before she began the manuscript of Discipline. In her journal from that year, 
Brunton explains the real differences she observed between Scotland and England in what 
she called “[a] comparison of the two extremities of the island”: “[y]ou no sooner cross the 
boundary,” Brunton observed, “than you are sensibly in another kingdom. Near 
neighbourhood and constant intercourse have effected little intercommunity of language, 
manners, or appearance. Before you advance ten miles on English ground, the women are 
prettier, the accent is perceptibly English, and hats and shoes are universal” (McKerrow 103). 
The comparative wealth Brunton saw among the English was accompanied by a lack of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Mary Brunton qtd. in McKerrow 122. 
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religious discipline; she was surprised to find in Greatham, for example, that the English 
waiter at the town’s local inn did not know the name of his own parish minister: “Intimate 
and affectionate relation between pastor and flock!” she exclaimed in ironical disbelief 
(Emmeline 105). This lack of proper religious discipline among the English was crystallized 
for Brunton later in the trip at a Covent Garden oratorio, where her religious sensibilities 
were offended by the irreverence of the London crowd during a performance that ended with 
Handel’s “Halleluiah Chorus” from The Messiah. Brunton remembers: 
All went on peaceably enough, till it pleased [the London tenor, John] 
Braham, the most delightful singer that ever sung, to sing a nonsensical song 
about Lord Nelson. Although the words and tune were equally despicable, the 
song was encored; Braham was engaged elsewhere, and went off without 
complying. The next performer, Mrs Ashe, a sweet, modest looking creature, 
whose figure declared her to be in no fit situation to bear fright or ill-usage, 
tried to begin her song, but was stopped by a tremendous outcry. She tried it 
again and again, but not a note could be heard, and she desisted. The 
Halleluiah chorus was begun; but the people bawled, and whistled and hissed, 
and thumped, and shrieked and groaned, and hooted, and made a thousand 
indescribable noises besides, till they fairly drowned the organ, the French 
horns, the kettle-drums, and—the Halleluiah chorus! (McKerrow 117) 
The failure of self discipline in London is signaled by the crowd’s encore of a tune with 
“despicable” lyrics, Mrs. Ashe’s appearance in public while pregnant, and—most offensive 
to Brunton of all—the derision by a mob of Handel’s famous proclamation of God’s eternal 
supremacy. Finding herself in a kind of modern Babel, Brunton felt confirmed in many of the 
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suspicions of London culture she had begun to voice in Self-Control with the unprincipled 
English characters of Hargrave and Lady Pelham—suspicions that became severe and certain 
critiques in Discipline. 
Once again, a synopsis is helpful; the argument resumes on page 125. The novel, 
which is the spiritual Bildungsroman of its English-born narrator, Ellen Percy, begins at 
Ellen’s father’s villa at Richmond and in the lavish ball and drawing rooms of other parts of 
London. Like Laura Montreville, Ellen loses her mother at the novel’s outset but, quite 
differently from Laura, embarks on a path of materialism and thoughtless flirtation, 
supported by the enormous fortune her indulgent English father has acquired as a merchant 
with the East India Company—and in spite of the spiritual guidance offered her by her 
mother’s childhood friend, Miss Mortimer, who is a Scottish Presbyterian. One of her 
father’s associates, Mr. Maitland, a virtuous Scottish MP and also a Presbyterian, meets and 
falls in love with Ellen in Richmond—but Ellen already has become entangled in an English 
plot on her fortune. Lady St. Edmund and Lord Frederick de Burgh (Discipline’s version of 
Lady Pelham and Hargrave, respectively) have conspired to remove Ellen to Scotland, where 
an irregular border marriage will consolidate Ellen’s wealth to Lord Frederick’s titled but 
impoverished family. Ellen—pressured by her shallow friend, Juliet Arnold, and threatened 
by Lord Frederick’s sister, Maria—consents to the elopement, which is cut short when Lord 
Frederick learns that Ellen’s father has been ruined and that none of the Percy fortune 
remains. By this time, Maitland has removed himself from his acquaintance with Ellen 
because, though he remains convinced of Ellen’s basic goodness, the company she keeps 
among the English disgusts him. After the loss of her fortune, Lord Frederick, Lady St. 
Edmund, and Juliet Arnold also abandon Ellen, who, following her father’s suicide, is flung 
	   124	  
to the streets where she becomes ill and delusional. Fortuitously, Miss Mortimer reappears on 
the scene to supply Ellen a modest shelter and assist in her physiological and spiritual 
recovery, though she dies from an unnamed illness before Ellen’s reformation is complete. In 
the wake of her death, Miss Mortimer’s will recommends Ellen to the care of friends in 
Edinburgh, the Murray family. Due to a series of missed meetings with the Murrays, Ellen 
lives in poverty in Edinburgh until finding a situation as governess to the Boswell family; 
wrongly imagining a budding romance between her husband and Ellen, however, the 
unstable Mrs. Boswell has Ellen removed to an Edinburgh lunatic asylum, where she suffers 
from a fever contracted from the Boswells’ daughter, Jessie.92 After her release from the 
asylum, Ellen meets a variety of old and new friends, including the newly impoverished 
Juliet Arnold, who has consented to an irregular Scottish marriage to Lord Glendower, which 
he fails to honor in favor of a more regularized marriage to the English Maria De Burgh. 
Grieving over his betrayal, Juliet sinks into illness and, in spite of Ellen’s faithful nursing, 
dies. Following Juliet’s death, Ellen meets the Highlander Charlotte Graham and travels with 
Charlotte to her Highland home in Glen Eredine, where Ellen eventually is married to 
Charlotte’s brother, Henry, who is next in line to be laird. The novel’s most significant plot 
twist is to reveal in its final pages that Henry Graham is the real identity of the Scottish MP 
Maitland, who originally fell in love with Ellen in London and has been trying ever since his 
disappearance from the novel’s first volume to rescue her from the tribulations that followed 
her father’s death and the loss of her fortune. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Clearly the Boswells are a reference to Dr. Johnson’s famous Scottish friend; they are such a fleeting and odd 
presence in Brunton’s novel, however, that it remains difficult to discern if she intended the family as a 
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 Although Ellen remains on the British Isles for the whole of Discipline, the scope 
of the novel’s concern is as broad as Self-Control’s. Instead of exploring the problem of 
English coercion and Scottish vulnerability abroad, however, Discipline highlights the reflux 
of these colonial problems first to London and Greenwich and then to the Scottish Lowlands 
and Highlands. Using this geopolitical schematic as a rough scaffolding, Brunton’s novel 
remaps Great Britain according to a concept Alan Bewell has identified as “colonial return” 
(13). As Bewell explains, “figures of colonial return” were those Britons who had traveled 
and lived in Britain’s tropical colonies only to return home with permanent constitutional 
damage inflicted by the ravages of equatorial disease environments that contained pathogens 
to which British constitutions lacked immunity. Normally, figures of colonial return were 
service members in Britain’s army and navy—but overseas merchants, colonial 
administrators, and their families often succumbed as well to this widely acknowledged 
constitutional threat. “Colonial return” became especially visible as diseases known only in 
the empire abroad began appearing in London and other major British cities as afflicted 
British colonists returned home, making it seem particularly certain to some that individual 
and thus national constitutional decline was immanent in the British imperial project. 
Looking back in 1852 to the beginnings of Britain’s empire, Robert Dundas, for example, 
appended to his Sketches of Brazil the sinister subtitle Remarks on a Premature Decay of the 
System Incident to Europeans on Their Return from Hot Climates (Bewell 13). Brunton’s 
particular innovation in Discipline is to encode the internal divisions among the Scottish 
Highlands, the Scottish Lowlands, and England by their levels of susceptibility to colonial 
return: in Brunton’s London the likelihood of colonial return is absolute; to the north in 
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Scotland, the inherent Calvinist discipline of Scottish culture tends to keep at bay 
constitutional threats from abroad. As Bewell has written: 
[i]t is striking how far discipline shaped the lives of British, and especially 
Scottish, colonists. Read within the context of colonial epidemiology, the 
British emphasis on discipline may be less the expression of an intrinsic 
national moral outlook than a reflection of epidemiological anxiety—a fear 
perhaps that self-control was the only thing that might keep one alive. (26) 
For Brunton, discipline probably remained first and foremost “the expression of an intrinsic 
[Scottish Calvinist] moral outlook” before it was a “reflection of epidemiological anxiety”—
but she remains clear in Discipline that the Anglo-Scottish relationship, and with it the 
British constitution, was significantly troubled by an unprincipled English element that 
required a Scottish—and particularly a Calvinist—variety of moral discipline for both 
individual and national health. 
And yet, there is a marked uncertainty in Discipline about Scotland’s ability to resist 
the national constitutional decay of colonial reflux brought on by the English. As Ellen 
recovers from the shock of her father’s death and the loss of her fortune, she, like Harriet in 
Austen’s Emma, joins Miss Mortimer in a visit to the three members of a poor Highland 
family, the Campbells, who are living in a “low dark apartment in the meanest part of 
Greenwich” where the “vapour” is so “stagnant” Ellen can “scarcely breathe.” The 
Campbells, we learn, have come to London from the Highlands looking for employment; Mr. 
Campbell is a gardener, but is unable to find work in the south until applying to his 
countryman, Mailtland, who finds a position for him at the villa of one Mr. Percy of 
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Richmond, who is of course Ellen’s father. This is how Ellen remembers the Campbells’ 
story: 
I was become cautious; and, without betraying myself, asked whether they 
had ever seen Miss Percy. The woman answered that they had not; having 
entered on their service the same day that their master’s family removed to 
town. The evil influence of Miss Percy, however, had blasted all their hopes 
and comforts. She had given peremptory orders that some delicate exotics 
should be forced into flower to adorn an entertainment. Poor Campbell, 
deputed to take care of them, watched them all night in the hot-house; then 
walked two miles to his lodging through a thick drift of snow; breathed ever 
afterwards with pain; struggled against disease; wrought hard in the sharp 
mornings and chilly evenings of spring; and, when my father could no longer 
repay his services, was dismissed to die. (186-87) 
The pathogenic humid atmosphere and the exotic flora of Britain’s tropical colonies appear 
in this passage at the Percy’s Richmond hot-house in support of Ellen’s personal, imperial 
luxury. Mr. Campbell, whose Scottish constitution has been seasoned in the more northerly 
climes of the Highlands, falls ill when he is exposed to tropical temperatures and then 
suddenly to the cold winter weather of the British Isles. Unable to bear this imperial range of 
meteorological conditions, Mr. Campbell unwittingly becomes what Alan Bewell has called 
a “tropical invalid,” or that “new kind of patient […] with ‘a constitution […] wasted and 
debilitated’” by pathogenic colonial environments (Curtis qtd. in Bewell 13). As we learn 
later in the story, Mr. Campbell finally succumbs to his consumption, his death invoking the 
tragically common Romantic-period reality that a British servant class—normally military 
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service members, but in this case an impoverished Scottish gardener—succumbed in 
disproportionate numbers when British constitutions of all classes were increasingly exposed 
to the tropics (Bewell 82). 
 In the same Greenwich apartment, the Campbells’ infant son suffers from 
smallpox—another colonial disease, which was the European scourge of populations native 
to the Americas during the age of imperialism. “William Bradford,” for example, “after 
observing that, in contact with smallpox, the natives of the Connecticut River ‘dye like rotten 
sheep,’ notes with some satisfaction that ‘by the 
marvelous goodness and providens of God not one of 
the English was so much as sicke, or in the least 
measure tainted with this disease” (Bewell 5). But as 
medical historian Deborah Brunton has shown, the 
Scottish Highlands and the Hebrides also were the site 
of several smallpox outbreaks, a major one in the late 
1790s, about a decade before Mary Brunton began 
Discipline, when inoculation efforts of the British state failed in these distantly removed 
Scottish populations.93 That illness generally, and smallpox in particular, characterized life in 
the Scottish Highlands is borne out by the above rather cruel example of 1763 English 
Wilkite propaganda titled “Famine,” in which a starving clansman freezes in his insufficient 
tartan while scratching at a worsening skin condition, consistent with the lesions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Deborah Brunton, “Smallpox Inoculation and Demographic Trends in Eighteenth-Century 
Scotland,” Medical History 36, no. 4 (October 1992): 403–29. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1036632/. So far as my research shows, Deborah is not directly 
related to Mary and Alexander. 
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smallpox.94 These conditions of poverty and disease made the lives of Scottish Highlanders 
strikingly similar to those of British colonial subjects. In Discipline’s Greenwich scene, 
therefore, not only have the colonial diseases of consumption and smallpox arrived just east 
of London at the seat of Britain’s naval power; they have been carried there by postcolonial 
Highland bodies, whose human identities are obscured by their illnesses to the eyes of an 
Englishwoman: as Ellen recalls, the Campbells’ son “scarcely retained a trace of human 
likeness,” though certainly he retains his humanity in the eyes of his Scottish parents (186). 
 Just as Laura Montreville’s constitutional extremity in Self-Control is the product 
of prolonged English sexual coercion, so in Discipline is Scottish constitutional decline 
caused by English greed and immorality. “On my entrance,” Ellen recalls, Mrs. Campbell 
“started up to offer me the only seat which her apartment contained; and the poor Scotchman, 
with national courtesy to a superior, would have risen to receive me, – but was unable to 
move without help.” When Ellen sees the Campbells struggling under the burdens of their 
colonial illnesses and their nationalized inferiority, Ellen suddenly, emphatically realizes: “it 
was my work” (187, Brunton’s emphasis). Scottish Highland illness and inferiority are 
produced in this scene by Ellen’s English claims to national superiority and disproportionate 
English ascendency within the British empire, which are embodied in Ellen’s greed, 
materialism, beauty, and good health. 
 If Brunton saw English imperial greed at the heart of Highland suffering, her 
solution in Discipline was to use the English Ellen Percy to ventriloquize these concerns, and 
then to commit Ellen to a particularly Scottish variety of personal reformation: namely, the 
moral discipline of the Presbyterian Church and the more explicitly Foucauldian bodily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Image from Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1807, p. 115. 
	   130	  
discipline of grating poverty following the failure of her father’s colonial ambitions and her 
subsequent confinement in an Edinburgh asylum. The novel enacts these Scottish forms of 
discipline by using English characters to destabilize Ellen’s own English constitution as well 
as that of her English friend, Juliet, who, we noted earlier, is tricked into an irregular Scottish 
marriage by an unprincipled Englishman. Ultimately, Brunton makes both Ellen and Juliet 
dependent upon the care of the Highlander Mrs. Campbell when they occasion to meet her 
again in Edinburgh; now living in a “clean though humble” home and recovered from her 
family’s tragedies in Greenwich, the widowed Mrs. Campbell offers to care for Juliet and 
Ellen, who remarks wistfully on the reversal of their positions affected by “the changes of 
this restless world” (314). Later, when the Boswells employ her, Ellen imagines herself 
“degraded into slavery” (290). The English colonizers—through their undisciplined living—
have become, as Ellen sees it, as wretched as the colonized.  
 And yet, Brunton’s apparently clear-cut nationalist position—that Scotland, and 
especially the Scottish Highlands, were immunized by Calvinist discipline to the pathologic 
reflux of the British empire—is nevertheless marked by a deep undercurrent of ambivalence: 
perhaps, Brunton suggests in Discipline, Scotland already was unalterably complicit in the 
moral transgressions of the British empire. This ambivalence is best articulated in the 
Scottish MP and East India merchant Maitland who, among other contradictions, is an 
abolitionist who owns slaves. As Ellen explains: 
[a]wake, as he ever was, to the claims of justice and humanity, it was not 
personal interest that could shield the slave trade from the reprobation of 
Maitland. He conquered his retiring nature that, in the senate of his country, 
he might lend his testimony against this foulest of her crimes; and when that 
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senate stilled the general cry with a poor promise of distant reform, he blushed 
for England and for human kind. Somewhat of the same honest shame he felt 
at the recollection that he was himself the proprietor of many hundreds of his 
fellow-creatures. (130) 
This is a truly curious passage. Ellen is inclined to associate the shame of the Atlantic slave 
trade with the English: the abolitionist Maitland, on her view, blushes primarily “for 
England.” But this association is undercut by Maitland’s “recollection” that he, a Scot, is also 
a slave owner. Brunton’s unsettling implication is that Maitland, with an insidious variety of 
Scottish self-division, regularly forgets his own “shame[ful]” role in the empire. Ellen—fresh 
from her realization that Scottish constitutional problems are owing to English ascendency in 
the Union—struggles, too, to acknowledge Scotland’s complicity in the Triangle Trade, that 
“foulest of […] crimes.” Ellen and Maitland thus dramatize an acute constitutional problem 
of the Anglo-Scottish union: the obstacles to abolition presented by “the senate of 
[Maitland’s] country”—Parliament, that is—are represented by Ellen as English, not Scottish 
or British. In Discipline, therefore, the tendency for Great Britain to be construed as England 
becomes not a figure for the elision of Scottish and Welsh politics and culture, but 
Maitland’s, Ellen’s—and perhaps also Brunton’s—reluctance to acknowledge Scotland’s 
implication in the most immoral offshore activities of the British empire. 
Brunton’s initial effort in Discipline to situate Scottish discipline as an antidote to 
English constitutional dissipation therefore comes to an impasse. The clearest formal result 
of this impasse is Ellen’s revelation very late in the novel that the Scottish MP and colonial 
merchant Maitland is actually the Highland clansman, Henry Graham, who uses his 
pseudonym when transacting business in Europe and London on behalf of Britain’s empire. 
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He is called by his given Scottish name only when he returns to the Highlands, in an effort to 
distance himself, his family, and the Highland community at Glen Eredine from the ill effects 
of his ambitions. For Ellen, however, the name Maitland itself remains fraught with the 
complications of imperial reflux—the “self-reproach” and “regret” of her luxurious life in 
London—and so she resolves never again to call Henry by his British name (371). 
Consequently, the integration of Ellen’s newly disciplined English constitution into Highland 
life is extensive, but incomplete: she is “united” to the Highland community through her 
marriage to Henry Graham, she retains her old English superiority as “the mother of their 
future chieftan”; and though Ellen’s moral life is largely reformed by the novel’s end, she yet 
maintains “a little of the coquettish sauciness of Ellen Percy” (375). Most ominously of all, 
Henry, Ellen, and Henry’s sister, Charlotte, represent the appearance in the Highlands of the 
Atlantic slave trade, for it is from her new home in Glen Eredine that Ellen maintains her 
own stake in the “large plantation which [she, Henry, and Charlotte] all superintend together” 
(371). Previously confined to London, the reflux of Britain’s empire reaches the Highlands as 
a result of Henry and Ellen’s international marriage. Thus—in spite of the tenuous British 
domesticity she establishes in Self-Control between Laura and De Courcy—Brunton finally 
could not maintain Anglo-Scottish intermarriage as an arrangement immune to the 
constitutional problems posed by the political unification of England and Scotland and their 
mutually dependent role on Britain’s imperial stage. 
§ 
Marking a new chapter in the long tradition of the self-divided Scot, Brunton 
positioned her own intellectual life squarely at the nexus of Scottish nationalism on one hand 
and a united, imperial, English-speaking Great Britain on the other. Writing in 1813 to 
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Joanna Baillie, who was living abroad in England that year, Brunton confided a lasting 
nationalist disposition: “I hope,” Brunton ventured, “you will be so national as to let me say, 
that a pretty English knoll is not half so exhilarating as the top of a Scotch hill” (Emmeline 
lx). And yet, on August 15, 1814, the day she finished the manuscript for Discipline, Brunton 
wrote to Mrs. Izett: 
I began the Gaelic Grammar y’day. The pronunciation is terribly 
unintelligible. “There is no sound like this in English” is a very spirit-braking 
index. I fear I shall never make out the true croaking and spluttering. If I 
persevere, however, I may astonish you when we meet – shocking your ears 
with your dear native tongue spoken in the barbarous accents of a southron. 
(McKerrow 133) 
The English instructions of Brunton’s Gaelic Grammar—that “[t]here is no sound like this in 
English”—equally frustrate Brunton’s mind, which thinks in English, and her Scottish 
nationalist disposition to learn Gaelic; together these opposing constitutional forces turn her 
into a person of “barbarous accents”—not really a “colonial other,” but a peculiar variety of 
Scottish nationalist made alien exactly by her sense of nationalism. 
In the same letter, Brunton characterizes the novel as a genre particularly suited to 
addressing the kind of constitutional dilemma she was facing in her program to learn Gaelic: 
[Scot’s Waverly] delights my very soul. […] I think a fiction containing a just 
representation of human beings and of their actions – a connected, interesting 
and probable story, conducing to a useful and impressive moral lesson – might 
be one of the greatest efforts of human genius. Let the admirable construction 
of fable in Tom Jones be employed to unfold characters like Miss Edgworth’s 
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[sic] – let it be told with the eloquence of Rousseau, and with the simplicity of 
Goldsmith – let it be all this, and Milton need not have been ashamed of the 
work! (McKerrow 133) 
Imagining a novel constituted by Scottish, English, Irish, and Swiss formal elements, and 
celebrating the work of her countryman, Sir Walter Scott, she nevertheless sets the English 
poet Milton as their judge, suggesting that Brunton, more like Wordsworth than some might 
care to acknowledge, still saw the English as the chief arbiters of literary taste in Britain. But 
with the “patch-work” of characters and settings she imagined in Self-Control and Discipline, 
the novel already had become for Brunton something more than a Scottish advance into an 
English literary market: it was rather a multi-national genre capable of addressing the 
English—and Scottish—problems inhering in a British constitution. 
  
 
CHAPTER III 
“That Mixture of Character”95: Constitutional Instability in Austen’s Sanditon 
The death of Princess Charlotte Augusta on November 6, 1817, within hours of her 
first son’s stillbirth, marked one of the most acute constitutional crises of the British 
Regency. Most evident in this national tragedy was that Britain had lost its future queen and 
king—as well as the constitutional stability they embodied—for neither Princess Charlotte 
nor her estranged parents had any other children. Reflecting on this loss thirty years later, 
during the opening years of Queen Victoria’s reign, writer and translator Harriet Martineau 
called Charlotte’s death “the great historical event of 1817”—“never,” she continued, “was a 
whole nation plunged in such deep and universal grief. From the highest to the lowest, this 
death was felt as a calamity that demanded the intense sorrow of domestic misfortune.” (Qtd. 
in Behrendt 1) As Stephen Behrendt notes, Martineau’s conflation of Charlotte’s “personal 
and public life, domestic and national interest,” and her position as “citizen and sovereign” is 
why her loss could be felt so universally: Charlotte was a figure who embodied many 
different meanings of the British constitution (1). 
Other circumstances had increased Charlotte’s appeal to her presumptive subjects. 
Since her 1816 marriage to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Charlotte been celebrated 
increasingly by the British public as an “attractive and acceptable alternative” to her mother, 
Caroline of Brunswick, who, as we saw in this study’s first chapter, had long been gaining 	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renown as Britain’s most visible fallen woman (Behrendt 2). Caroline’s real or imagined 
transgressions against her husband, the Prince Regent, were matched by his own, which—
with irresponsible spending habits costing British taxpayers in excess of 3 million pounds 
since his twenty-first birthday—had begun considerably to erode his own popularity. In 
December of 1815, two years before Princess Charlotte died, diarist and novelist Charlotte 
Bury recorded in her journal that: 
[o]n late occasion, when His Royal Highness went to church (to receive the 
sacrament) he was hissed and groaned at, both going and coming. He was 
afraid of going in state through the streets as he should have done, but went in 
his private carriage through the park. But the mob found him out, and clung to 
the wheels, hissing […] and the church (the chapel royal) was surrounded by 
soldiers, who would not let in a peer’s son.96 
Bury’s portrait is of a national constitution destabilized by the unpopularity of the Regent: 
concealing himself in a private coach instead of going to church publicly “as he should have 
done,” he interacts with his subjects in the amalgamated form of a clinging and hissing mob, 
a more reptilian version of Edmund Burke’s “swinish multitude” from Reflections Upon the 
Revolution in France. In Martineau’s explanation, the Regent’s fear transforms free-born 
Britons into something at least akin to the French rioters who, in Burke’s account, had 
entered Marie Antoinette’s bedchamber in 1789.97 Britain’s military, which had lately 
acquitted itself victoriously at Waterloo, is now required in London to protect the monarch 
from his people while he is at prayer. In addition to providing a respectable alternative to her 	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mother, therefore, Princess Charlotte was widely expected to relieve the British people from 
her father’s blatantly ineffectual leadership upon her ascension to the throne. 
 Britain’s constitutional stability also was being rocked during this period by usual 
postwar problems: with a common French enemy soundly defeated at Waterloo, Britons of 
all stations were faced at home with unemployment, rising food costs, and a social system 
inadequate to the support of soldiers and sailors returning from Europe and the British 
colonies, many of whom had been invalided by their service. While local relief was 
sometimes available, these social problems were largely under the administration of George 
IV’s facile leadership, bureaucratic deficiencies of Great Britain’s government, and partisan 
wrangling in London. Thus, perceived threats to the British constitution were no longer 
coming from the French abroad, but from the capital, a popular sentiment that was confirmed 
by the 1819 “Peterloo Massacre” of protestors by government troops in the city of 
Manchester. 
In view of her parents’ perceived moral inadequacies, the well-publicized madness of 
her grandfather, King George III, and the difficulties of a postwar domestic economy, it is 
not surprising that the young Charlotte became for Britons a critical public figure, standing 
for the possibility that the Hanoverian line, and Britain with it, might recover one day soon 
from the constitutional weaknesses signified by the older members of the royal family. Other 
circumstances made it easy for the British public to see Charlotte as a princess apart from her 
family: it was reputed that Charlotte was badly mistreated by her father, who forbade her 
attendance at his social functions at Carlton House, prevented her from having a circle of 
female friends, and made it difficult for her to have only the most basic contact with her 
mother. “The British people,” Behrendt notes, 
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came to see in Charlotte’s plight – as a victim of the Regent and by extension 
of the government and of the status quo generally – a measure of their own. 
And because she was attractive both physically and socially (in contrast to 
both her parents), the people found it easy to invest her with […] nationalistic 
views of ‘Englishness’: liveliness, extroversion, independence of mind and 
spirit, and an easy commerce with the public generally. Charlotte seemed to 
break the royal mould of the aloof, elitist ruler, crossing the traditional barriers 
[…] separating the nobility from the rest of society. (20) 
Thus, Princess Charlotte came to personify the increasingly complicated constitution of 
postwar Britain alongside the figures of John Bull and Britannia, with whom she often was 
portrayed. 
So important was it for Britons to separate Charlotte from the rest of her family that, 
as Behrendt observes, something of a public campaign to this purpose became visible in 
literary and print media dating from 1812 to 1815, the years when Charlotte was in the 
process of selecting a husband. Lord Byron, in the 1812 poem “Lines to a Lady Weeping,” 
characterized Charlotte’s treatment at her father’s hands as “a Sire’s disgrace, a realm’s 
decay,” drawing in these two possessive clauses the ready analogy between the “disgrace” of 
George IV and the “decay” of Great Britain while setting Charlotte apart from these 
deficiencies. After Charlotte’s death, Byron would emphasize Charlotte’s singularity in 
Canto IV of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, calling her “The fair-hair’d Daughter of the Isles” 
and “The love of millions!”—appositives which hail the princess and elide her family: “the 
Isles” of Britain stand clearly in the place of her parents (Byron qtd. in Behrendt 24-25). 
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Accordingly, Charlotte’s wedding—to Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, whom she chose 
over the Hereditary Prince William of Orange, whom her father had selected—inspired 
hopeful acclimation of a renewed national wholeness at a time otherwise marked by 
widespread social unrest; the Augustan Review, for example, proclaimed in June of 1816: 
“[Our rejoicings on the occasion] spring out of an event auspicious to the royal family, 
because it is so to the nation at large.”98 Charlotte’s refusal of William in favor of Leopold, 
which marked a royal young woman’s ability seriously to contravene at least one of her 
parents, had acquired nationalistic resonance as well. The public reason Charlotte provided 
for ending her relationship with William was her nationalist aversion to spending any part of 
the year outside of Great Britain. This was grist to the mill of the anti-Regent Whig press, 
who characterized Charlotte’s prospective marriage to William as the tyranny of a father who 
was trying to get her out of his political way, and, worse, “an assault on British liberty” 
(Behrendt 18). Particularly poignant for many Britons was the idea that Charlotte, strongly 
identified as the queen under whom the British nation would cast off despotic power while 
retaining its monarchy, would be forced by that same despotic power to leave her people and 
her beloved homeland. 
Just how important Charlotte had become to Britons became most apparent, however, 
in the wake of her unexpected death. As royal daughter, heir apparent, and mother of the 
future king, Charlotte was mourned as both a woman and a princess; as the art collector and 
novelist William Beckford attested in a letter: “I consider her loss pretty great, a sad and dire 
accident calculated to fill with tears the eyes of almost all the people, a fatal event pregnant 
with confusion, and, in time, with civil war.” (Qtd. in Behrendt 2) Charlotte’s death, in 	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Beckford’s view, brought the medical and national meanings of the British constitution into 
crisis: the common dangers of Romantic-era childbirth, which Beckford invokes in the word 
“pregnant,” were raised in Charlotte’s case to the loss of a monarch and the end of a royal 
line, affecting “almost all the people” of Britain. Charlotte’s death, therefore, made clear the 
connection between the constitution of the individual body and the constitution of the British 
body politic: in time, Beckford predicts, Charlotte’s death may result in civil war, national 
constitutional crisis in its absolute form.  
Jane Austen was not alive to witness Britain in the wake of Charlotte’s death. She had 
died on the 18th of July, 1817—a little more than three months before the woman who was to 
be her queen. When she died, however, Austen left behind a strange, unfinished manuscript 
known as the Sanditon fragment, which follows a young woman named Charlotte from her 
country home at Willingden to the fictional seaside resort of Sanditon, where she, very like 
Princess Charlotte on the national stage, plays a healthful alternative to the constitutional 
decay embodied by the characters around her. It seems unlikely that Austen’s naming of 
Charlotte Heywood is purely coincidental, given the popularity of the princess (another 
Charlotte H.) during the period when Austen was composing the Sanditon fragment, but it 
also seems unlikely that Austen intended Charlotte Heywood as an absolute allegory for the 
princess: though Princess Charlotte inspired a great many nationalist allegories, poems, and 
essays, there is not much evidence beyond Charlotte Heywood’s name that Austen intended 
Sanditon to be among them. 
Critical in the current argument, however, is that Regency-era Britons were eager in 
the constitutionally precarious postwar years to raise their healthy young princess as a 
national heroine poised to usher in an era of political and social renewal. They did this 
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precisely by seeing Charlotte as an individual apart from her vulgar family—quite 
reminiscent, in fact, of how Austen had separated Elizabeth from the Bennets in order to save 
them. And yet, just as the constitutionally sound, lone heroine was coming to the fore at the 
highest level of Britain’s national stage, Austen was writing a manuscript that is altogether 
less certain about the efficacy of individual characters against a complex social force this 
chapter terms “constitutional instability.” Constitutional instability—“that mixture of 
Character” is Austen’s phrase for it—connotes the dramatically changing social landscape of 
postwar Britain, wherein traditional markers of class and family constitutions—title, wealth, 
and land—were being eroded by postwar inflation, the persistent reflux of Britain’s 
expanding empire to the metropole, and the continuing rise of the middling classes under 
capital, a system in which everything—including the British constitution—was marked for 
sale. As the Sanditon fragment implies in its striking lack of suitable husbands, these 
enormous social changes made the advantageous marriages of Austen’s early novels a 
narrative impossibility. Instead of positioning her Sanditon heroines for social elevation in 
marriage, therefore, Austen would seem instead to set a fledgling friendship between 
Charlotte Heywood and another female character, Clara Brereton, distinctly apart from the 
disorienting social and narrative effects of constitutional instability. 
Because Austen was writing Sanditon as she was dying, criticism has tended to see 
the fragment’s asyndetic form as evidence of both Austen’s innovating literary mind and her 
dissociative mental tendencies as a gravely unwell person. Kathryn Sutherland, for example, 
notes that critics of Sanditon risk “mistaking composition for the more painful but no less 
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revelatory labour of decomposition.”99 The decline in Austen’s health should enter into our 
consideration of the Sanditon fragment as much as any other biographical detail, and I leave 
the bulk of this work to biographers and critics who already have used the available record to 
describe both probable and improbable relationships between Austen’s illness and her 
energetic spoof of hypochondriacs in the last months of her life. It will, however, remain 
worthwhile to make some recourse to Austen’s final letters from 1817 as well as the 
correspondence she wrote to Cassandra from the health resort at Bath in 1800. In spite of 
how well this earlier Bath correspondence illuminates Austen’s disdainful attitudes toward 
coastal health resorts and hypochondria, the Sanditon fragment has not yet been read against 
it. Together with these early and late letters, the Sanditon manuscript tends to show not 
Austen’s mental decomposition in the throes of illness, but a highly stylized conception of a 
destabilized British constitution that deliberately confounds the clearer narrative meanings 
“constitution” held in her earlier work. 
Rather than preparing her stage for another set of heroines to find social and financial 
security in companionate marriages, Austen seems to have been working out in Sanditon the 
problem heroines face when narratives of social ascendency and companionate marriage are 
foreclosed by national economic downturn and the bleak social realities it produces. Though 
Austen did not live long enough to resolve this narrative problem (which is to assume—
perhaps wrongly—that Austen saw a resolution), the fact of her having posed the problem in 
1817 is important for several reasons. First, Sanditon’s apparent foreclosure of marriage plots 
suggests that the historical realities of the postwar Regency were making comedic narratives 
seem impossible to Austen, if not highly improbable, to borrow a word from her Aristotelian 	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critique of Mary Brunton’s novels. Further, the developing relationship Sanditon describes 
between Charlotte and Clara suggests that Austen may have been posing homosocial bonds 
as a constitutionally viable alternative to marriage, a social and narrative structure she had 
raised in Sense and Sensibility under the more traditional form of a double marriage. While 
Elinor and Marianne are eventually secured in their social and financial conditions through 
respective unions with the ineffectual Edward Ferrars and the rheumatic Colonel Brandon, it 
remains clear in the novel’s final paragraph that this friendship between sisters outruns 
whatever domestic felicity their nuptials produce: 
[b]etween Barton and Delaford there was that constant communication which 
strong family affection would naturally dictate; and among the merits and the 
happiness of Elinor and Marianne, let it not be ranked as the least 
considerable, that, though sisters, and living almost within sight of each other, 
they could live without disagreement between themselves, or producing 
coolness between their husbands. (380) 
This lack of “coolness between […] husbands”—as strange as two sisters living “without 
disagreement”—suggests that Edward and Brandon do not even mind that their wives go 
elsewhere to find the kind of close companionship Thompson has called “intimacy” (159-
80). Though the reading that follows here must remain speculative in view of Sanditon’s 
fragmentary nature, it seems possible that Austen was pulling taut in Sanditon the thread she 
had only briefly touched in the female friendships of Sense and Sensibility, Pride and 
Prejudice, and Emma. Unlike Elinor, Marianne, Elizabeth, and Jane, whose sisterhood is the 
foundation of their friendship—and unlike Emma and Harriet, whose friendship is 
circumscribed by Emma’s belief in their shared social position—Charlotte Heywood and 
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Clara Brereton’s relationship transcends these constitutional categories. Sanditon, as critics 
frequently observe, remains deeply pessimistic, even fatalistic, about the condition of the 
British constitution; Charlotte and Clara are heroines apart from this national decline because 
they make minimal recourse to the old order’s decaying categories. 
§ 
 As in Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice, Austen uses in Sanditon a false 
step to signify her story’s rising action. On his way to Willingden to contract a surgeon to 
live at Sanditon, the fragment’s eponymous (and fictional) seaside resort, Mr. Thomas Parker 
overturns his carriage, spilling himself and his wife, Mary, into the road, thereby injuring his 
ankle. According to the trend we have observed in the early novels with Marianne Dashwood 
and Jane Bennet, Mr. Parker’s physical injury also occasions an episode of his social 
exposure to a Mr. Heywood, the father of Charlotte, who comes to the Parkers’ aid. Mr. 
Parker is exposed in Sanditon’s opening scene not by a romantic attachment exactly, but by 
his obsession with the commoditization of constitutional health; as Wiltshire notes, “Mr. 
Parker has privatised the sea air”—and is quite eager that as many Britons as possible might 
enjoy, as he does, this developing market on their coast (205). While Austen suggests the 
materialist flavor of Mr. Parker’s patriotism in his home at Trafalgar House, where Britain’s 
costly naval victory is remade as Mr. Parker’s personal luxury, she also is keen to play up 
Mr. Parker’s belief that his personal interest in the health-promoting qualities of Britain’s 
coast is a matter of his nationally-minded beneficence. For example, this is how Mr. Parker 
assesses the effect of Sanditon’s high society on the local poor: Sanditon is “the sure resort of 
the very best Company, those regular, steady, private Families of thorough Gentility & 
Character, who are a blessing everywhere, excite the industry of the Poor and diffuse comfort 
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& improvement among them of every sort.” (368) Sanditon, on Mr. Parker’s view, advances 
a kind of proto-trickle-down economics, whereby constitutionally sound “private Families of 
thorough Gentility & Character” improve Britain’s national constitution at large. Mr. 
Parker’s opinion—that the health-promoting qualities of Britain’s coast were a boon to 
British constitutions—was common historically as well. The January 1816 Gentleman’s 
Magazine eagerly explained, for example, that 
[i]t is now universally advised to have recourse to that Ocean, at once the 
safeguard and the glory of the Nation, whose healing properties cannot be too 
much extolled […]. The numerous places on the coast that now, at each 
returning summer, vie with each other in tempting the invalid of the interior to 
try the efficacy of Sea-Air and Sea-Bathing, are solid and convincing proofs 
of the importance of the offered remedy. (Qtd. in Wiltshire 206) 
Very like this passage’s circuitous rhetoric—in which the asserted “healing properties” of a 
nationalist Atlantic become proof of “the importance of” its “remedy”—Mr. Parker’s self-
interest and his nationalism amount finally to the same thing. 
Mr. Parker’s Sanditon thus represents a strange implosion of national, class, familial, 
and individual constitutions: “Sanditon was second Wife & 4 Children to him—hardly less 
Dear,” Austen’s narrator discloses, “[Sanditon] had indeed the highest claims;—not only 
those of Birthplace, Property, and Home,—it was his Mine, his Lottery, his Speculation & 
his Hobby Horse; his Occupation his Hope & his Futurity.” (372) That the commas fall 
altogether out of this litany suggests the breathless ardor of Mr. Parker’s enthusiasm for 
Sanditon, a new coastal home that becomes Austen’s late counterpoint to Pemberley. While 
Darcy’s estate symbolizes and undertakes the maintenance of a multigenerational family 
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structure within the larger genealogical constitution of the British aristocracy, Sanditon 
represents Mr. Parker’s financial speculation on the success of the surrounding resort, which 
paradoxically will require the widespread constitutional decline of Britons everywhere. 
“[E]verybody has heard of Sanditon,” he boasts to Mr. Heywood, through the pain of his 
seriously sprained his ankle: “for a young & rising Bathing-place, [Sanditon is] certainly the 
favourite spot of all that are to be found along the coast of Sussex” (368). Into the mouth of 
Mr. Heywood, however, Austen places this critique, enlisting her usual suspicion of 
hypochondria: 
Yes—I have heard of Sanditon. […] Every five years, one hears of some new 
place or other starting up by the Sea […].—How they can half of them be 
filled, is the wonder! Where People can be found with Money or Time to go to 
them!—Bad things for a Country;—sure to raise the price of Provisions & 
make the Poor good for nothing.” (368) 
Austen’s italicized “Where” is important, for while it suggests Mr. Heywood’s popular 
political view that excess luxury was depleting the national economy and destabilizing its 
class constitution, this “Where” also implies that nowhere in Britain’s postwar economy are 
there people who responsibly can afford such luxuries; still less is there anyone who needs 
them. This is a fitting pretext for the strange group of people Austen assembles at Sanditon: 
they are, at least in Mr. Heywood’s view, characters from nowhere. 
 While Mr. Parker’s injured ankle reveals his peculiar obsession with his home, it also 
allows Austen, several chapters later, to pursue an important comparison of Mr. Parker to 
Coleridge and Wordsworth. Critic William Deresiewicz finds no direct proof that Austen 
read Coleridge and only her fleeting references to Wordsworth; nevertheless, he argues 
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persuasively, the two poets significantly influenced Austen’s later works.100 Austen’s clear 
reference to Coleridge in Sanditon is exciting because it corroborates Deresiewicz’s claim 
and demonstrates that she must have read “This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison” (1797). The 
poem was written on a July afternoon when the poet was left alone at the Nether Stowey 
home of Thomas Poole. Poole and Coleridge had been neighbors since the end of 1796, when 
Coleridge took a cottage close to Poole’s property. On this particular afternoon, Coleridge’s 
friends, Charles Lamb, Dorothy and William Wordsworth, and probably also his wife, Sara 
Fricker, embarked from Poole’s home on a walking tour across the Quantocks. Suffering 
from a scalded foot after Sara spilled boiling milk on it, Coleridge stayed behind to 
convalesce in Poole’s arbor: the location of the poem’s title lime tree.101 Famously, the poem 
becomes an appeal that the idealized British landscape will instill in Lamb a “gladness,” (l. 
21) bringing him into full communion with the poem’s speaker (presumably Coleridge), his 
other “friends” (l. 19), the surrounding scene, and God: 
 
Ah! slowly sink 
Behind the western ridge, thou glorious Sun! 
Shine in the slant beams of the sinking orb, 
Ye purple heath-flowers! richlier burn, ye clouds! 
Live in the yellow light, ye distant groves! 
And kindle, thou blue Ocean! So my Friend 
Struck with deep joy may stand, as I have stood, 
Silent with swimming sense; yea, gazing round 
On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem 
Less gross than bodily: and of such hues 
As veil the Almighty Spirit, when yet he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence. (l1. 33-44) 
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The phrase “till all doth seem / Less gross than bodily”—much remarked by eco-critical 
Romanticists as Coleridge’s elision of the boundary between the human mind and the natural 
world—is most important to the current discussion, for Mr. Parker, lamed like Coleridge by 
an injury to his foot and ankle, is arrested by a similar sentiment when viewing the landscape 
at Sanditon: “He longed,” Austen’s narrator tells us, “to be on the Sands, the Cliffs, at his 
own House, & everywhere out of his House at once” (384, my emphasis). If Austen is 
alluding to Coleridge here, and it seems likely that she is, two interpretations are plausible: in 
her usual stance toward hypochondria, Austen may be using Mr. Parker to poke fun at 
Coleridge’s poetic dramatization of his own injury. But Mr. Parker is also a rather degraded 
version of Coleridge in that he does not call upon the surrounding landscape to promote his 
friend’s constitutional health, as Coleridge did on Lamb’s behalf—but for the increase of his 
own health and surplus: Mr. Parker’s “Spirits rose with the very sight of the Sea & he cd 
almost feel his Ancle getting stronger”; in this moment of spiritual exultation, Mr. Parker—
never too far from his mercenary attitudes—also hopes “to see scarcely any empty houses” at 
the Sanditon resort (384). Exemplary of the way Austen undercuts characters whose motives 
she does not approve, Mr. Parker’s remarks are designed to reveal his purely financial 
interest in the landscape’s health-imparting, spirit-raising qualities. Because Austen also 
includes in this paragraph a clear reference to Wordsworth’s “Lines Written a Few Miles 
above Tintern Abbey,” it seems likely that she is drawing Mr. Parker as a kind of anti-type to 
both Romantic poets, and Sanditon as a Romantic landscape in an advanced condition of 
ruin: Wordsworth’s famous “steep woods and lofty cliffs”102 surrounding Tintern Abbey 	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become, in Austen’s hands, a clear but broken echo: Sanditon’s cliffs are “steep, but not very 
lofty,” the subordinate clause pointing up a deficiency not with the angle of the cliffs, but in 
the eye that perceives them—which belongs to Mr. Parker. More important is that the 
landscape at Sanditon does not lead on to Wordsworth’s salubrious “hedge-rows, hardly 
hedge-rows” (l. 16), “sportive wood run wild” (l. 17), or “pastoral farms / Green to the very 
door” (ll. 17-18)—but to a “Hotel & Billiard Room,” “the best Milliner’s shop,” and, at the 
water’s edge with a subtle air of the bizarre, the “Bathing Machines,” designed expressly to 
mediate human interaction with the natural world, which Coleridge had sought in “This 
Lime-Tree Bower My Prison” to figure as seamless. In short, Wordsworth and Coleridge’s 
health-imparting landscapes have become in Austen’s scene “the Mall.” (384) 
Austen’s reworking of the landscapes of “This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison” and 
“Tintern Abbey” do not necessarily satirize Coleridge and Wordsworth’s high Romantic 
formulations of what constituted Britons, though this is one possible reading of Austen’s 
allusions. Given Sanditon’s wider interest in lampooning bad readers of literature, however, 
it seems far more likely that Austen is satirizing not Coleridge and Wordsworth but readers 
like Mr. Parker, who absorbed the most memorable phrases of popular poems but 
misunderstood their meanings. Instead of using the British landscape to, in M. H. Abram’s 
reading of the Greater Romantic Lyric, arrive at an “insight,” understand “a tragic loss,” 
make “a moral decision,” or work out “an emotional problem,” Mr. Parker uses his Romantic 
imagination to indulge a frivolous consumerist idyll fueled by the ugly offshore activity of 
imperialism while actually believing himself engaged to the higher purpose of national 
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health.103 Thus not only is Mr. Parker a degraded version of Coleridge, but of Wordsworth, 
who was an important figure of national health during the Romantic period identified 
primarily by his proclivity for walking. Mr. Parker is a great walker, too—even in spite of his 
injury—but as Austen shows in Sanditon, his pedestrianism does not give way to 
Wordsworthian insights about the nature of human consciousness. Rather, everywhere Mr. 
Parker walks he sees potential profits on an aggressively marketed British coastline. 
And yet, Austen’s critique of Mr. Parker, and the commercialization of the British 
constitution he represents, remains unlike the work of materialist literary criticism of the 
1980s, particularly Marjorie Levinson’s “Insight and Oversight: Rereading ‘Tintern Abbey,’” 
(1986) and, more broadly, Jerome McGann’s The Romantic Ideology: A Critical 
Investigation (1983).  Though “Blue Shoes,” “nankin Boots,” (383) and “Venetian 
window[s]” (384) etch marks of empire at Sanditon, and though Charlotte Heywood is 
invited to Sanditon by the Parkers “to buy new Parasols, new Gloves, & new Brooches”—
Austen does not see at Sanditon merely what Romantic ideologies obscure (374). Sanditon is, 
for all its ugliness, also beautiful—even to the practical eye of Charlotte Heywood: “having 
received possession of her apartment, [Charlotte] found amusement enough in standing at her 
ample Venetian window, and looking over the miscellaneous foreground of unfinished 
Buildings, waving Linen, & tops of Houses, to the Sea, dancing & sparkling in Sunshine & 
Freshness” (384). Most striking about Charlotte’s prospect is its aesthetic of miscellany, 
which imperialism produces locally: the Venetian window, presumably more “ample” than 
British windows, allows Charlotte to see both the disembodied work of urban development 
and domesticity (“unfinished buildings” and “waving linen”)—as well as a more traditional, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 M. H. Abrams, “Structure and Style in the Greater Romantic Lyric,” The Correspondent Breeze: Essays on 
English Romanticism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), pp. 78-108. 
	   151	  
and more beautiful, “dancing and sparkling” view of that conduit of British trade, the English 
Channel. This framed view of the water, an effect of picturesque tourism, is what Mr. Parker 
wishes to sell to his guests—but it comes with a “miscellaneous foreground,” a British 
landscape variegated by the very changes that make possible Charlotte’s window and the 
scenery it showcases. Typical of Austen’s genius is a tendency to see both sides of the 
matter. 
This mixed landscape on the coast paints in Sanditon a contrast to a more 
homogenous inland; signs of change, however, appear subtly in the country as well. On their 
way to the seaside resort, the Parkers and Charlotte pass a “moderate-sized house” about two 
miles inland that reminds Charlotte of her family’s home at Willingden (379). This, we learn, 
is the Parkers’ original home where Mr. Parker, his siblings, and his three eldest children 
were born—giving the lie to an earlier impression we have received in the narrator’s free 
indirect discourse that the resort at Sanditon was Mr. Parker’s “Birthplace.” Here, the 
narrator mocks Mr. Parker’s ongoing sales pitch of Sanditon to the Heywoods while he is 
laid up at their Willingden home with his ankle: in his enthusiasm for the resort, and the 
financial gain it promises, Mr. Parker conveniently has forgotten where he was born. Perhaps 
more telling is that his rage for the new and improved Sanditon has compelled him to give up 
his ancestral home to Mr. Hillier, “who occupies the cheif [sic] of [Mr. Parker’s] land,” an 
action which places a tenant of no relation in the position traditionally reserved for Mr. 
Parker’s son and heir, disrupting traditional hereditary mechanisms of constitutional 
maintenance (380). 
At length, the Parkers and Charlotte arrive in Sanditon—“modern Sanditon,” the text 
now specifies—where we see the Parkers’ new home at Trafalgar House, which Mr. Parker 
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“wishes [he] had not named Trafalgar—for Waterloo is more the thing now.” Thus, on the 
developing coast, we see inscribed the most recent activity of British military might, standing 
in contradistinction to the Parker’s old home, which, in Mr. Parker’s opinion, was “built in a 
hole” “without Air or View” by “pent down” ancestors who knew no better—this a 
hypochondriac’s formulation of the common Romantic-era belief that the practices of the 
past were becoming insufficient to the progress of the present. And yet, Mr. Parker’s 
certitude of his “better” situation on the coast is troubled by Mrs. Parker’s information that 
the Hilliers “did not seem to feel the Storms last Winter at all.—I remember seeing Mrs 
Hillier after one of those dreadful Nights, when we had been literally rocked in our bed, and 
she did not seem at all aware of the Wind being anything more than common” (381). While 
the Parkers have had the aesthetic enjoyment of “the Grandeur of the Storm” at the new and 
poorly-built Trafalgar House, the Hilliers are protected from the weather in a home built to 
last by an older generation of Britons; the architectural stability of the “honest old Place” 
serves ironically to underline the new constitutional precariousness of its original family 
(381, 380, my emphasis). 
Between the Parkers’ original home and the resort at Sanditon’s coast is the Sanditon 
parish church and—Austen’s narrator is clear—“the real village of Sanditon” with its 
working-class cottages, “Woods & enclosures,” “Baker’s shop,” and “a small cluster of 
Fisherman’s Houses” at the mouth of a small stream (382-3). But even “real Sanditon” is 
home to a new leisured class, much to Mr. Parker’s shallow satisfaction: two or three of the 
best cottages have taken up their own tourist enterprise, with “Lodgings to let” advertised in 
their windows; “two Females in elegant white” read in the green court of a farm house; 
through an upper casement comes the sound of someone improving herself at harp lessons 
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(383). Yet Mr. Parker’s joy in “the increasing fashion of the place altogether” is belied by his 
utter lack of “personal concern in the success of the village itself.” There is also the imposing 
geographic reality of a hill, which hides “modern Sanditon” from the baker, the fishermen, 
and the elegantly attired farmers’ daughters, who can only approximate the leisure of 
wealthier coastal tourists (383). Charlotte Heywood’s journey from Willingden to the coastal 
Sanditon thus traverses a geography of sprawling commercialism, which shows that Britain’s 
constitution is in remarkable flux: traditional barriers of class and location are eroding—but 
by no means fully eroded—under the constant pressures of the market. 
The variety of Sanditon’s landscape (the old and the new; the sturdy and the 
decaying; the real and the ersatz; the systematized and the arbitrary) together with a honed 
textual confusion about Sanditon’s location (is it at the Parkers’ old home, in the village of 
Sanditon, or on the developing coast?) suggest the constitutional instability of Sanditon’s 
populace. In addition to the Hilliers, tenants who have moved into the manor house by 
invitation, Austen gives us a variety of characters whose class and familial constitutions are 
increasingly, and openly, mixed. The most memorable of these characters is Lady Denham, 
Sanditon’s resident dowager and Mr. Parker’s “Colleague in Speculation,” whose significant 
fortune of more than £30,000 is even more significantly encumbered by relations and legal 
heirs she has incurred through her multiple marriages—the first to a wealthy Mr. Hollis and 
the second to an impoverished Sir Harry Denham, whom she widely is rumored to have 
married for his title (375). Lady Denham’s mercenary interests in Sanditon, however, are 
tempered by her generous attentions to Miss Clara Brereton, a poor young relation from an 
unfashionable part of London whom she has invited to stay with her: Mr. Parker “gave [to 
Charlotte] the particulars which had led to Clara’s admission at Sanditon, as no bad 
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exemplification of that mixture of Character, that union of Littleness with Kindness with 
Good Sence [sic] with even Liberality which he saw in Lady D.” Lady Denham’s is a 
constitutional instability at the level of the individual: here is the “Kindness” and “Liberality” 
of noblesse oblige typical of Darcy and Knightley alongside the “Littleness” and greed of a 
rising capitalist (378, my emphasis). 
At the level of Sanditon’s society constitution is no less mixed—and this poses a dire 
challenge to Mr. Parker and Lady Denham’s joint venture to make Sanditon among the most 
fashionable of Britain’s bathing places: after all, Mr. Parker already has turned the resort’s 
social constitution into a marketable commodity in his promise to Mr. Heywood that 
Sanditon’s is a constitutionally homogenous society of “private Families of thorough 
Gentility & Character.” But Mr. Parker has not let the facts get in the way of his sales pitch 
to Mr. Heywood, as evidenced by this very disappointing “List of Subscribers,” who are in 
Sanditon for the upcoming season: 
The Lady Denham, Miss Brereton, Mr and Mrs P—— Sir Edw: Denham & 
Miss Denham, whose names might be said to lead off the Season, were 
followed by nothing better than—Mrs Mathews—Miss Mathews, Miss E. 
Mathews, Miss H. Mathews.—Dr & Mrs Brown—Mr Richard Pratt.—Lieut: 
Smith, R.N. Capt: Little,—Limehouse.—Mrs Jane Fisher. Miss Fisher. Miss 
Scroggs.—Rev: Mr Hanking. Mr Beard—Solicitor, Grays Inn.—Mrs Davis. & 
Miss Merryweather. (389) 
Behind Austen’s primary cast of characters, “whose names might be said to lead off the 
Season,” is a disheartening litany of miscellaneous military officers on peacetime half pay, a 
solicitor, a physician, a man of the cloth, and finally married and unmarried women with 
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unpromising last names—Miss Scroggs registering to the ear particularly as a kind of proto-
Dickensian marker of constitutional mediocrity. Accordingly, Lady Denham assesses 
Sanditon’s situation: “if we could but get a young Heiress to S[anditon]! But Heiresses are 
monstrous scarce! I do not think we have had an Heiress here or even a Co—[heiress] since 
Sanditon has been a public place. Families come after Families, but as far as I can learn, it is 
not one in an hundred of them that have any real Property” (401). Again, the constitution of 
Sanditon society is far less distinguished than its chief speculators would wish for—and “real 
Property,” the material basis of British constitutional authority, is somewhere beyond the 
reach of the coastal resort (401). 
Underpinning Lady Denham’s exclamations about an heiress is that postwar inflation 
has, at Sanditon and across Britain, outrun the conservation of wealth once guaranteed by 
strict settlement, “a legal provision developed in the middle of the seventeenth century to 
ensure that the family estate would descend intact to the eldest son,” perpetuating the 
maintenance of the family’s financial status and thus its strength of constitution into the next 
generation. “Under strict settlement,” Poovey explains further, “each man was the only life-
tenant of the family estates. Generally, the essential articles governing property were settled 
on the eldest son’s marriage: the amount of his maintenance, his wife’s jointure […] and the 
form and amount of portion that the younger children of the marriage would receive” (12). 
Lady Denham is familiar with this process because it has governed the inheritance of the 
dwindling Denham estate since the death of her most recent husband: after Sir Harry’s 
decease prior to the beginning of Sanditon, Lady Denham returned with her £30,000 per 
annum to Sanditon House, the home she enjoyed as Mrs. Hollis, leaving behind an 
impoverished Denham Park for her nephew and his sister, Miss Esther Denham, as Sir and 
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Lady Denham have had no children of their own. Heiresses, therefore—or co-heiresses, as 
Lady Denham allows—are necessary to raising the fortunes of penurious heirs like her 
nephew, the baronet Sir Edward, whose estate has presumably long exceeded its income in 
spite of Sir Harry’s efforts to improve its situation: in a mutually convenient effort to re-
establish the Denham family constitution, Sir Harry is supposed to have married Lady 
Denham for her fortune just as she is believed to have married him for his title. 
Though the Denham estate has passed from Sir Harry to Sir Edward undivided, its 
yearly income is unequal to the Denhams’ new style of life at Sanditon and Denham Park; as 
Mr. Parker discloses, Sir Edward Denham is “a poor Man for his rank in Society” and has not 
enough money to be a patron of the resort (377). Lady Denham and her nephew therefore 
find themselves in an unorthodox arrangement in which Lady Denham, herself an heiress not 
having had the inclination to enrich the “ancient” Denham family with her new money, 
supports Sir Edward in his baronetcy in payments according to her whim. She explains to 
Charlotte: “for though I am only the Dowager my Dear, & he is the Heir, things do not stand 
between us in the way they commonly do between those two parties.—Not a shilling do I 
receive from the Denham estate. Sir Edw: has no Payments to make me. He don’t stand 
uppermost, beleive [sic] me.—It is I that help him.” Not putting too fine a point on the 
matter, Lady Denham adds: “Sir Edwd must marry for Money,” a comment intended to warn 
Charlotte that he is, in every possible way, no Mr. Darcy (400). Thus, we begin to see that 
Sanditon’s society is the strange shadow cast by deflating feudal incomes, rising capitalist 
markets, postwar inflation—and, in the foreground, not a missing male heir as in the 
Dashwood and Bennet families, but an heir absurdly without a fortune to inherit. 
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 The heiress who arrives in Sanditon, at length, is the West Indian Miss Lambe: “here 
was the very young Lady, sickly & rich, whom [Lady Denham] had been asking for; & she 
made the acquaintance for Sir Edward’s sake, & the sake of her Milch asses,” whose milk 
Lady Denham hopes to offer, or perhaps sell to, Miss Lambe for her constitutional 
improvement. Described as “about 17, half Mulatto, chilly & tender,” Miss Lambe has been, 
in spite of her brief appearance in the fragment, a magnet for the attention of literary critics 
(421). D. A. Miller attributes Miss Lambe’s racial characteristics to Austen’s projected 
anxiety about the dermatologic symptoms of her own illness, which she characterizes as 
“black and white and every wrong colour” in a late letter to her niece, Fanny Knight.104 Clara 
Tuite has argued more persuasively that “Miss Lambe is for Lady Denham what Maria 
Edgeworth’s Lady Delacour in Belinda refers to as ‘the heiress lozenge’—the consolation of 
a rich wife for a ruined aristocrat,” noting that “Belinda (1801) also has a West Indian 
intertext, and was revised in 1810 to occlude interracial marriage.” On Tuite’s view, Miss 
Lambe (according to her Pentecostal name) becomes in Lady Denham’s imagination an 
offering to her penniless nephew: the wealthy offspring of empire will be sacrificed on the 
crumbling altar of the English aristocracy. Fortunately for Miss Lambe, Lady Denham’s plan 
is checked by Miss Lambe’s aunt, Mrs. Griffiths, who “would not allow Miss L. to have the 
smallest symptom of a Decline, or any complaint which Asses’ milk cd possibly relieve [sic]” 
(422). This interaction forecloses Lady Denham’s marriage plot, but it seems unlikely that 
Austen would have introduced Miss Lambe into Sanditon’s heiress-starved social scene 
without a narrative purpose. Because of Sanditon’s status as a fragment, however, and Miss 
Lambe’s relatively brief appearance in it, any conjecture about the outcome of Lady 	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Denham’s speculation on the marriage of Miss Lambe to Sir Edward, such as Tuite’s 
assertion that Miss Lambe is designed as “the sacrifice and scapegoat” of Sanditon, must 
remain largely unfounded.105 
Tuite’s reading nevertheless brings to light yet another critical discourse on 
constitutional instability within Sanditon, in which wealthy West Indians, are “for the 
locals,” Tuite explains, “a monstrous inbred parvenu class, persecuted for eliminating 
difference” through their immense wealth. “[B]ecause they have full purses,” Lady Denham 
observes, “West-injines” “fancy themselves equal, may be, to your old Country Families”; 
“they who scatter their Money so freely, never think of whether they may not be doing 
mischief of raising the price of Things.” (Tuite 179; Sanditon 392). Here, Lady Denham 
reduces what Tuite identifies as a “persecution text around the West Indians” to the market’s 
absolute measure: “the price of Things.” And, while Lady Denham broadcasts many 
unflattering prejudices against the West Indians in Sanditon, she notably has no compunction 
that Miss Lambe should become the next Lady Denham, suggesting that wealth now trumps 
absolutely Lady Catherine de Bourgh’s myth of a heritable (even pseudo-racial) aristocratic 
purity—not surprising, considering that Lady Denham herself married Sir Harry from 
(probably quite far) outside the British aristocracy. Finally, Mr. Parker is able to convince 
Lady Denham by this same logic that West Indians ought not to be persecuted, but welcome 
in Sanditon: “[m]y dear Madam, they can only raise the price of consumable Articles, by 
such an extraordinary Demand for them & such a diffusion of money among us, as must do 
us more Good than harm,” an observation which largely quells Lady Denham’s classist and 
racist concerns (392). Thus, contrary to Tuite’s assessment that “Sanditon occupies the 	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dangerous shoreline that keeps the reflux of empire barely in check,” the British and West 
Indian populations that constitute Sanditon society along the human fault lines of empire are 
really not so volatile—as long as the market remains stable. In Austen’s formulation of 
colonial relationships in Sanditon, the bottom line tends to, as Tuite says, “eliminate 
difference,” thereby emptying constitutional categories (of family, of class, of race) of their 
tenuous and complex meanings. 
Sanditon’s most programmatic discursive technique, enacted one way or another in 
all of the above examples, is to demonstrate not that Britons’ constitutions are in decline per 
se (though many of them are), but that constitutions no longer maintain a clear relationship 
with narrative. While Austen’s early novels reward constitutional health with social 
ascendency and conversely punish constitutional decline with social ruin, there seems to be 
no such correlation in Sanditon—though we must remember that the novel is not so much 
unfinished as it is just begun, and not yet at that stage where Austen’s novels normally meet 
out punishments and rewards. Even in its fragmentary condition, however, Sanditon’s 
representation of destabilized constitutions erodes the reader’s ability make judgments or 
predictions about the story’s narrative progress. “Austen,” Sutherland notes, “seems to have 
little energy for characters who require some probable development.” Further, in her analysis 
of the Sanditon holograph, Sutherland sees evidence that Austen was working in her 
compositional process to achieve precisely this effect: “[t]ime and again, revision clears the 
text of information and works to counter the temptation of first thoughts to over-direct the 
reader’s response and anticipate evaluation” (178, 180). Perhaps this compositional technique 
explains why critics have come to trouble in their attempts to identify Sanditon’s heroine 
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between Charlotte Heywood and Clara Brereton, a point to which this argument will finally 
return. 
Austen’s subtle detachment of constitution from narrative is why hypochondria—the 
condition whose narrative is always unhinged from constitutional symptoms—is Sanditon’s 
central figure for the condition of the British constitution. Hypochondria, George C. Grinnel 
explains, was produced during the Romantic period by an “unprecedented fascination with 
well-being combined with greater investments in the construction of the body as an object of 
knowledge” (14). For Austen, hypochondria is the surest indicator of constitutional 
instability, and in the Sanditon fragment Austen envisions the very world to which the 
uncontrollable physiological, social, and discursive symptoms of hypochondria go after they 
have been cordoned off from more stable elements of the British body politic. This act of 
separation has important textual effects in the Sanditon manuscript; as Tony Tanner has 
observed: “[Sanditon] is not mere burlesque. [Austen] is writing herself out of the world she 
is writing about,”106 where very little authorial control can be exercised over the constitutions 
of bodies, societies, or narratives. 
The removal of hypochondria to the coast of Britain—both historically and in 
Austen’s novel—represents an important phase in the cultural meanings of this condition. 
Originally identified by ancient practitioners as a somatic disorder of the hypochondrium, 
hypochondria enjoyed a long and well-documented cultural history in England, which 
begins with forms of melancholia or what became known as the English 
Malady. The Renaissance deemed melancholia to be a rapidly spreading 
disorder imported from Europe. The melancholic was a figure of foreignness 	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and disordered well-being who became a stock malcontent in the literary and 
medical texts of the Elizabethan era. For Shakespeare, the melancholic was 
also an anguished figure whose ennui was expressive of a troubled and 
tormented psyche. Hamlet is the example par excellence of the foreign 
melancholic, a sufferer whose spectacular grief and bodily disorders only 
further affirm his depression. (Grinnel 16) 
We should note here the important nationalist meanings hypochondria held in the early 
modern period: the melancholic was not yet a figure of Englishness, but a foreign presence 
whose disordered health set him apart from a healthy English populace. Hamlet, of 
continental Denmark, becomes in England the standard of the male melancholic just as 
Ophelia was gaining traction as the original Crazy Jane—their co-devolution suggesting the 
prevalence in England of gendered characterizations of psychic decline and of course the 
enduring power for the English of Shakespeare’s tragedy.107 
 “The melancholic – like the hypochondriac of the eighteenth-century,” Grinnel notes, 
“was often associated with a scholarly life and refinement and sensitivity. Francis Bacon, Sir 
Phillip Sidney, Edmund Spenser, and John Donne all numbered themselves among the 
morbidly depressed.” But one commentator, Robert Burton, considered his period of intense 
ennui productive, in that it inspired him to write his 1638 The Anatomy of Melancholy, 
probably the first English text expressly devoted to describing the disorder. It was not until 
nearly a century later, in 1733, that George Cheyne would offer a dramatic revision of the 
splenetic sufferer in his The English Malady: A Treatise of Nervous Diseases of all Kinds, as 	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Spleen, Vapours, Lowness of Spirits, Hyochondriacal and Hysterical Distempers (Grinnel 
16-17). In his widely influential study the physician from Bath observed, in opposition to 
Renaissance formulations, that hypochondria was not a foreign disorder at all, but a 
definitive characteristic of the English constitution produced by English geography, climate, 
and ways of life: 
the moisture of our air, the variableness of our weather, (from our situation 
amidst the ocean) the rankness and fertility of our soil, the richness and 
heaviness of our food, the wealth and abundance of the inhabitants (from their 
universal trade), the inactivity and sedentary occupations of the better sort 
(among whom this evil mostly rages), and the humour of living in great, 
populous and consequently unhealthy towns, have brought forth a class and 
set of distempers with atrocious and frightful symptoms, scarce known to our 
ancestors, and never rising to such fatal heights, nor afflicting such numbers in 
any other nation. These nervous disorders being computed to make almost one 
third of the complaints of the […] condition in England.108 
What is so striking about Cheyne’s explanation of hypochondria is that, while he sees it first 
and foremost as the English malady his title asserts, he also acknowledges that this disorder 
was “scarce known to our ancestors,” suggesting that hypochondria, though a constitutional 
problem, has no hereditary component. Rather, hypochondria represents the coincidence of 
“universal trade,” “sedentary occupations of the better sort,” and overcrowding with English 
climes and social habits—a set of characterizations which suggest that, even in the eighteenth 
century, hypochondria was understood to be historically and culturally produced. 	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In Sanditon, Austen offers her own extended interpretation and critique of 
hypochondria. The English malady—once a constitutional problem affecting nearly one third 
of all English people in Cheyne’s estimation—is now moved to the coast of Britain, back in 
the direction of the continent from whence it is alleged to have come during the sixteenth 
century. Making possible this relocation is Mr. Parker’s loud and vigorous contradiction of 
what Cheyne had earlier called England’s unhealthy “situation amidst the ocean.” In Mr. 
Parker’s view, nothing in Britain is healthier than Sanditon’s geographic situation, which 
boasts “[t]he finest, purest Sea Breeze on the Coast—[…]—Excellent Bathing—fine hard 
Sand—Deep Water 10 yards from the Shore—no Mud—no Weeds—no slimey rocks—
Never was there a place more palpably designed by Nature for the resort of the Invalid” 
(369). Such aggressive commercialization of the coast’s salubrity was common historically, 
too, with many new resorts springing up during Austen’s lifetime and attracting an increasing 
number of patrons from the growing middle classes. As Wiltshire observes, it was common 
for British proprietors of one resort or another to slander neighboring resorts, as Mr. Parker 
does in running down Brighton, Worthing, and Eastbourne. This example from Dr. Anthony 
Relhand’s Short History of Brighthelmston (1761), sets Brighton apart from competitors at 
Baiae and the ancient city of Bath: 
Brighthelmston, thus free from the insalutary vapour of stagnant water, distant 
from […] noxious steams […] and every other cause aiding to produce a […] 
putrid atmosphere, seldom sees its inhabitants labouring under those disorders 
which arise from a relaxed fibre and a languid circulation. Yet, from the 
vicinity of the sea, and the abundant, but salutary vapour it affords, it is as 
certain that the complaints that arise from a too rigid and tense fibre are 
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equally unknown. Hence neither dropsical, nor Chlorotic complaints; 
Pleurises, nor Quincies, nor any other inflammatory ones prevail here. (Qtd. in 
Wiltshire 206) 
Similarly, Mr. Parker is convinced that Sanditon’s salubrious atmosphere and landscape 
along with its “Buildings,” “Nursery Grounds,” and growing markets (“the demand for every 
thing” is Mr. Parker’s phrase) set it apart from every other resort on Britain’s coast (368). 
What Cheyne had lately identified as the poison—of the British weather, overcrowding, and 
materialism—is here being offered to Britons in the bottle of the cure, a paradox that could 
hardly have been lost on Austen’s acute sense of irony. 
Herself a resident of Bath for several years during her mid-twenties (Charlotte 
Heywood is twenty-two), Austen had ample occasion to observe the social constitution of a 
coastal resort. Strangely, critics never mention Austen’s residence in Bath in their readings of 
Sanditon, tending instead to set the fragment in the context of Austen’s final illness and 
death. We must remember, however, that this is a context that Austen very likely did not 
have, especially because she left off writing Sanditon several months before the onset of her 
final decline. Even Austen’s last letters from May of 1817, which we will consider at the end 
of this chapter, suggest her belief that she might be getting better. In December of 1800, 
when Austen had just turned 25, her parents announced their plan to remove to Bath from 
their longtime home at Steventon, where Austen had spent almost all of her life. The choice 
seems to have been as unexpected to Austen as it was unwelcome. As Tomalin notes, 
“Cassandra destroyed several letters Jane wrote to her immediately after hearing her parents’ 
decision, which suggests they made her uncomfortable, too full of raw feeling and even 
anger.” It seems likely that Austen’s scathing characterization of the Parkers’ heartless 
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abandonment of their old home in favor of new Sanditon is a reworking in fiction of the 
feelings she experienced when her parents moved to Bath: “[a]ll the Austen children were 
affected by it,” Tomalin explains, “every one of them who was absent and could possibly 
return to Steventon—Edward, Henry, Frank and Charles—made a point of doing so before 
their parents left—‘while Steventon is ours,’ as Jane put it.” The sudden disruption of her 
family’s steady constitution in her beloved childhood home is one that Austen learned to 
deflect with parody. As Tomalin explains, letters from this period show Austen using her 
“established comic tone for Mrs. Austen,” who, as Jane Austen saw it, was leading the move 
to Bath for the sake of her own health and comfort: “[m]y Mother looks forward with as 
much certainty as you can do to our keeping two Maids—my father is the only one not in the 
secret,” she noted suspiciously in a letter to Cassandra (Tomalin 171-73). Long before 
Austen ever set to work on Sanditon, therefore, she seems to have been poised by her 
mother’s indulgences to see connections between hypochondria, consumerism, and the 
erosion of traditional familial constitutions. 
 Austen found Bath not much different from what she was expecting it to be. A place 
of “vapour, shadow, smoke & confusion,” Bath is, in Austen’s letters, aesthetically similar to 
the disorienting place Sanditon would become in fiction. The society at Bath was as 
intolerable as its weather: she writes to Cassandra of “stupid” parties, confessing finally that 
she “cannot anyhow continue to find people agreable [sic].” Other characterizations from the 
letters bespeak Austen’s intense boredom with (and outright disdain of) the women in her 
society: a Miss Langley, “like any other short girl with a broad nose & wide mouth, 
fashionable dress, & exposed bosom,” and a Mrs. Chamberlayne, who prompted this bitter 
line to Cassandra: “[a]s to Agreableness [sic] she is much like other people”—a particularly 
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striking rebuke when we understand that Cassandra had recommended Mrs. Chamberlayne to 
Austen as a “suitable friend.” The meanness of Austen’s characterizations are, again, perhaps 
the original, suggestive kernel of the stunning caricatures she would accomplish much later 
in Sanditon (Tomalin 171-73). 
 Tomalin suspects that Austen’s intense dissatisfaction with Bath society was 
underwritten by her “stinging sense of humiliation at any idea of being paraded” by her 
parents in the Bath marriage market. Her parents had met and married in Bath, as had her 
Aunt Jane: it was not difficult for Austen to see the plan her parents had in mind. Austen 
rebelled against this arrangement, Tomalin suggests, by driving “up and down Kingsdown 
Hill in a phaeton and four with a man she could not be suspected of setting her cap at, Mr. 
Evelyn, who was both married and thought more of horses than anything else,” not unlike 
Captain Tilney in Northanger Abbey. Because the letters from Bath stop in May of 1801, just 
before Cassandra joined her family on the coast, we have little else with which to 
characterize Austen’s life in Bath, apart from the fact that she seems to have stopped writing 
altogether while she lived there. Tomalin concludes that while Austen never wrote of being 
depressed in the way of Johnson or Boswell, her treatment of Fanny Price’s “permanent low 
spirits after a childhood trauma” in Mansfield Park—so different from her earlier clichéd 
figuration of Marianne Dashwood suffering as Crazy Jane—suggests how well Austen had 
come to understand depression during her residence at Bath (Tomalin 174-76). 
It was not Austen’s experience of depression, however, but her energetic irony that, 
once practiced on her mother in Bath, would finally direct her characterizations of 
hypochondria in Sanditon. As John Wiltshire has noted, “the hypochondriacs who dominate 
the uncompleted novel Sanditon are presented with an amazing inventiveness, brio and zest. 
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There is not just one ‘sad invalid’ here, but at least three, a trio of health-obsessed people,” 
who are given much more attention than the hypochondriacs of Pride and Prejudice, Emma, 
and Persuasion, with the possible exception of Mrs. Bennet, whose nervous complaints are 
mocked with considerable endurance (198). Sutherland notes that, in this vein, Sanditon 
“seems to recall the spirit of the early, finished fragments of juvenile burlesque” rather than 
any of the finished works (176). Mr. Parker’s sister Diana, who is introduced through her 
long and bizarre letter read aloud by Mr. Parker to Charlotte, is the fragment’s most extended 
indulgence of this characterological form. In Diana’s letter we learn the extreme measures by 
which she and her siblings, Arthur and Susan, maintain their “wretched Constitutions” 
against all manner of ailments: “Spasmodic Bile,” “[deranged] Nerves,” “Headache” (for 
which Susan has had three teeth drawn), “cough,” and so on (386-7). This, Wiltshire 
explains, highlights “the way all three Parkers suffer in concert, reflect and amplify, act and 
react upon each others’ symptoms,” suggesting that hypochondria is, for Austen, a problem 
of social, not individual, constitutions. Like her oeuvre’s other suspected malingerers, none 
of the Parkers are observably sick; Diana, the avid inventor and narrator of the Parkers’ ills, 
is especially busy upon her arrival in Sanditon and seemingly quite well. Instead, 
hypochondria presents in Sanditon as a disordered family constitution, Austen’s version of 
what would one day be called folie à famille, and an allegory for the broader social 
conditions at the Sanditon resort.109 “Nothing,” Wiltshire concludes, “is too amazing to be 
true [in Sanditon] about a person’s relation to their body: the body is an infinitely labile and 
plastic medium for the living through and projection of desires and symptoms and ideas, an 
expandable arena for the imagination and culture to collaborate in the creation of subjective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Folie à famille is a form of group psychosis (less known than the more famous folie à deux) in which family 
members, like the Parkers, share a set of psychotic tendencies. 
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phenomena” (214-15). Because constitutions like the Parkers’ can be illimitably destabilized 
in narrative through the imaginative and cultural actions of hypochondria, individuals in 
Sanditon begin to have a pathologic effect on the collective constitutions of family, class, and 
nation. 
The text of the fragment enacts this pathologic consequence in a series of asyndetic 
monologues by Mr. Parker, Lady Denham, Diana Parker, and Sir Edward Denham; in fact, 
only Charlotte Heywood and her father, from “so healthy a family,” seem consistently to 
speak in response to others, suggesting that their family’s constitutional health may bear 
some relationship to their discursive patterns. As Sutherland notes, “[t]he unusual range of 
strongly drawn characters” who “occupy the foreground, serially and in so short a space—
Mr. Parker, Diana Parker, Sir Edward Denham, Lady Denham, Arthur Parker—each one 
adrift in their own language-loop, deny by their robust self-absorption an underlying 
principle of consensus. There is none.” (194) Said another way, the asyndetic discourse of 
the unfinished novel is that of a society whose constitution is rendered extremely (if not 
entirely) diffuse by its members’ acute self-interest. 
In Sanditon, excessive care of the self is figured as a kind of isolating horror, an effect 
accomplished most explicitly in “those 3 Teeth” Susan Parker has had drawn in an appalling 
attempt to relieve a headache (388). More disconcerting still is the narrator’s apparent 
departure from the voice and consciousness of Charlotte, the fragment’s central female 
character; as Sutherland notes, Austen’s minimal use of free indirect discourse is divided in 
Sanditon almost equally between Charlotte and Mr. Parker, one of Sanditon’s “leading 
eccentrics,” and is usually quite hesitant to declare sympathy with any of the characters 
(Sutherland 175). This brings to light an important distinction between the discursive patterns 
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of Sanditon and the early novels. As we have observed in this study’s first chapter, social, 
physiological, and textual overexposure tend to produce illness in Marianne Dashwood and 
Jane Bennet while the composure of Elinor and Elizabeth, in combination with the narrators’ 
clear sympathy with them, works narratively to fortify their constitutions. Something like the 
converse is true in Sanditon, where the narrator is flatly disinterested in the constitutions of 
characters who are chronically overexposed by their own discourse—but not sick at all. 
Thus, the Sanditon fragment is Austen’s exploration of what a character like 
Charlotte Heywood—very similar to Elizabeth Bennet in her constitutional vigor, ready 
prejudice, and early interest in a man whose “great object in life was to be seductive”—will 
do in a world where the constitutions of society, and of narrative itself, are increasingly 
destabilized by pathologic forms of individualism (405). As Alistair M. Duckworth notes: 
“[t]his is a world, it would seem, so far removed from traditional grounds of moral action that 
its retrieval through former fictional means is no longer possible, a world in which the 
heroine, though she remains a fundamentally moral figure, can no longer be an agent of 
social renewal”—perhaps especially because no other character bothers to hear Charlotte 
above her or his own monologue.110 The most notable example of this is Charlotte 
Heywood’s conversation with Sir Edward Denham about the work of Sir Walter Scott, 
Robert Burns, James Montgomery, Thomas Campbell, and William Wordsworth. 
Reminiscent of Colonel Brandon’s telling of the fallen woman narrative to Elinor Dashwood; 
Henry Tilney and Catherine Moreland’s discussions of gothic novels in Northanger Abbey; 
and Anne Eliot and Captain Harville’s debate about history in Persuasion, Charlotte and Sir 
Edward’s conversation is meant to critique the commonplaces of a popular Romantic-period 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Alistair M. Duckworth, The Improvement of the Estate: A Study of Jane Austen’s Novels (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 221. 
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genre. Instead of using tableau or quoted speech, however, as she does in these earlier novels, 
Austen accomplishes Sanditon’s absorption of clichéd forms almost entirely through Sir 
Edward’s character, a careful parody of the Romantic man of sensibility whose over-studied 
elocution, luxury, and general self-indulgence place him close to the hypochondriac on 
Austen’s sliding scale of pathologic individualism. 
Sir Edward appears in the fragment as a dilettante’s idiolect. This is how he begins 
“to stagger [Charlotte] with the number of his Quotations, & the bewilderment of some of his 
sentences”; because this lengthy passage demonstrates Sir Edward’s views on literature, 
which in turn illuminate Austen’s, it is necessary to quote fully: 
“Do you remember,” said he, “Scotts’ [sic] beautiful Lines on the 
Sea?—Oh! what a description they convey!—They are never out of my 
Thoughts when I walk here.—That Man who can read them unmoved must 
have the nerves of an Assassin!—Heaven defend me from meeting such a 
Man unarmed.—“What description do you mean?—said Charlotte. I 
remember none at this moment, of the Sea, in either of Scotts’ Poems.”—“Do 
you not indeed?—Nor can I exactly recall the beginning at this moment—
But—you cannot have forgotten his description of Woman.— 
 ‘Oh! Woman in our Hours of Ease—’ 
“Delicious! Delicious!—Had he written nothing more, he wd have 
been Immortal. And then again, that unequalled, unrivalled address to Parental 
affection— 
 ‘Some feelings are to Mortals given 
 ‘With less of Earth in them than Heaven’ &c. 
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“But while we are on the subject of Poetry, what think you Miss H. of Burns 
[sic] Lines to his Mary?—Oh! there is Pathos to madden one!—If ever there 
was a Man who felt, it was Burns.—Montgomery has all the Fire of Poetry, 
Wordsworth has the true soul of it—Campbell in his Pleasures of Hope has 
touched the extreme of our sensations—“Like Angel’s visits, few & far 
between.” Can you conceive of anything more subduing, more melting, more 
fraught with the deep Sublime than that line?—But Burns—I confess my 
sense of his Pre-eminence Miss H.—If Scott has a fault, it is the want of 
Passion.—Tender, Elegant, Descriptive—but Tame.—The Man who cannot 
do justice to the attributes of Woman is my contempt.—Sometimes indeed a 
flash of feeling seems to irradiate him—as in the lines we were speaking of—
‘Oh! Woman in our hours of Ease’—. But Burns is always on fire.—His Soul 
was the Altar in which lovely Woman sat enshrined, his Spirit truly breathed 
the immortal Incense which is her Due.— (396-97, Austen’s emphasis) 
He continues in this manner for several additional paragraphs, but Austen has achieved the 
point she raised earlier in the fragment in her comparison of Mr. Parker to Coleridge and 
Wordsworth. That is: there is a problem with the self-reflexive way Romantic-era discursive 
modes, namely the picturesque and some forms of poetry, represent the British constitution. 
Sir Edward’s character displays in Sanditon a highly ironized form of this problem: “[h]e 
began,” Austen’s narrator mockingly explains, “in a tone of great Taste & Feeling, to talk of 
the Sea & the Sea shore—& ran with Energy through all the usual Phrases employed in 
praise of their Sublimity, & descriptive of the undescribable [sic] Emotions they excite in the 
Mind of Sensibility.” (396) Here, Sir Edward invokes William Gilpin’s popular tautology 
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that the picturesque was that which was sufficient to form a picture as well as Burke’s 
discussion of the sublime in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful—simultaneously foreclosing the possibility that he will actually 
communicate with Charlotte, his fellow Briton. More disconcerting is that Sir Edward, the 
heir of Sanditon House and thus the proper steward of the estate, is instead utterly overcome 
by the landscape itself because of his “Mind of Sensibility,” his highly sensitized 
constitution. In this way, Sir Edward Denham represents another “mixture of Character”: the 
ridiculous frivolity of a Reverend Collins with the social station (and attendant civic 
responsibilities) of a Mr. Darcy. The relation between Britons and the British landscape 
embodied in Sir Edward is thus not only ridiculous in Austen’s estimation, but corrosive to 
the political order represented by the country estate—not to mention a major dilemma for 
Austen’s heroines, who in Sanditon have no reasonable person with whom to fall in love. 
Coming under particular scrutiny in Sanditon is what Keats would, the following year 
in an October letter to Richard Woodhouse, call the “wordsworthian or egotistical sublime,” 
or the tendency of Wordsworth’s poetry to stand “alone” in excessive self-reflexivity (387). 
As we have observed, Austen sets Sanditon’s constitutionally variegated landscapes in 
contradistinction to the fully-integrated scenes of Coleridge’s lime tree bower and 
Wordsworth’s Tintern Abbey, where the landscape of Britain is precisely the landscape of 
the self, where dwells “A motion and a spirit” that “rolls through all things” (“Tintern 
Abbey,” ll. 101, 103). The coextensive nature of human constitutions in Wordsworth and 
Coleridge’s poems admits the possibility of human communion, like the kind Coleridge 
writes of between himself and Charles Lamb. Austen is clear, however, that no such common 
spirit runs through the characters gathered at Sanditon, who are a community in name only. 
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Absorbed by their own constitutions, or deflected as Charlotte is by the self-interest of her 
company, Austen’s characters each find themselves quite alone in the landscapes of their 
own imagining: “[a] little of our own Bracing Sea Air will soon set me on my feet again.—
Depend upon it my Dear, it is exactly a case for the Sea. Saline air & immersion will be the 
very thing.—My sensations tell me so already,” pronounces Mr. Parker after injuring his 
ankle (367). Though he is comforted by the certainty he attributes to his own “sensations,” he 
hears no reply from his wife, Mary, whom Austen places in a position similar to that of the 
silent auditor of “Tintern Abbey,” Wordsworth’s sister, Dorothy, or the Mary of Robert 
Burns’s poems, who all but disappears amidst the speaker’s commentary on himself. 
This is not to imply that Austen disliked the poetry of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Burns, 
Montgomery, Scott, and Campbell—or that she saw an absolute moral problem at the heart 
of the poetry contemporary to her novels; as Deresiewicz shows at length, Austen’s 
interactions with the Romantic poets was much more nuanced. What is borne out by the text 
of Sanditon, however, is that bad readers of literature—good, bad, or otherwise—endanger 
British constitutions, both physiological and social. At the commercial lending library on 
Sanditon’s Mall, for example, novels are regularly subjected to “that vast, unknown mass of 
buyers or renters and readers,” who, like Sir Edward, constitute “the most treacherous and 
unpredictable audience.” (Thompson 10) In Sanditon, genre itself is under the hard sway of 
expanding British markets, as in Sir Edward’s highly stylized, imperial designs on Clara 
Brereton: 
[i]f she could not be won by affection, he must carry her off. He knew his 
Business.—Already had he had many Musings on the Subject. If he were 
constrained so to act, he must naturally wish to strike out something new, to 
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exceed those who had gone before him—and he felt a strong curiosity to 
ascertain whether the Neighborhood of Timbuctoo might not afford some 
solitary House adapted for Clara’s reception;—but the Expense alas! of 
Measures in that masterly style was ill-suited to his Purse, & Prudence obliged 
him to prefer the quietest sort of ruin & disgrace for the object of his 
Affections, to the more renowned. (405-6) 
Sir Edward’s appearance in his own imagination as a rake in the style of Richardson’s 
Lovelace is encouraged by the empire’s expansive narrative possibilities; fortunately for 
Clara, Sir Edward’s deteriorating personal finances will prevent his taking action on any of 
them. 
What becomes so striking, then, about the Sanditon fragment is that it seems a 
preliminary formulation of Austen’s idea that, particularly in the hands of bad readers, 
literature is insufficient to promoting human sympathy and the social cohesion such 
sympathy implies. This is how Austen frames Sir Edward’s belief (which is now enjoying a 
great resurgence in twenty-first-century literary studies) that novel-reading promotes human 
sympathy: “[t]he Novels which I approve,” Sir Edward begins, 
hold forth the most splendid Portraitures of high Conceptions, Unbounded 
Views, illimitable Ardour, indomptible [sic] Decision—and even when the 
Event is mainly anti-prosperous to the high-toned Machinations of the prime 
Character, the potent, pervading Hero of the Story, it leaves us full of 
Generous Emotions for him;—our Hearts are paralyzed—. […] These are the 
Novels which enlarge the primitive Capabilities of the Heart, & which cannot 
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impugn the Sense or be any Dereliction of character, of the most anti-peurile 
[sic] Man, to be conversant with. (403-4). 
Ironically, Sir Edward’s over-articulated opinions about sympathy prevent Charlotte from 
sympathizing with his position: “[i]f I understand you aright […] our taste in Novels is not at 
all the same,” she replies to him flatly (404). Austen suggests through Sir Edward’s 
monologues to the mostly silent Charlotte that highly self-reflexive methods of reading, 
produced in this case out of the idle, impoverished lifestyle of a Regency aristocrat, make 
sympathy not only impossible but unfavorable—and the prospect of marriage to such a 
person more impossible and unfavorable still. Like hypochondria, self-reflexive reading is 
another of Sanditon’s modern plagues, and Sir Edward is not its only victim. Mrs. Whitby, 
the proprietor of Sanditon’s lending library, appears at the beginning of the fragment’s sixth 
chapter “in her inner room, reading one of her own Novels, for want of Employment.” (389) 
At the center of Sanditon’s busiest social venue—and its repository of literature—sits a 
solitary, idle female novelist: a writer and a reader collapsed in a lonely dystopia of boredom. 
After beginning such a brutal critique of hypochondria in Sanditon, Austen remained 
highly aware of her own illness’s tendency to isolate her from her friends, or to make her 
ridiculous; she was quite determined in her final months, it would seem, to stay out of Mrs. 
Whitby’s inner room. In a letter written from Chawton on May 22, 1817 to Anne Sharp, 
Austen wittily admits to being “really a very genteel, portable sort of an Invalid” in an 
account of her travel to the hospital at Winchester to receive ministrations during the worst 
bout of her illness to date. The incongruent pairing of the languid adjective “genteel” with the 
staccato, practical notes of the word “portable” suggest aurally that Austen cheerfully was 
able to direct her irony at herself as eagerly as she had applied it to Mr. Parker and his 
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hypochondriac siblings. Later in this letter is another rather striking personal reference to the 
kind of monologue she had been developing among the Sanditon hypochondriacs: “Beleive 
[sic] me,” Austen assures Sharp, “I was interested in all you wrote, though with all the 
Egotism of an Invalid I write only of myself.” After serially lampooning the Sanditon 
characters who speak only of themselves, she admonishes this tendency in herself—but, in 
another note of humor, not until after she has permitted herself the indulgence. In Austen’s 
last letters, there are more difficult moments as well—particularly Austen’s constant worry 
that she is burdening Cassandra, and the rest of her family, with her care (494-95, 497). Thus 
we can see that while Austen was sometimes carried away in the wry narration of her own 
illness, she was careful to check this tendency not only with self-mockery but an almost 
constant recourse to thoughts of her relatives, particularly her dear sister. In Austen’s own 
experience of illness, therefore, a collective family constitution was a critical and comforting 
protection against the “Egotism of an Invalid,” a hedge that she had all but written out of 
Sanditon. 
In Sanditon, in fact, there only seem to be the relatively undeveloped Charlotte and, 
less developed still, Clara standing against the solipsism of the other characters, who exhibit 
what R. W. Chapman called “a certain roughness and harshness of satire […] due in part to 
lack of revision.” As Sutherland observes, “Chapman […] felt sure (following a hint from 
Anna Lefroy) that Austen would have toned down the caricatures of Mr. Parker, his sister 
Diana, Lady Denham, and Sir Edward: ‘she would have smoothed these coarse strokes, so 
strikingly different from the mellow pencilings of Persuasion.’” (Chapman qtd. in Sutherland 
175) In a more decorous approach, critic Francis Warre Cornish discouraged altogether 
critical interpretation of Sanditon because of these rougher sections: while the fragment 
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“contains some promising sketches,” on his view, “it would be useless, if not impertinent, to 
pass an opinion on a work so obviously incomplete.”111 These more conservative approaches 
to the manuscript—and the caution they urge to critics who would take advantage of the 
suggestive power of fragments—are important to bear in mind when interpreting Charlotte 
and Clara: we must acknowledge that a fragment cannot support notions of authorial 
intention in the ways a published novel can. 
But many of these readers frequently append to their apologies and warnings 
suggestions that Austen was not drastically off her mark in the manuscript she left at her 
death: “a degree of savagery would, I think, have persisted,” Chapman added, in his 
explanation of Sanditon’s satirized characters.112 As Brian Southam has argued, “the 
modifications to the characters, especially to the four eccentrics, are not in the direction of 
toning down, of de-caricaturising, but tend to enforce and heighten their traits and 
eccentricities.”113 Sutherland notes more generally of the Sanditon holograph that “every 
page is filled, implying that no large-scale revision of the draft in this form was 
contemplated” (172). The textual features we have assessed in this chapter—Sanditon’s 
highly programmatic representations of British constitutional instability, Austen’s complex 
development of hypochondria as a figure for Regency life, her invocations and parodies of 
Romantic poetry, and the formalization of her characters’ solipsism into a series of asyndetic 
monologues—tend to corroborate these views of a more “finished” Sanditon manuscript. 
If Austen indeed intended the harsh caricatures of the Parkers and the Denhams, then 
we can see Charlotte and Clara as a kind of textual relief from the exhausting self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Francis Warre Cornish, Jane Austen, “English Men of Letters” series (London: Macmillan, 1913), p. 231. 
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involvement of the others. That Sanditon was calculated to explore what a heroine might do 
under the relatively serious narrative pressure of being unable to speak (like Dorothy 
Wordsworth at Tintern Abbey, or Mary in Robert Burns’s poem) is made particularly 
manifest in the dynamic Austen achieves briefly between Charlotte and Clara toward the 
fragment’s end. Short as it is, it remains Sanditon’s most psychologically developed 
relationship, putting one in mind of the most innovative moments of Emma. As Charlotte is 
making the approach to Lady Denham’s home at Sanditon House, this is what she sees: the 
Entrance Gates were so much in a corner of the Grounds or Paddock, so near 
one of its Boundaries, that an outside fence was at first almost pressing on the 
road—til an angle here, & a curve there threw them to a better distance. The 
Fence was a proper park Paling in excellent condition; with clusters of fine 
Elms, or rows of old Thorns following its line almost everywhere.—Almost 
must be stipulated—for there were vacant spaces—& through one of these, 
Charlotte as soon as they entered the Enclosure, caught a glimpse over the 
pales of something White & Womanish on the other side;—it was something 
which immediately brought Miss B. into her head—& stepping to the pales, 
she saw indeed—and very decidedly, in spite of the Mist; Miss B— seated, 
not far before her, at the foot of the bank which sloped down from the outside 
of the Paling & which a narrow Path seemed to skirt along;—Miss Brereton 
seated, apparently very composedly—& Sir E. D. by her side. (426) 
Like the approach to Sotherton in Mansfield Park, which illuminates Fanny Price’s place in 
the web of attractions suspended between the members of the party in transit, the approach to 
Sanditon House elaborates Charlotte’s position in Sanditon, which is marked by her desire 
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for clarity in an uncertain landscape. While the odd composition of this scene might tend at 
first to suggest a lack of clarity and redundancy of detail that would have been removed from 
the passage in revision, Sutherland has shown that the reverse is true: as in other revisions to 
the fragment, Austen’s manuscript shows her heightening, rather than reducing, the passage’s 
“roughness of finish, perceptual opacity, and the leveling of relevant and non-relevant 
information” (184). Through these disorienting discursive techniques as well as a morning 
mist that threatens further to obscure her perceptions, Charlotte receives a series of vague 
impressions that make her think of Clara Brereton, who is finally confirmed to be seated next 
to Sir Edward, as if in a sketch or painting “very composedly.” “Like Alice in Wonderland,” 
Sutherland notes, “[Charlotte] experiences the loss of peripheral vision that inhabiting a 
strange world entails” (190). It is notable, therefore, that she achieves a pronounced 
perceptual clarity when she encounters Clara—even in spite of the “Mist,” which surely 
would have overthrown the perceptive faculties of Sanditon’s other characters; Mrs. Parker, 
in fact, who is traveling to Sanditon House with Charlotte, sees “nothing” of the scene. 
 Earlier in the fragment, Clara has similar effects on Charlotte’s consciousness. On 
their way from Willingden to Sanditon, when Charlotte is by turns overwhelmed and 
confused by Mr. Parker’s effusions on the resort and its inhabitants, he also speaks 
warmly of Clara Brereton, & the interest of his story increased very much 
with the introduction of such a Character. Charlotte listened with more than 
amusement now;—it was solicitude & Enjoyment, as she heard her described 
to be lovely, amiable, gentle, unassuming, conducting herself uniformly with 
great good sense, & evidently gaining by her innate worth, on the affections of 
her Patroness.—Beauty, Sweetness, Poverty & Dependence, do not want the 
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imagination of a Man to operate upon. With due exceptions—Woman feels 
for Woman very promptly & compassionately. (377-78) 
Clara is literally the only person in Sanditon for whom Charlotte exhibits any kind of fellow 
feeling. In fact, for characters like Lady Denham, Charlotte finds it “impossible even to 
affect sympathy” (401). Early in the fragment, Charlotte’s sympathy for Clara is figured as 
an intense attraction that may be owing to genre: “Charlotte could see in [Clara] only the 
most perfect representation of whatever Heroine might be most beautiful & bewitching 
[…].—Perhaps it might be partly owing to her having just issued from a Circulating Library” 
(391). Like Catherine Moreland’s tendency to expect the gothic everywhere in Northanger 
Abbey, Charlotte is eagerly prepared to find heroines in Sanditon. 
Charlotte’s rather superficial, and probably naïve, fascination with Clara becomes 
much more complicated, however, when she discovers Clara in a compromising situation 
alone with the ridiculous Sir Edward. At first, the view “could not but strike [Charlotte] 
rather unfavourably with regard to Clara,” but this assessment dissipates when Charlotte 
concludes that Clara’s poverty is “a situation which must not be judged with severity.” Then 
a striking thing happens: Charlotte, suspending even her extreme disdain for Sir Edward, 
cannot “but think of the extreme difficulty which secret Lovers must have in finding a proper 
spot for their stolen Interviews” (426-27). In addition to feeling this sympathy for Clara, 
Charlotte also is eager that Clara’s reputation should not be damaged by wider discovery of 
the meeting, suggesting that she is not mocking Clara with her idea of “stolen Interviews” 
between “Lovers.” In fact, Charlotte is “glad to perceive that nothing had been discerned by 
Mrs Parker; if Charlotte had not been considerably the tallest of the two, Miss B.’s white 
ribbons might not have fallen within the ken of her more observant eyes” (426). Charlotte, 
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normally ruled by her first impressions like Elizabeth Bennet, is willing to make a long series 
of exceptions for Clara, whom she barely knows. 
 One possible reading of these scenes is that Charlotte Heywood, like Sir Edward, is 
just another voracious and bad reader of literature, all too eager to see opening in front of her 
the seduction of a Clarissa by a Lovelace, or far too enamored of Clara’s role as heroine to 
judge her honestly. But this does not seem to square with what we know of Charlotte’s 
prudent, rather judgmental character: “She is thoroughly mean,” Charlotte rapidly concludes 
of Lady Denham, “[Mr. Parker] is too kind hearted to see clearly.—I must judge for myself.” 
(402) Nor does this reading work with a detail from Clara’s own consciousness, that she “had 
not the least intention of being seduced” by Sir Edward, for it would require Sanditon’s 
narrator, in this rare example of free indirect discourse, to be wrong (405). It seems more 
likely that these interactions between Charlotte and Clara are the fragment’s tentative attempt 
to represent real sympathy between Charlotte and Clara, which Austen had once longed for 
herself in Bath’s tedious society: “[t]he distance between Charlotte and the world she 
encounters and attempts to analyse is rarely bridged,” Sutherland notes, but these rare 
occasions of understanding are almost always marked by Clara’s presence (190). This is 
compelling evidence that Austen was beginning to establish bonds between these two young 
women as a viable alternative to the constitutional instability—both national and narrative—
represented at large in Sanditon. 
Tentative though it must remain, this reading sets the Sanditon manuscript as a site of 
competing notions of social constitution: real sympathy, and the constitutional cohesion it 
implies, is set in contradistinction to those who would erode collective constitutions through 
excessive attention to the self. Charlotte’s attempt to sympathize with Clara in the final pages 
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of the fragment suggests that Austen may have been working out a narrative mechanism, 
similar to Wollstonecraft’s in Maria, or The Wrongs of Woman, through which two women 
might constitute a community apart from the pathologic individualism of the British 
Regency. Critically, the sympathy Charlotte shows for Clara at the end of the Sanditon 
fragment marks a connection categorically different from friendships between related sisters 
in Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice, and the extra-familial friendship in Emma 
between Emma Woodhouse and Harriet Smith—which, founded on Emma’s belief that 
Harriet is the daughter of an aristocrat, must end when the difference between their social 
constitutions is at last revealed. Instead, Charlotte’s real sympathy for Clara would seem to 
transcend constitutional barriers of family and class: in fact, these characters have no more in 
common than their unfortunate situation in a constitutionally destabilized nation and 
narrative, where marriage seems at least highly undesirable, if not utterly impossible. What 
begins in Sanditon to constitute a heroine, therefore, is not Elizabeth Bennet’s (or Princess 
Charlotte’s) moral capacity to break from her family in self-actualizing preparation for 
companionate marriage; rather, Austen envisions in Charlotte Heywood a heroine whose 
primary psychological inclination is to see in another the possibility of a heroine. 
  
 
CHAPTER IV 
Frankenstein, Romantic Medicine, and the End of the British Constitution 
A State without religion is like a human body 
without a soul, or rather like a human body of 
the species of the Frankenstein Monster, without 
a pure and vivifying principle. 
  —Fraser’s Magazine, 1830114 
 
 In Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818), Mary Shelley gave Western 
literature its first mad scientist. But by giving Victor Frankenstein influential medical 
training at the University of Ingolstadt, she also created a doctor. Victor Frankenstein’s 
white-coated successors on the silver screen often have highlighted the medical character of 
his education and experiment: Dr. Henry Frankenstein (Colin Clive) in James Whale’s 1931 
film Frankenstein is a medical student turned rogue experimenter; in Young Frankenstein, 
Mel Brooks’s 1974 parody, Gene Wilder plays the medical school lecturer, Dr. Frederick 
Frankenstein. In these films, Frankenstein’s Creature appears as a patient on a hospital 
gurney swathed in bandages or under a tented white sheet, underlining the clear similarities 
between Shelley’s animation scene and modern surgery. But Frankenstein’s medicine is not 
merely a product of twentieth-century cinema; as this chapter argues, Shelley, too, saw 
Frankenstein as a physician, the Creature as his patient, and their tragic relationship as a 
critique not only of science, as so many scholars have found, but of medicine. Some may 	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argue that the difference between “science” and “medicine” was unremarkable during the 
Romantic period when disciplinary boundaries where much more pliable than they 
eventually would become. But this chapter will show that even in the period of Shelley’s life 
there were clear cultural distinctions, which Shelley certainly knew of, between medicine and 
the new science of the Enlightenment to which medicine had not yet fully adapted. When 
Shelley began Frankenstein in 1816, Romantic medicine, by and large, was still treating a 
holistic body, a fully integrated constitution, which the new science was in many ways 
threatening to dissolve. These differences between science and medicine, which Shelley 
takes up at length in Frankenstein, were posing important questions about the nature, in fact 
the very existence, of the British constitution. 
 Marilyn Butler’s groundbreaking reading of the radical science in Shelley’s 1818 
Frankenstein is foundational to understanding the novel’s interaction with Romantic 
medicine. As Butler argues, Shelley revised the original text of Frankenstein for an 1831 
popular edition to minimize the 1818 text’s thoroughgoing engagement with the controversy 
over the nature and origin of life between John Abernethy and his protégé, William 
Lawrence, at London’s Royal College of Surgeons between 1814 and 1819, what scholars 
now interchangeably call the Lawrence-Abernethy debates, the vitalist debates, or the Life 
question. Butler compellingly explains how the science of the London debates underwrote 
Shelley’s first novel—but Mary Shelley’s engagement with the Lawrence-Abernethy debates 
in Frankenstein is tied perhaps even more explicitly to Romantic-era medical practice, not 
just to the radical science that was beginning to reform and complicate it. The reason William 
Lawrence could argue so brilliantly about human physiology at the Royal College of 
Surgeons is that he had dissected cadavers during his medical training with his teacher, the 
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Edinburgh-trained physician John Abernethy. Both men had overseen hundreds of surgeries 
on human patients. In an 1815 example particularly resonant with Frankenstein, Lawrence 
cared in his own home for a boy born without a portion of his brain, a condition Lawrence 
later described in Ree’s Clycopaedia as an “aberration” of the body’s “form and structure” 
that had produced a “monster” (qtd. in Butler xli-xlii). Much later in his career, Lawrence 
treated perhaps his most famous patient, the young Queen Victoria. Abernethy and 
Lawrence’s position as practicing physicians is a vitally important but as yet unremarked 
aspect of Frankenstein’s historical context indicating that—just as Shelley knew and 
championed the radical science underlying the Lawrence-Abernethy debates—she also 
understood that this science came with potentially dangerous implications for physicians and 
their patients in Romantic-era Britain. 
 “Everything must have a beginning,” Shelley declared in her 1831 preface to 
Frankenstein, and this argument begins in 1814, when John Abernethy, then the President of 
the Royal College of Surgeons, used the work of John Hunter to argue—somewhat 
unclearly—that life was owing to a “subtile, mobile, invisible substance,” which was 
“superadded” to the human frame and not part of the body itself.115 This, the vitalist position 
as it became known, was attractive to faithful scientists like Abernethy, who, holding fast to 
the Newtonian ideal that a mechanized universe was the Creator’s work, sought further to 
reconcile scientific and religious understandings of human life. Crucially for Abernethy and 
those in agreement with him in the Royal College of Surgeons, vitalism held that this 
superadded “vital principle” was coextensive with the soul; perhaps the vital principle was 	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electricity itself or at least analogous to that subtle fluid Benjamin Franklin (whose surname 
Frankenstein’s echoes) had recently drawn from the heavens in his own famous experiment. 
 In 1816, the year Shelley began Frankenstein, Abernethy’s pupil, William Lawrence, 
first publicly challenged the vitalist position of his teacher. Using the work of the French 
zoologist Georges Cuvier, the tissue theory of Cuvier’s young countryman, Marie François 
Xavier Bichât, and the ethnography of the German naturalist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, 
Lawrence argued for a materialist understanding of life, in which the functions of living 
beings depended absolutely upon their bodily structures. Structure, Lawrence argued to the 
Royal College of Surgeons, was “the peculiar composition, which distinguished living 
bodies,” and functions were “the purposes, which any organ or system of organs executes in 
the animal frame.”116 Ultimately, as Bichât had written, life represented the sum total of 
organic functions “by which death is resisted” (qtd. in Temkin 106). Generally believed to be 
more charismatic and articulate than his teacher, Lawrence thus inaugurated a long and 
contentious debate in the College of Surgeons and beyond in the public that complicated 
science’s cultural ascendency in Britain during the Regency. As the debate was popularized 
in Britain, it involved political figures as diverse as the radical materialists Sir Thomas 
Charles Morgan, his wife, Lady Sydney Morgan, and, on the other side of the aisle, the 
conservative Christian Advocate in the University of Cambridge, Reverend Thomas Rennell, 
and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who staunchly defended the vitalist position in his 
Philosophical Lectures of the 1818-1819 winter (Temkin 106-108). 
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 Predictably, in view of the post-war political climate of the Regency, the vitalist 
debates became nationalized, a fact especially important in understanding Mary Shelley’s 
treatment of national constitutions in Frankenstein, which this chapter will discuss in its final 
section. Reverend Rennell, for example, remembered with satisfaction the work of the 
anatomist Charles Bell, who, according to Bell’s own account, was “engaged in maintaining 
the principles of the English school of Physiology, and in exposing the futility of the opinions 
of those French philosophers and physiologists, who represented life as the mere physical 
result of certain combinations and actions of parts” (Temkin 107). More scathing than 
Rennell’s characterization was the complaint of an anonymous “Oxonian Resident in 
London,” who situated Lawrence among a “radical triumvirate” of thinkers including Lord 
Byron and the “infidel” Thomas Paine. In the view of this anonymous commentator, 
Lawrence, Byron, and Paine were “Colleaguing with the Patriotic Radicals to Emancipate 
Mankind from All Laws Human and Divine,” and in so doing were “undermining belief in 
the Bible and the immortality of the soul, were destroying hope or dread of future reward or 
punishment”—and thus they were sabotaging Britain’s constitution under civil, religious, and 
divine authorities (Temkin 108). Though he at first refrained from these nationalized 
arguments, Abernethy eventually would impute sedition to Lawrence’s continental 
understanding of human physiology. According to their nationalist suspicions of the godless, 
politically radical French, Abernethy and his coreligionists in the College of Surgeons were 
especially offended by Lawrence’s claim that science could offer no account of the 
everlasting soul: “the theological doctrine of the soul and its separate existence,” Lawrence 
argued in 1817, depended upon “a species of proof altogether different. These sublime 
dogmas could never have been brought to light by the labours of the anatomist and 
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physiologist. An immaterial and spiritual being could not have been discovered amid the 
blood and filth of the dissecting-room.” (Lectures 8) But too late: the conservative 
establishment in London already had brought English nationalism and Christian belief 
together under the banner of a vitalist physiology promulgated by English science, which is 
why the anonymous conservative contributor to Fraser’s Magazine quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter could in 1830 so readily liken a “State without religion” to a being “without a 
pure and vivifying principle.” 
 Lawrence’s gothicized rhetoric about “the blood and filth of the dissecting room” 
should sound familiar to those who have read Frankenstein because, as Butler momentously 
has shown, there was a healthy traffic in ideas between the Shelleys and Lawrence during the 
vitalist debates in London, particularly from 1815-1816, when Lawrence was physician to the 
hypochondriac Percy Shelley (who, at this time, believed himself to be dying of syphilis); by 
1816, Mary Shelley was working up her famous ghost story into the novel manuscript of 
Frankenstein. As Butler explains, it was because of this traffic in ideas that Lawrence came 
to adopt Shelley’s gothicized language and her social satire, and that Shelley (like Lawrence) 
was believed, in Frankenstein, to be attacking Britain’s state-sponsored Christianity. Because 
of its intense preoccupations with materialist science, the 1818 Frankenstein had definitively 
aligned Shelley with Lawrence in the hostile London debates (Butler xx). 
 Lawrence and Shelley’s radical materialism also challenged implicitly the notion of 
constitution, an idea that was, as we have seen in the previous chapters, at least as entrenched 
in Britain as Christianity. Georgian-era Britons made constant recourse to the idea of their 
bodily constitutions: “My constitution will no longer allow me to toil as formerly,” Tobias 
Smollet wrote to his doctor in 1762; and Lady Palmerston, recording her father’s descent into 
	   189	  
ill health, explained: “Papa is a little better for the change of air, but not much. He is 
certainly weak and ill and in very low spirits. He is broken within the last few months, […] 
yet he had so strong a constitution ones hopes he may pick up again.” As Roy and Dorothy 
Porter have shown, and as the remarks of Smollet and Palmerston bear out, constitution was 
a holistic conception of the body and its health: “the inner stock of vitality and strength, the 
vigour that flowed when all one’s organs worked effectively together, without the artificial 
crutches of medicines.” (Porter and Porter 26-28; Smollet and Palmerston qtd. in Porter) 
Owing largely to the absorption of Galenic humoralism into understandings of bodily 
constitution during the eighteenth century, disease still meant total constitutional disorder to 
most Britons during the Romantic period; it was not yet a sign, as in later nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century medicine, of a particular affliction to a unique site in the body: the lesion, 
as it eventually would be called by the materialist Foucault. Physiological events—boils, 
swelling, rashes, and fevers—were regarded by Romantic-period sufferers and their 
caretakers only as the outward manifestations of full-scale constitutional problems—
favorable signs, in fact, that disease was working itself out of the body. This is why in Sense 
and Sensibility, for example, Dr. Harris initially sees Marianne Dashwood’s fever as a 
welcome sign of her recovery. 
When the Lawrence-Abernethy debates and Frankenstein appeared on Britain’s 
national scene, therefore, constitution—as we have seen in the works of Austen and 
Brunton—was the essentially unchallenged rubric under which Britons understood their 
bodies and what ailed them. Materialism’s insistence on discreet bodily structures with 
unique, structure-dependent functions dangerously implied that holistic human constitutions 
might not exist and—more outrageous still—that all human beings might be fundamentally 
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the same in their body’s structures regardless of familial, racial, or national identities. 
Without bodily constitutions, where were those material human differences to be located? 
Materialism was thus deeply troubling to political conservatives not only because it 
questioned the existence of God and an everlasting soul, but because it undermined the 
widely-held belief that constitutional differences between people produced and justified the 
existing social order in which the rich were superior to the poor, the English were superior 
the Scottish, and—particularly important in the context of Frankenstein—men were superior 
to women. On the other hand, this is why materialism was so exciting to radicals lately 
disenchanted by the failed French Revolution. Materialism supported democratic conceptions 
of human perfectibility explicated by Shelley’s father, William Godwin, in his Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice: if everyone had the same material body with the same 
structures and the same functions, then each person, regardless of the circumstances of birth, 
might improve toward perfection on a similar program. Thus would the ancien régime’s 
hierarchies be leveled through education, that Romantic mechanism of individual 
improvement which Shelley’s mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, had argued for so famously in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman. More compelling still to British radicals was that 
materialists in Britain and on the continent, perhaps most notably Lawrence, were laying the 
groundwork for evolutionary theory: the idea that not just individuals, but entire species, 
could improve based on sexual selection. As Butler notes, science thus offered a wonderfully 
tantalizing alternative to the failed political revolution in France: [i]f revolution were to be 
put in a new, much grander frame, and redefined as evolution, it could be represented as 
natural, even inevitable” (xxxii)—certainly a comforting thought to those British radicals 
who had seen the momentous political upheaval in France quashed by the Terror and 
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Madame Guillotine. By invoking Lawrence’s materialist science in Frankenstein’s radical 
experiment, Shelley irreparably altered—in a way the French Revolution could not—
Romantic-era constitutional identities with the birth of the Creature: a nation-less, race-less, 
and, as some feminist and queer theorists have argued, genderless being who has no family. 
According to the Godwinian promises of Lawrence’s democratizing materialist science, 
Shelley’s Creature is unencumbered by membership in the corporate constitutions implied by 
each of these categories. 
And yet: instead of staging the triumph of scientific discovery or, as in Pride and 
Prejudice, the rise of the individual over the unfair systems of the past, Frankenstein is most 
famously a story of domestic tragedy that, as her biographers frequently note, resonates 
deeply with Shelley’s own losses. The first and perhaps most famous of these was Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s death from puerperal fever very shortly after her daughter’s birth, a 
common Romantic-period fate of new mothers who had been delivered of their babies by 
doctors and midwives who, before the advent of germ theory much later in the century, saw 
no reason to maintain sterile birthing rooms. Mary Shelley, née Godwin, was born at home, 
and a midwife attended until Mary Wollstonecraft had difficulty delivering the placenta 
following Mary’s birth; finally the physician Dr. Poignard was called who, allegedly coming 
to Wollstonecraft’s bedside from a post-mortem without washing his hands, introduced the 
infection that killed her little more than a week later.117 Mary Shelley lost three of her own 
children as well: a prematurely-born daughter, Clara, died in February of 1815, just before 
Shelley conceived the ghost story that would become Frankenstein; William and a second 
daughter, also Clara, died in childhood. As an adolescent, Shelley was ineffectively treated 	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for a case of eczema, which erupted on her hand and spread along one of her arms. The 
thirteen-year-old was often sent away from her father’s home to the Kent coast at Ramsgate 
because sea-bathing had been prescribed as part of her treatment. The prescriptions of her 
doctor, which never cured her eczema, often removed her from familiar domestic life in her 
father’s home.118 
When she began Frankenstein in 1816, therefore, the nineteen-year-old Shelley was 
grappling with competing conceptions of human life: the wonderful freedom from individual 
and corporate constitutions championed by her parents and all but promised by Lawrence’s 
materialist science, on one hand, and, on the other, Britons (including herself and beloved 
members of her own family) who lived and died with what still looked to most doctors—and 
felt to most patients—like integrated bodily constitutions, consistent with the vitalism 
championed by Abernethy. Shelley embodied this conundrum in the Creature. His birth is the 
result of Victor’s materialist science but also of Victor’s older preoccupations with medieval 
and Renaissance occult forms of inquiry, which are notionally if not explicitly vitalist. Stuart 
Peterfreund, Martin Tropp, and Irving Buchen, who explore Victor’s longstanding interest in 
Cornelius Agrippa, Albertus Magnus, and Paracelsus, convincingly have explained the 
vitalist nature of Victor’s childhood interests. Peterfreund acknowledges the novel’s 
particular use of Paracelsus’s work, noting the “similarity […] between the ‘transparent’ 
homunculus of Paracelsus […] as well as the forty-day and forty-week gestation of the 
homunculus and the ‘nearly two years’ that Victor works ‘for the sole purpose of infusing 
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life into an inanimate body.’”119 Tropp notes in Frankenstein the influence of Godwin’s St. 
Leon (1799), explaining that in her father’s novel Shelley “read of an alchemist […] who 
discovers both the philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life,”120 and modeled Victor 
Frankenstein after this character. Medieval and early modern necromancers also sought to 
animate lifeless matter, and Buchen describes the role of this occultist pursuit in 
Frankenstein, underlining Victor’s aim to “wed the visions of alchemy to the methodology of 
science.”121 These elements of Victor’s early interests, particularly the elixir of life, are 
deeply consistent with the vitalist idea that a superadded principle, perhaps even fluid like an 
elixir, was necessary to make a being live. 
Shelley’s alignment of Victor’s early (and unsuccessful) interests with the vitalist 
position would have seemed fairly explicit to her contemporary readers attuned to the 
Lawrence-Abernethy controversy. Against his father’s recommendation, for example, Victor 
ineffectively repeats Agrippa’s old methods of incantation, which, like Victor’s animation of 
the Creature at Ingolstadt, seek to bring insentient bodies to life by exciting a vital 
principle.122 This is another important parallel between Shelley’s 1818 Frankenstein and the 
work of William Lawrence. In his Lectures on Comparative Anatomy, Lawrence mockingly 
compared the vitalist position to the very myths that fascinate Shelley’s young Frankenstein 
(and that newer colonial figure, the “untutor’d” “Indian”): “Thus we find,” Lawrence argued, 
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“that the philosopher with his archeus, his anima, or his subtle and mobile fluid is about on a 
level, in respect to the mental processes, by which he has arrived at it with the 
‘Poor Indian, whose untutor’d mind, 
Sees God in clouds, and hears him in the wind.’” (77) 
 
Victor’s early interests in older methods are tellingly coupled with his backward resistance to 
Enlightenment science, particularly to the minutia of chemistry. When Victor “attend[s] a 
course of lectures upon natural philosophy” at his father’s behest, he is confused and 
alienated by the professor’s lecture on “potassium and boron, of sulphates and oxyds, terms 
to which [he] could affix no idea,” ultimately becoming “disgusted with the science of 
natural philosophy” (70-71). With Victor’s aversion to these elements of Enlightenment 
science—and his enthusiasm for the holism of ancient and medieval traditions—Shelley 
clearly situates him as a primitive vitalist of the Abernethy school. 
As he begins his courses at Ingolstadt, however, Victor’s attitude toward the new 
science changes dramatically, largely under the influence of his teacher, M. Krempe. 
Following this shift, Victor censures his anachronistic fascinations and apologizes for his 
ignorance: 
[i]t may appear very strange, that a disciple of Albertus Magnus should arise 
in the eighteenth century; but our family was not scientifical, and I had not 
attended any of the lectures given at the schools of Geneva. My dreams were 
therefore undisturbed by reality. (68-69) 
Victor’s retrospective assessment of himself echoes Krempe’s critique of Victor upon his 
arrival at the University: “I little expected in this enlightened and scientific age to find a 
disciple of Albertus Magnus and Paracelsus. My dear Sir [he says to Victor], you must begin 
your studies entirely anew” (75). Shelley uses Victor and M. Krempe not only to critique 
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vitalism, but to articulate a linear narrative of scientific progress, common to the rhetoric of 
Romantic-era materialists. Lawrence, for example, rejoiced that, because Europe was 
becoming “one great state prison,” many French scientists were emigrating to the newly 
formed United States. Unencumbered by the oppressive systems of the Old World, in which 
he included Abernethy’s religious vitalism, Lawrence predicted that American people “may 
reach in our lives as gigantic a superiority over the worn-out despotisms of the old world, as 
the physical features of America, her colossal mountains, her mighty rivers, her forests and 
her lakes, exhibit in comparison with those of Europe” (qtd. in Temkin 102). The constitution 
of the young republic becomes for Lawrence a Godwinian utopia, a classically liberal 
experiment in human perfectibility; on Lawrence’s view, America is Frankenstein’s endeavor 
to construct a perfect, “beautiful” Creature writ large (85). 
And yet: Victor’s transition from older methodologies to the new science of the 
Enlightenment is imperfect and, according to Shelley, incomplete. Though Victor reportedly 
abandons his childhood fascination with alchemy at Ingolstadt, he retains a “supernatural 
enthusiasm” for his physiology courses (79).  In her 1831 preface to Frankenstein, Shelley 
continues to characterize Victor as “the pale student of the unhallowed arts kneeling beside 
the thing he had put together” (qtd. in Macdonald and Scherf 357). Victor’s work on the 
Creature therefore represents the collision of new materialist science with a lately discredited 
but as yet not fully abandoned vitalism that supported Britons’ notion of constitutional 
holism. This is why we must see Victor Frankenstein not only as Shelley’s vitalist 
philosopher turned materialist experimenter but as her physician: that lone figure Romantic-
era Britons had—perhaps unfairly—positioned in the yawning chasm between the promises 
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of Enlightenment science and the darker realities of embodied life at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. 
Largely unaware of the latest scientific and medical discoveries being made in the 
great urban centers of Great Britain and the continent, most Romantic-era Britons continued 
to rely on older methods of constitutional maintenance: common sense remedies of nursing 
and midwifery in combination with prayers, charms, strict and well-recorded dietary and 
exercise regimens, and homespun treatments based on supposed healing properties of plants 
and minerals that, like Victor’s early intellectual interests, dated back to the Renaissance, or 
earlier.123 Especially before the broad standardization of medical education and practice 
required by The Apothecaries Act in 1815, there was no guarantee that British medical 
practitioners—physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries—could offer their patients anything 
much different from these holistic domestic remedies. In favor of folk nostrums and rightly 
suspicious of new methods that frequently were painful and ineffective, many mid- to late 
eighteenth-century Britons advocated avoiding medicine altogether, as diarist Joseph 
Farington reports of his watchmaker, Johnson: 
I asked him how he preserved his health being so constantly employed in a 
sedentary business. He said by abstemiousness. That He never eats so much as 
He could, and when He finds himself a little indisposed He reduces the 
quantity of his usual allowance. He never takes Physick. He eats water gruel 
for breakfast – drinks half a pint at night. He scarcely knows what it is now to 
feel very hungry. Sometimes He is low and faint with a sinking of the 
stomach: but rest from business for a day restores him. He drinks a glass of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Century England (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p. 178. 
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cold water every morning when He gets up. Dr. Fothergill of Bath told him 
that would carry off accumulating bile. (Qtd. in Porter and Porter 31) 
Johnson’s apparently complicated relationship with professionalized medicine is underlined 
in this passage by his consultation with the Bath physician, Dr. Fothergill, in spite of other 
allegations to Farington that he “never takes Physick.” 
While owing partly to Shelley’s own experience with the failures of Romantic-era 
medicine in the deaths of her mother and children, the domestic tragedy that results, in 
Frankenstein, from Victor’s medical practice on the Creature also reveals a more general 
cultural anxiety, in which the watchmaker Johnson takes part, about the changing nature of 
medical training, medical practitioners, and medicine itself in the wake of the Enlightenment. 
During the Romantic period, medicine was still evolving from Galenic medicine’s 
humoralism, which relied on a physician’s capacity to interpret patients’ constitutional 
symptoms in a fashion more literary than scientific.124 Progressive Romantic-period medical 
practitioners sought to marry these interpretive techniques to disease pathology, using both 
patient narratives and empirical knowledge from scientific experiments to diagnose illness. 
Science and medicine were of course not separate and highly specialized fields: even 
university-trained, practicing physicians like Lawrence could have their hands deep in 
experimental science and philosophy. The field Lawrence and Abernethy worked in was thus 
a broad and varying venture, which Shelley recreates in the sheer miscellany of Victor 
Frankenstein’s training at Ingolstadt, enumerated here by Anne Mellor: 
Victor Frankenstein chooses to work within the newly established field of 
chemical physiology. He must thus become familiar with recent experiments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Lilian R. Furst, Medical Progress and Social Reality (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), p. 
3. 
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in the disparate fields of biology, chemistry, mechanics, physics, and 
medicine. (90) 
And though Enlightenment science was playing an increasingly larger role in more 
progressive Romantic-era medical practices, British medical men would not be legally 
required to know anything of this new science until Parliament passed The Apothecaries Act 
in 1815. Before this, medical practitioners were divided haphazardly into the (often 
indistinguishable) categories of apothecary, surgeon, and physician not by standardized 
university or hospital training, but by personal decisions and local business practices. In 
1772, the famous Edinburgh-trained physician and medical ethicist John Gregory (whose 
traditional views on raising girls Wollstonecraft had decried in A Vindication125) explained 
that 
[i]f a surgeon or apothecary had had the education, and acquired the 
knowledge of a physician, he is a physician to all intents and purposes, 
whether he has a degree or not, and ought to be treated and respected 
accordingly. In Great Britain surgery is a liberal profession. In many parts of 
it, surgeons or apothecaries are the physicians in ordinary to most families, for 
which trust they are often well qualified by their education and knowledge; a 
physician is only called in where a case is difficult, or attended with danger.126 
These blurred distinctions between apothecaries, physicians, and surgeons were made 
increasingly unreliable by the range of practitioners in each category. Before 1815, some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Gregory’s “paternal solicitudes” were rejected vehemently by Wollstonecraft in A Vindication of the Rights 
of Women (Dublin: J. Stockdale, 1793), p. 122. Though Gregory was a household villain in this sense, his ideas 
about medical practice—particularly his theory of medical sympathy, which we will shortly discuss—seem to 
have been palatable to the Wollstonecraft-Godwin-Shelley circle. 
126 Qtd. in Irvine Loudon, Medical Care and the General Practitioner: 1750-1850 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), p. 25. 
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practitioners held degrees, university certificates, or membership in the Company of 
Surgeons; large numbers had served full apprenticeships to others in their practice. Other 
medical practitioners, however, had started as grocers and began selling medicines on the 
side to increase business; some physicians had purchased or inherited their degrees instead of 
earning them through academic training. Even among practitioners trained in hospitals and 
universities was the occasional itinerant quack; the most infamous of these, John Taylor 
(1703-1772), had even undertaken formal training at St. Thomas’s Hospital in London 
(Loudon 13). 
The Apothecaries Act thus represented in medicine the general spirit of reform that 
had animated British politics in the wake of the Napoleonic wars and, in 1819, inspired an 
anonymous author earnestly to insist that “[a] spirit of Reform, Revolution, Renovation and 
Alteration, are passing through every rank, spreading far and wide and like the resistless 
billows of the ocean, carrying all things before it with an irresistible and impetuous sway.”127 
The Act and the changes it encouraged—the professionalization of each of the three areas of 
medicine and, eventually, their establishment as academic disciplines—are suggested in 
Victor’s study of only post-Enlightenment subjects at Ingolstadt, a detail Mary Shelley surely 
gleaned from her acquaintance with several university-trained physicians: William Lawrence, 
for one, as well as John William Polidori, who was Byron’s physician in 1816 and 
consequently present at the ghost story contest during which Shelley first came to her idea 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 This anonymous statement was made as a defense of the University of Edinburgh, where the reforms of the 
early nineteenth century found both support and practical application in the University’s medical training 
programs. W. H. McHenemey, “Education and the Medical Reform Movement,” The Evolution of Medical 
Education in Britain (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1966), p. 135. 
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for Frankenstein.128 While this chapter will soon argue that the amateur chemist and partially 
trained surgeon Percy Shelley was Mary Shelley’s primary model for Victor Frankenstein, it 
seems equally plausible that Polidori, like Lawrence, also served as an inspiration for 
Shelley’s title character. Like Victor Frankenstein, Polidori was dissatisfied with his 
professors and academic work at Edinburgh and often wished to leave medical school. More 
compelling still is that, a the time of Polidori’s matriculation, enrollment at Edinburgh had 
increased from 158 students in 1750 to 650 students in 1800, a dramatic change in lecture 
sizes that led to cadaver shortages in Edinburgh’s anatomy courses. While it is not known 
whether or not Polidori ever participated, his classmates at Edinburgh took it upon 
themselves to make up for this shortage through an extensive grave-robbing campaign, 
which, as Polidori’s biographer D. L. Macdonald speculates, likely encouraged Polidori’s, 
and perhaps Mary Shelley’s, gothic imagination.129 
Alongside social and legal developments in medicine represented by The 
Apothecaries Act of 1815 was a burgeoning medical interest in the nature of human 
sensation, particularly pain; experiments on sensory perception—like those in galvanism 
Shelley references in her 1831 Preface to Frankenstein—were steadily beginning to inform 
medical practice in Great Britain and elsewhere on the continent. As Steven Bruhm explains, 
[t]he complex slipperiness of pain began to manifest itself profusely in the 
mid-eighteenth century as physicians attempted to reorganize the landscape of 
the human body and its responses to stimulation (10) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 While it is important to note that Victor, a Swiss citizen attending a German medical school, would not 
literally have fallen under the governance of The Apothecaries Act, this reading of Frankenstein assumes that 
Mary Shelley’s imaginative foundations for the medicine in the novel rest primarily in British medical culture. 
129 D. L. Macdonald, Poor Polidori: A Critical Biography of the Author of The Vampyre (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 2. 
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 —an enterprise at the heart of the Lawrence-Abernethy debates and, of course, 
Frankenstein’s work at Ingolstadt. As in Elinor Dashwood’s fear in Sense and Sensibility that 
Marianne might sympathize with others’ feelings too readily and thus ruin her own 
constitution, many who advocated a physiological understanding of sympathy extended this 
theory to include social sympathy, or the literal transmission of corporal feeling from 
constitution to constitution. 
The mechanisms of social sympathy cohered nicely with vitalist explanations of 
human life: eighteenth-century physiology held that organs themselves existed in mutual 
awareness, or sympathy, with one another because of the vital principal (or something like 
it), thus producing a fully integrated constitution. Newton’s argument in Opticks (1704) that 
sensory impressions were produced by vibrations in the ether—that invisible substance 
flowing both between bodies and through the nerves—explained how sympathetic 
transmissions occurred not only within, but between, individual constitutions. This model of 
sympathy was not new. Ether was merely the empiricist’s explanation of what heretofore had 
been sympathy’s supposed occult properties, which prompted the early modern English, for 
example, to treat wounds “by anointing the offending weapon,” or by using “plants fancifully 
resembling a lung […] as specifics against phthisis.” These sympathetic “wound salves” and 
the “doctrine of signatures” practiced by the Renaissance physician Paracelsus were regularly 
derided during the Romantic period by university-trained doctors, but it is critical to 
remember that, like Shelley’s Frankenstein, many Romantic-era Britons were involved in the 
ongoing practice and even the revival of Paracelsian methods.130 Victor’s fascination with 
Renaissance systems is therefore probably not what Butler calls a “poorly explained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Nora Crook and Derek Guiton, Shelley’s Venomed Melody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
p. 28. 
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preoccupation,” but Shelley’s keen understanding of just how variable medical practice was 
during the period of her own life, particularly before The Apothecaries Act (xxviii). 
 Although it took place before Mary knew him, Percy Shelley’s brief attempt to 
become a surgeon illustrates the chaotic and unregulated nature of medical training in Britain 
prior to The Apothecaries Act and suggests that Mary Shelley—positioned by the fall of that 
year to compare her husband’s meager medical training to that of the already quite 
accomplished William Lawrence—knew British medicine’s lack of standards when she 
imagined Victor Frankenstein. Before he was expelled from Oxford, Percy Shelley used his 
rooms there to house, according to Thomas Jefferson Hogg, “an electrical machine, and air-
pump, the galvanic trough, a solar microscope, and large glass jars and receivers,” which he 
was using to prepare medical salves on his own program of innovation and discovery.131 
Shelley’s biographers tend to agree that he pursued medicine primarily because of a 
persistent and debilitating hypochondria, which, in combination with the necessity of 
supporting himself after expulsion from Oxford, eventually led him to the study of surgery in 
London (Crook and Guiton ix). 
Percy Shelley’s intention to practice medicine professionally can be traced through 
his letters of 1811, when he was visiting London after the expulsion. Charles Grove recalls 
that Shelley 
then came to London, his father at that time refusing to receive [him] at Field 
Place. He came, therefore, to my brother’s house in Lincoln-inn Fields. I was 
then in town, attending Mr. Abernethy’s anatomical lectures. The thought of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Sharon Ruston, Shelley and Vitality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 74. 
	   203	  
anatomy […] became quite delightful to Bysshe, and he attended a course 
with me, and sometimes went also to St. Bartholomew’s Hospital.132 
 In July of that year, and in spite of his increasingly dire financial straits, Shelley reported to 
E. F. Graham his ongoing determination to become a surgeon: “I still remain firm in my 
resolve to study surgery – you will see that I shall.” Shelley was then regularly 
accompanying Charles on their summer course of study at St. Bartholomew’s during which 
they followed practicing surgeons through the hospital, observing as the surgeons diagnosed 
patients, performed operations, and conducted post-mortems. Four months later, however, 
Shelley composed a far less certain letter to his friend, Elizabeth Hitchener, suggesting that 
his interest in surgery was by then well on the wane (Ruston 77). 
Shelley’s elopement with Harriet Westbrook drew him away from his surgery 
training permanently after that summer, but as Ruston writes, Shelley 
clearly felt that he had gained sufficient knowledge from his time at Bart’s to 
advise others on their health. Leigh Hunt’s son, Thornton, recalled that 
Shelley, in Marlow in the summer of 1817, “played the Lord Bountiful among 
his humbler neighbours, not only helping them with money or money’s-worth, 
but also advising them in sickness; for he had made some study of medicine, 
in part, I suspect, to be the more useful.” (79) 
While it was infrequent and relatively inconsequential, Shelley’s ability to dispense medical 
advice among his “humbler neighbours” without proper qualification was symptomatic of a 
larger social problem that The Apothecaries Act of 1815 was meant to correct. Irregular 
medical practitioners—like Percy Shelley and his fictive incarnation, Victor Frankenstein—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Qtd. in Thomas Jefferson Hogg, The Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 
1906), p. 575. 
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stood at the heart of the British public’s distrust of the medical profession during the 
Romantic period (Loudon 132-33).133 
Before leaving his surgery training in London, however, Percy Shelley encountered—
and for a time, it seems, embraced—a vitalist theory of constitutional maintenance being 
promulgated during the 1811 summer by his anatomy lecturer, John Abernethy, whose ideas 
Shelley would come to reject for Lawrence’s materialism. During Shelley’s attendance at 
these lectures, Abernethy explicated the theory of physiological sympathy already laid out 
broadly in his Surgical Observations on the Constitutional Origin and Treatment of Local 
Diseases; and on Aneurisms, a book Abernethy had been promoting wildly among his 
patients and professional circles since its publication in 1809. Abernethy’s lectures at St. 
Bartholomew’s in the summer of 1811 were organized according to individual parts of the 
body, but the overarching theme of his lectures, as the title of his book suggests, was that 
local physiological problems were merely the symptom of global constitutional disorder 
(Ruston 84-85). For example, in a lecture on joints and their musculature, Abernethy 
explained that “many joints become diseased by the general health being disordered, in these 
cases local applications will be of little use, our chief care then should be to amend the 
constitution, and having done this we cure the disease” (qtd. in Ruston 85). Shelley 
references Abernethy’s lectures extensively in his 1815 “Essay on the Vegetable System of 
Diet,” noting, in once instance, that the “remotest parts of the body sympathise [with] the 
stomach; groundless terrors, vertigo and delirium are frequently consequent upon a disease of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Like Percy Shelley’s abbreviated attendance at St. Bartholomew’s, Frankenstein leaves the University of 
Ingolstadt before obtaining any formal qualification. Percy left his medical training to marry Harriet Westbrook, 
who had committed suicide in the Serpentine by the time Mary published Frankenstein; Frankenstein, similarly, 
leaves Ingolstadt to work on his Creature, a grim effort resulting in two more dead brides: Elizabeth 
Frankenstein and the Creature’s female companion, whom Victor destroys before bringing her to life. 
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the digestive organs” (qtd. in Ruston 84). As Crook and Guiton have shown, Percy Shelley 
would soon become a vegetarian in an effort to manage his stomach’s sympathy with the rest 
of his constitution on Abernethy’s program (69-84). 
Sympathy had yet another critical role to play as aspiring medical professionals like 
Percy Shelley learned to treat Britons’ ailing constitutions during the Romantic era. John 
Gregory’s seminal Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician (1772), which 
Percy Shelley must have encountered at St. Bartholomew’s, stressed that a physician’s 
capacity to reason scientifically and sympathize with his patient must be independent of one 
another while simultaneously present in his practice: the “happy union of genius and 
understanding, which we so rarely see,” Gregory claims, “constitutes a [physician] of the first 
rate and dignity.” (Qtd. in Caldwell 34) According to Gregory, it was possible for a physician 
to have both too small and too great a measure of fellow feeling: 
a physician […] has many opportunities of displaying patience, good-nature, 
generosity, compassion, and all the gentler virtues that do honour to human 
nature. The faculty has often been reproached with hardness of heart, 
occasioned, as is supposed, by [physicians’] being so much conversant with 
human misery. […] But […] when this insensibility is real, it is an [sic] 
misfortune to a physician, as it deprives him of one of the most natural and 
powerful incitements to exert himself for the relief of his patient. On the other 
hand, a physician of too much sensibility may be rendered incapable of doing 
his duty from anxiety, and excess of sympathy, which cloud his 
understanding, depress his spirit, and prevent him from acting with that 
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steadiness and vigour, upon which perhaps the life of his patient in a great 
measure depends.134 
By the time Percy Shelley matriculated at St. Bartholomew’s, Gregory’s medical ethics were 
required reading at major hospitals, and influential elsewhere in the medical profession, as 
Hermione de Almeida explains in her study of Keats’s medical training at Guy’s Hospital, 
which he began in 1815: 
conduct treatises by famous researchers like Brodie and regimental surgeons 
like James Wallace, and handbooks by renowned general practitioners like 
Anthony Carlisle and Abraham Banks, as well as the pamphlets on staff 
manners and perspective in the clinics drawn up by the individual teaching 
hospitals, were all testament to the Romantic age’s growing preoccupation 
with defining who knew most of life and pain and so deserved best the 
accolade of physician.135 
While ministering to the constitutions of others, therefore, Romantic-period physicians were 
also tasked with managing their own sympathies, and thus their own constitutions, in order to 
provide proper care at the patient’s bedside. 
In Victor Frankenstein’s profound—sometimes comically hyperbolic—lack of 
sympathy for the Creature, Shelley invokes these contemporary medical debates about the 
physiology of human sympathy and its relationship to the medical practitioner, which she no 
doubt collected from her husband, William Lawrence, and John William Polidori. The full 
scope of Shelley’s engagement with medical sympathy in the novel comes more completely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 John Gregory, Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 
1772), pp. 7-9. 
135 Hermione de Almeida, Romantic Medicine and John Keats (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 36. 
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into view when we remember that Victor Frankenstein’s famous experiment is actually two: 
the discovery of the principle of life and then, later, the construction of the Creature’s body, 
which Victor animates by means of his first discovery. Film’s popular adaptations of the 
animation scene in Frankenstein—bolts to conduct electric current, for example, inserted into 
the Creature’s neck—reinforce a materialist perception that the completion of the Creature’s 
physical body and its animation are simultaneous events: after all structure, in Lawrence’s 
view, should itself produce life’s functions. Mary Shelley’s text, however, gives a different 
chronology of the experiment, suggesting that while Shelley was indeed fascinated with 
Lawrence’s materialism in 1816, she still was unable or unwilling to write an animation 
scene without invoking Abernethy’s vitalism. Long before the Creature’s body is completed, 
Victor discovers the method, the principle of life, by which he will animate his Creature: 
[s]ome miracle might have produced it, yet the stages of the discovery were 
distinct and probable. After days and nights of incredible labour and fatigue, I 
succeeded in discovering the cause of generation and life; nay, more, I became 
myself capable of bestowing animation upon lifeless matter. (80) 
The theoretical work of discovering the principle of life, a more glorified and prestigious 
practice than Victor’s admittedly filthy work on the Creature’s body, underpins 
contemporary class distinctions among apothecaries, surgeons, and physicians reinforced by 
The Apothecaries Act in 1815. Physicians, for example, especially eighteenth-century 
practitioners who often delivered their prescriptions by correspondence, enjoyed a much 
higher social position than apothecaries and surgeons who dirtied their hands by coming into 
contact with patients (Loudon 19). 
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 A more recent form of this same aversion to the human body, especially a body that is 
dead or sick, has caused Frankenstein’s critics to wonder how Victor stood the smell of the 
second half of his experiment. Those who write on Frankenstein’s science have often 
perpetuated this cultural aversion to the body, tending to ignore the second half of Victor’s 
experiment to focus on his discovery of “the cause of generation and life” and link it to 
scientific theories that held wide currency in academic institutions and intellectual circles 
during the Romantic era. But reading Victor as a university-trained physician offers a 
compelling new view of the second, dirtier half of Victor’s project because it allows us to see 
this work as an anatomical dissection in reverse: “I possessed the capacity of bestowing 
animation,” he explains, “yet to prepare a frame for the reception of it, with all its intricacies 
of fibres, muscles, and veins, still remained a work of inconceivable difficulty and labour” 
(83). The work of assembling the Creature’s body is separate from Victor’s discovery of the 
method of animation, and this second part of the experiment thoroughly drains Victor of his 
own vitality—perhaps a comment on the strenuous nature of a medical education, recognized 
as well by Shelley’s generation as it is now (McHenemey 138). Victor remembers: 
[w]inter, spring, and summer, passed away during my labours; but I did not 
watch the blossom or the expanding leaves – sights which before always 
yielded me supreme delight, so deeply was I engrossed in my occupation. […] 
I appeared rather like one doomed by slavery to toil in the mines, or any other 
unwholesome trade, than an artist occupied by his favorite employment. (84) 
This exhausting, dirty, and “unwholesome” work contrasts Victor’s prior discovery of the 
principle of life, which sends him into a state of “delight and rapture” (80). This distance 
Shelley portrays between theoretical science and medical practice is one of her most 
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important pieces of social satire in Frankenstein: for while a university-trained man like 
Lawrence could be both a practicing physician and an experimental scientist, there were, as 
yet, only a very few ways to transform the knowledge produced by experiments into better 
patient care. This is why medical sympathy was so important to practicing physicians like 
John Gregory: even if his medicines failed—as they so frequently did—the physician’s 
sympathy could yet provide a moral balm to his patient that, at least according to the many 
Britons who believed in physiological sympathy, might actually aid an ailing constitution. 
 Although we might expect Victor to sympathize with the Creature’s body after its 
animation by the glorious “spark of life,” the result is precisely, and catastrophically, the 
reverse. Victor becomes disgusted with his remarkable discovery in this famous passage 
because the Creature is hideous: 
[h]ow can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the 
wretch whom which such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form? 
His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. 
Beautiful! – Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles 
and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of 
a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast 
with his watery eyes, that seemed almost the same colour as the dun white 
sockets in which they were set, his shriveled complexion, and straight black 
lips. (85) 
Victor’s failure to make the human body “beautiful,” though, is not a deficiency of his 
science or even of his training in anatomy and physiology. Indeed, all of these aspects of 
Victor’s work are successful: he discovers the “spark of life” and creates a human frame that 
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can and does bear the process of animation. Shelley is clear that Victor’s real failure is his 
lack of what Gregory called the “happy union of genius and understanding”—Victor is a 
genius to be sure, but he does not possess the understanding, the moral sympathy, which 
distinguishes a gifted scientist from a skilled physician. In her husband, an aspiring medical 
man, Shelley might have seen a similar tendency. This is how Percy Shelley remembers his 
time walking the wards at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital: 
[h]ospitals are filled with a thousand screaming victims; the palaces of luxury 
and the hovels of indigence resound alike with the bitter wailings of disease, 
idiotism and madness grin and rave amongst us. (Qtd. in Ruston 81) 
Like Victor’s view of the Creature, Percy Shelley abstracts the symptoms of sufferers in St. 
Bartholomew’s Hospital, personifying physical and mental illness instead of seeing the 
patients themselves. 
For all of Shelley’s well-documented investment in Lawrence’s materialist science, 
she nevertheless insists that Victor’s materialist way of seeing the Creature gets in the way of 
his medical sympathy. Victor’s account of the animation focuses on different, discrete parts 
of Creature (eyes, hair, teeth), fragmenting the Creature’s body, and turning him into the 
subhuman fiend, wretch, and daemon Victor calls him serially throughout the novel. 
Oppositely, the Creature’s sense of himself suggests an integrated holism: 
it is with considerable difficulty that I remember the original aera of my 
being: all events of that period appear confused and indistinct. A strange 
multiplicity of sensations seized me, and I saw, felt, heard, and smelt at the 
same time. (128) 
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At this crucial moment of Victor’s absolute scientific success, he fails, as a physician, to 
know what his patient is feeling: a problem of moral sympathy and of diagnosis. Because 
Victor is unable to know what the Creature is feeling, he also is unable accurately to 
understand the Creature’s condition and provide proper care, a crisis that was, as Mary 
Shelley knew, at the heart of medical practice during the Romantic period—though certainly 
the problem was less acute in most cases than the satirical extreme Frankenstein represents. 
Mellor addresses this aspect of Victor’s relationship with the Creature when she reads Victor 
as a parent whose absolute lack of sympathy prevents him from caring for his child: 
Frankenstein’s inability to sympathize with his child, to care for or even to 
comprehend its basic needs, soon take the extreme form of putative 
infanticide. After his next glimpse of his child, he confesses, “I gnashed my 
teeth, my eyes became inflamed, and I ardently wished to extinguish that life 
which I had so thoughtlessly bestowed.” (42) 
Through her portrayal of Victor as a parent and physician, Shelley implies that Victor’s 
sympathy is faulty in both domestic and clinical senses. 
 Victor’s lack of sympathy for the Creature is much more than a passing topical 
reference to Romantic medical practice; Shelley uses it as a major structuring principle of the 
novel. The Creature’s narrative, the innermost story in Frankenstein, catalogs the intricacies 
of his physiological suffering as well as his diet and sleeping habits during the first weeks of 
his life, a very common practice of Romantic-period sufferers attempting better to understand 
and correct their constitutional disorders at home. After some time, the Creature learns how 
to live in his strange environment, and there are strong suggestions in the 1818 text that the 
Creature is seasoning his body to local environmental factors—food sources, daily rhythms 
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of lightness and dark, and the weather—increasing his personal sense of holism in a body 
whose pieces have been gathered variously within and without the human species. In this 
sense, Victor’s failed medical sympathy positions the Creature as the Romantic patient par 
excellence: not the hypochondriac whose ailments are of the imagination, but a real sufferer, 
whose constitution is so fundamentally disordered that it cannot be said to exist. 
The Creature’s first real understanding of his constitution-less condition comes from 
his acquaintance with the De Lacey family as he learns their language, observes their social 
interactions, and reads the family’s books on political economy, where he begins to 
understand the exclusive nature of corporate human constitutions: “I heard of the division of 
property, of immense wealth and squalid poverty; of rank, decent and noble blood”; the 
Creature learns that without wealth or descent a man is considered “a vagabond and a slave, 
doomed to waste his powers for the profit of the chosen few” (145). The Creature also begins 
to understand that his physical form—both its strange origin and its appearance—will 
prevent his constitution within the human family. The ugliness of his body is why he has “no 
friends”: “[w]as I then a monster […] from which all men fled?” he wonders rhetorically. In 
a body without kin or connection, the Creature also is without clan and class, the 
consummate subaltern with claim to “no money” and “no kind of property.” Later, when 
Victor destroys the Creature’s companion, it becomes clear that the Creature will remain a 
race unto himself, his suicide in the Arctic amounting to genocide. Outside all imaginable 
human constitutions, the Creature famously, poignantly asks: “What was I?”—a sentiment 
that is of course reinforced when the Creature is violently driven by Felix from the idealized 
De Lacey home (145). 
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In Shelley’s thematization of medical sympathy in Frankenstein, the counter-text to 
the Creature’s patient narrative is Victor’s journal, which the Creature discovers in the pocket 
of his garments taken from Victor’s laboratory. In it, the Creature reads Victor’s original, 
damaging observations and diagnosis: 
[y]ou, doubtless, recollect these papers. Here they are. Every thing is related 
in them which bears reference to my accursed origin; the whole detail of that 
series of disgusting circumstances which produced it is set in view; the 
minutest description of my odious and loathsome person is given. (155) 
Though they contradict his sense of having a fully integrated constitution, the Creature—like 
a patient—trusts Victor’s observations of his body, which suggest a fragmented and 
subhuman condition. When the Creature adopts Victor’s diagnosis, it alienates him from the 
De Lacey household and the rest of humankind: “[i]ncrease of knowledge,” the Creature 
explains, “only discovered to me more clearly what a wretched outcast I was.” Victor’s 
laboratory notes on the Creature thus become a rather prescient critique of how nineteenth-
century “medicine” would participate in the institutionalization of racism. The Creature still 
feels the human emotion of hope, but it “vanishe[s]” each time he is reminded of Victor’s 
devastating but authoritative opinion by seeing his reflection in water (156). While the split 
nature of Victor’s experiment suggests the huge divide yet to be closed during the Romantic 
era between theoretical science and medical practice, the difference between Victor’s opinion 
of the Creature and the Creature’s account of himself insists that moral sympathy be applied 
in medical practice as a necessary corollary to Enlightenment science. The alternative 
Shelley warns of is a materialist medicine that fragments the body to diagnose its ailments 
without an understanding of the whole patient, turning that patient into a monster and outcast. 
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William Wordsworth’s famous caution about nature in “The Tables Turned” (1798), 
that “[w]e murder to dissect” (l. 28) it, therefore has radical resonance in the medical context 
Mary Shelley establishes in Frankenstein: Victor fragments the human body through a 
reverse dissection seeking to create life, but when it is performed without sympathy to the 
whole patient, it is more deadly than life-giving. What is most striking, though, about 
Shelley’s structural pairing of the Creature’s narrative to Victor’s journal is that the Creature 
clearly emerges from the comparison as the more sympathetic figure. Insofar as the Creature 
is constituted in Frankenstein by his own narrative (and not by Victor’s materialist view of 
him), we readers are far more inclined to sympathize with him—to feel, as some have 
argued, that he is a human being. Though readers do not agree about the Creature’s human 
status (which is largely Shelley’s point), he certainly seems more human to us than the 
egomaniacal Frankenstein revealed in the laboratory journal. This comparison of the 
Creature’s narrative to Victor’s, in fact, has led many critics and readers to name 
Frankenstein as the real monster of the two, a point that frequently reemerges when 
Frankenstein is adapted to film. By calling our attention to the disparate narratives of the 
Creature’s life that constitute Frankenstein, and by persuading us to identify with the 
Creature, Shelley situates the Romantic novel—not anatomical dissections, not electrical 
experiments, not even doctoring—as the period’s great innovation in moral sympathy.136 
 Victor’s denial of the Creature’s constitutional wholeness—through both his 
materialist science and his lack of medical sympathy—causes most immediately the tragedy 
of the Creature’s life. But Shelley sees larger constitutional problems on the horizon of 
Victor’s unregulated and unorthodox medical practice. Because Frankenstein does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 This as an absolute contrast to Austen’s deep ambivalence about the ability of novels to promote moral 
sympathy, most lucidly distilled a year before Frankenstein in her Sanditon caricature of Sir Edward Denham. 
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acknowledge the Creature even in the most basic ways—will not, in fact, report his existence 
to authorities after he knows the Creature to be capable of killing—Justine is wrongly 
accused of William’s murder, tried, and executed in what would have been in Shelley’s 
Britain a gross miscarriage of constitutional law, a fact Shelley of course acknowledges in 
the sardonic play of Justine’s given name. Similarly, the inquest following Henry Clerval’s 
murder in an Irish fishing village is short-circuited because the Creature remains in an extra-
legal condition perpetuated by Frankenstein’s unwillingness to acknowledge him. Finally, 
Frankenstein himself is wrongly tried for Clerval’s murder in an Irish assize and acquitted, 
without revealing that the Creature is responsible (205). Later, when Victor finally does 
report the Creature to a criminal judge at home in Switzerland, the judge believes 
Frankenstein himself constitutionally deranged, considering his tale “the effects of delirium.” 
Realizing himself in the presence of, apparently, a madman, the judge humors Frankenstein’s 
wishes: “I will exert myself [to find him],” he promises Victor, “[b]ut I fear, from what you 
have yourself described to be his properties, that this will prove impracticable, and that, 
while every proper measure is pursued, you should endeavor to make up your mind to 
disappointment” (222). The rule of law is thus severely compromised in Frankenstein, made 
meaningless, in fact, by the presence of not one being but two forced outside the bounds of 
traditional human constitutions: the Creature by Frankenstein’s unwillingness to 
acknowledge him, and Frankenstein himself by his periodic madness. 
The deterioration of constitutional law is itself more programmatic in Frankenstein 
than topical. Before the Creature commits any crime, and before Justine Moritz loses her 
constitutional rights in an unfair murder trial, Shelley prefigures the deterioration of the law’s 
meaning when the sighted children of old De Lacey—a figure of Blind Justice and the only 
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character in the novel to acknowledge the Creature as human—drive the Creature away from 
their father and back into the wilderness, where he lives for the rest of the novel beyond the 
rule of law. Together, Frankenstein’s engagements with criminal law are Shelley’s taut 
allegory for The Criminal Lunatics Act 1800, which was passed by the House of Commons 
in response to James Hadfield’s alleged attempt on King George III’s life at the Drury Lane 
Theater. Deemed by a judge and jury to have a mental constitution too deranged to be 
convicted on charges of treason, Hadfield was simply released from Britain’s legal system; 
The Criminal Lunatics Act was then passed through the House of Commons hastily to ensure 
that Hadfield could be incarcerated legally and indefinitely at the behest of the Regent.137 
In her 1826 novel, The Last Man, Shelley would further elucidate the political and 
legal problems created within a constitutional monarchy by pathologic individualism, 
particularly egomania of the kind she had presented in Victor Frankenstein. Adrian, Shelley’s 
progressive heir to the British leadership, is made unfit to rule by his idealism and “self-
destructive love” for the Greek princess Evadne, thus paving the way for the Byronic Lord 
Raymond to become Lord Protector. Raymond hopes that his rule will return England, an 
island republic in Shelley’s novel, to a constitutional monarchy: “my first act when I become 
King of England,” Raymond pledges, “will be to unite with the Greeks, take Constantinople, 
and subdue all Asia.”138 Raymond’s imperial ambitions and adulterous affair with Evadne 
disrupt the happiness of Shelley’s small cast of ruling families, the succession of power in 
England, and ultimately the population of the world. As Kari E. Lokke has observed, Lord 
Raymond’s brutal attack on Constantinople “disseminates the plague and initiates a narrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Richard Moran, “The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James Hadfield 
(1800),” Law & Society Review 19, no. 3 (1985), pp. 487–519. 
138 Mary Shelley, The Last Man, ed. Hugh J. Luke, Jr. (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 40.	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of death that will not end until the entire human race, save [Shelley’s] narrator, Lionel 
[Verney], is gone.”139 The problems of Shelley’s fictive constitutional monarchy under the 
egomaniacal Lord Raymond—while often read as a roman-à-clef,  “an act of mourning for 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, […] for Byron, and for the collective life they had led”—are also a 
clear critique of Regency-era Hanover family politics, which seriously compromised the 
political efficacy and the personal happiness of the royal family’s least powerful members 
(Lokke 117). Caroline of Brunswick and her daughter, Princess Charlotte, are allegorized in 
The Last Man as Shelley’s Perdita and Clara, Lord Raymond’s wife and daughter, whom he 
cruelly abandons following his affair with Evadne. Perdita, too, in her dejection over 
Raymond’s betrayal, neglects “even her child” and steels “her heart against all tenderness” 
(111). By the time Shelley published The Last Man, of course, both Caroline and Princess 
Charlotte were dead, the unwitting victims, many Britons believed, of an unfeeling, 
unprincipled Regent. In the meanwhile, George IV ruled as Britain’s king with the 
dissolution and self-interest that his subjects had long come to expect from him. Shelley’s 
notice of egomania’s effects on Britain’s constitutional monarchy—which she first 
articulated in Frankenstein in the erosion of Justine’s constitutional rights by Victor’s lack of 
sympathy—would become a programmatic feature of her third novel and a pointed attack on 
contemporary royal politics. 
 Familial constitutions, too, are deeply troubled in Frankenstein by Victor’s failed 
sympathy for the Creature: most obviously, the Creature, embittered by his loneliness and 
dejection, murders Elizabeth Frankenstein on her wedding night, strongly implying that the 	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Frankenstein family line will end with Victor, though his younger brother, Ernest (his name 
implying that he may be more sympathetic than his older brother), somewhat miraculously 
survives the novel. The Creature’s understanding of human family’s constitutions, what he 
calls the “sanguinary laws of man,” marks the child William out for death when he asserts 
the name of his father and with it his membership in the Frankenstein bloodline: “My papa is 
a Syndic – he is M. Frankenstein,” William announces defiantly to the Creature upon 
meeting him. “Frankenstein!” the Creature exclaims, “You belong then to my enemy – to 
him towards whom I have sworn eternal revenge; you shall be my first victim” (168, 167). 
But there is a deeper, more sinister problem with the Frankenstein family constitution: the 
threat of incest between Victor and Elizabeth, his cousin, who has been raised in the 
Frankenstein home as a sibling. As Butler argues, Shelley revised the original Frankenstein 
in 1831 to remove the stigma of incest (by making Elizabeth a stranger adopted by the 
Frankensteins, not Victor’s cousin), but in the 1818 version of the novel the theme of a 
degenerative upper class family is clear, a constitutional problem made worse by the 
ambitions of a son whose professional failures are revisited upon the Frankenstein family in 
the murders of the family’s most vulnerable members, Elizabeth and William. Victor’s 
professional failure is substantially underlined by the coincidence of illness and death in the 
Frankenstein household with the beginning of his medical education at Ingolstadt. With these 
details, Shelley suggests that Victor’s interest in medicine may be strongly focused by his 
desire to prevent the kind of domestic tragedy that precedes his departure from home: 
Elizabeth had caught the scarlet fever; but her illness was not severe, and she 
quickly recovered. During her confinement many arguments had been urged 
to persuade my mother to refrain from attending upon her. She had, at first, 
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yielded to our entreaties; but when she heard that her favourite was 
recovering, she could no longer debar herself from her society, and entered 
her chamber long before the danger of infection was past. The consequences 
of this imprudence were fatal. (72) 
This sense of possibility is disappointed, however, by Victor’s failure to see his studies as a 
way of righting his family’s misfortunes; rather, he selfishly thinks of Ingolstadt as a place 
merely to escape a boring life in his parents’ home: 
as I proceeded, my spirits and hopes rose, I ardently desired the acquisition of 
knowledge. I have often, when at home, thought it hard to remain during my 
youth cooped up in one place, and had longed to enter the world, and take my 
station among other human beings. Now my desires were complied with, and 
it would, indeed, have been folly to repent. (74) 
Victor’s blithe inattention even to the suffering of his own family—especially when 
compared to the utter selflessness of his mother’s care for Elizabeth—indicates that his lack 
of sympathy is not just a professional failure, but his own constitutional problem, a real 
aberration from the rest of his family. Victor acknowledges this problem in his conversation 
with the Creature, when they are discussing the possibility of Victor’s making a female 
companion. The Creature pleads with Victor to let him see that he “excite[s] the sympathy of 
some existing thing.” But Victor cannot: “I compassionated him,” Victor admits, “and 
sometimes felt a wish to console him; but when I talked, my heart sickened, and my feelings 
were altered to those of horror and hatred. […] I could not sympathize with him” (171). But 
the Creature has already intuited, through his own superior capacity for sympathy, that 
human feelings like Victor’s will always prevent him and his companion from being 
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constituted among the human family: “the human senses,” the Creature explains calmly to 
Victor, “are insurmountable barriers to our union” (169). Still, though, Shelley continues to 
suggest that Victor’s physical constitution is in some way particularly resistant to sympathy, 
not just for the Creature, but for everyone—even his closest friend. After Clerval’s death, 
Victor invokes Lawrence’s science to wonder: “Of what materials was I made, that I could 
thus resist so many shocks, which, like the turning of the wheel, continually renewed the 
torture?” “Why,” he clarifies, “did I not die?” (201) In a last effort for familial constitutional 
cohesion among the Frankensteins, Elizabeth urges Victor to “transfer” his love for the lost 
to “those who yet live,” a macabre bond to be forged in Elizabeth’s view “by the ties of 
affection and mutual misfortune”—but even this fails when Elizabeth, too, is murdered 
because of Victor’s neglect. 
The action of the Frankenstein family’s extinction is mirrored in Frankenstein’s 
destruction of the Creature’s female companion on the Orkney Islands, Victor’s effort to 
prevent the emergence of a family and eventually a race constituted entirely by monsters. 
Victor’s abortion of the Creature’s female companion in Scotland suggests an end to all 
familial constitutions touched by Frankenstein’s unsympathetic practice of medicine—a 
dissolution of the family unit Shelley knew well from a life lived without her mother. 
Following Wollstonecraft’s death, Godwin remarried his neighbor, Mary Jane Clairmont, in 
1801, and between 1810 and 1812, Mary Godwin herself went twice to Scotland, probably, 
her biographers agree, because of a tenuous relationship with her stepmother, who saw her as 
a rival for Godwin’s attention (Butler ix-x). On a broader scale, the discomposure of 
Europe’s most elite families, William Lawrence pointed out in his lectures at the Royal 
College of Surgeons, also was owing to the instability of physiological constitutions 
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produced by generations of inbreeding. The threat of incest between Victor and Elizabeth in 
an upper-class Swiss family dramatizes this concern in Shelley’s fiction; the constitutional 
weakness of ruling-class families like the Frankensteins was a clear reminder to Britons of 
their own King George III, whose recurrent episodes of mental derangement betrayed a 
weakness in both the Hanover family line and the British national constitution. 
The Creature’s constitution-less body and Victor’s unsympathetic treatment of it have 
still wider implications in Shelley’s novel—greater than the Frankensteins’ familial concerns, 
and greater even than the short-circuiting of Ireland and Switzerland’s criminal laws. As we 
have observed in our earlier discussion of the Lawrence-Abernethy debates, British 
conservatives perceived materialist science as a threat to the national constitution because it 
suggested that Britain’s social order and national supremacy could no longer be justified by 
constitutional differences among individuals. The Creature is Shelley’s embodiment of that 
threat. A figure explicitly apart from human corporate constitutions, the Creature is 
profoundly lonely—but he is also in many respects free, the reason why, near the end of the 
novel, he begins to refer to himself as “master” and to Victor as his “slave” (192). Shelley 
signals the Creature’s freedom physiologically in his ability to survive over an enormous 
climatologic range, travel great distances on foot, learn human languages quickly, and live on 
only a meager supply of food: “acorns and berries,” he notes to Victor, “afford me sufficient 
nourishment” (170). The Creature is not “beautiful,” as Victor had hoped, but his ability to 
survive (or, to use an idea that materialist science inaugurated, his evolutionary fitness) 
exceeds that of humans, who, during Shelley’s lifetime, were believed to season their 
constitutions in one climate and become enfeebled or diseased in others. This is why 
Frankenstein and Walton are so unwell in the Arctic—“daily declin[ing] in health” as Walton 
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reports—while the Creature maintains his usual strength of mind and body (235). In fact, it is 
only in applying simultaneously the global extremes of heat and cold—his imagined self-
immolation at the North Pole’s zero degrees north latitude—that the Creature will be able to 
end his life (243). 
Ultimately, Shelley insists that a being without a constitution—who can live 
anywhere on the globe without legal identity or family ties—dissolves the idea of national 
constitution as well, a point she achieves primarily through a comparison of Victor, Walton, 
and the Creature. Victor’s physiological constitution responds regularly to his belief in 
national constitutions: during his visit to the tomb of the English “patriot” John Hampden, 
the cousin and supporter of Oliver Cromwell, Victor reports that his soul is “elevated from its 
debasing and miserable fears to contemplate the divine ideas of liberty and self-sacrifice,” 
suggesting a strong analogy in Victor’s mind between his own Swiss nationalism and the 
English patriotism he so readily embraces (185). Following his incarceration in Ireland, but 
before he has arrived at home in Geneva, Victor reports a “maladie du pays”—literally 
“homesickness” in his native French—that is “devouring” his constitution (206). Similarly, 
Walton’s physical constitution is dependent upon his belief in a national one. When it 
appears that his ship, moored in the Arctic ice, will be crushed, he imagines his death and the 
deaths of his crew in familiar national terms: the idea of never seeing “dear England” again 
(234). Life is similarly conceived: when the ship breaks free of the ice, Walton’s crew 
celebrate on deck, and Walton reports to Frankenstein that “[t]hey shout […] because they 
will soon return to England” (238). 
The Creature, on the other hand, has no such national feelings, no such understanding 
of his life and death. As he explains to Victor on the sea of ice: “At length I wandered toward 
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these mountains, and have ranged through their immense recesses,” with no thought of 
compromising his constitution (168). The un-nationalized woods surrounding Ingolstadt, “the 
ice caves of the glaciers,” the “ridges of inaccessible precipices,” the “sea of ice,” the 
“desserts of the new world,” and the “dens” of the wilderness are equally habitable to the 
Creature, strongly suggesting that the infinite aesthetics of the sublime can be embodied in 
him, as Mellor has argued, precisely because he has no constitution (Frankenstein 172; 
Mellor 131-32). Unlike Laura Montreville, whose Scottish constitution is severely 
compromised by her transatlantic kidnapping, and unlike Crazy Jane, who lives on the fringe 
of Britain but cannot leave, the Creature willingly offers to leave the nation, in fact, the 
continent of his birth with his female companion: to “quit Europe” and live peacefully in the 
wilds of “South America,” probably the best opposite Shelley could imagine to Europe’s 
latitude and longitude. In his effort to draw Victor on in their final chase, the Creature sets 
out “across the sea in a direction that led to no land,” Shelley’s invocation of Thomas 
Moore’s utopia, literally, “no place,” turned bleakly in Frankenstein into the site of Victor 
and the Creature’s deaths, not to mention the obvious fate of the innocent sled dogs, which 
the Creature commandeers from the villagers of an Arctic outpost (228).  
Equally demonstrative of the Creature’s nation-less condition is that Victor 
Frankenstein must incorporate a variety of national settings in his endeavor to build the 
Creature and his female companion. First are Victor’s occult fascinations during his 
childhood in Switzerland and then the medicine he learns in Germany. When the Creature 
tasks him with building a companion, Victor travels to England, having “heard of some 
discoveries […] made by an English philosopher [in London], the knowledge of which was 
material to my success” (175). This is probably William Lawrence’s most topical appearance 
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in Frankenstein, the word “material” clueing us in to Shelley’s reference. After visiting 
London, Frankenstein removes to Scotland with his materials and chemical instruments, a 
detail strongly suggesting that Victor has gathered his materials for a female Creature in 
London. Shelley was very familiar with at least one London graveyard: St. Pancras 
Churchyard was where she frequently retired to read on her mother’s grave (Butler xi). 
Victor decides finally to construct the female Creature on “the remotest” of Scotland’s 
Orkney Islands, “an obscure nook in the northern highlands,” where he can work in solitude 
(188, 184). Frankenstein’s journey into Scotland—in which he consciously avoids that place 
of advanced medical reform and regulation, Edinburgh—may have prompted Sir Walter 
Scott to publish three dream visions in the Edinburgh Weekly Journal in the 1819 autumn: in 
the middle vision, the dreamer encounters in a “barely recognizable Scotland of the future” a 
“democratic ‘ogre’ with ‘a physiognomy which was brutal rather than human’” (Scott qtd. in 
Butler xlvi). Frankenstein’s Creature follows him throughout his journey, enduring 
“incalculable fatigue, and cold, and hunger,” a set of details that begin to demonstrate the 
Creature’s super-, not sub-, human condition across many latitudes and climes. When Victor 
begins his pursuit of the Creature after Elizabeth’s death, he travels northward through 
Europe to the “wilds of Tartary and Russia,” still maintaining a nationalized view of the 
world; the Creature, on the other hand, feels no such distinctions, and has no sense of being 
far from a national home he does not possess (225). This is why the Creature’s strength 
grows while Victor’s constitution begins to succumb. 
Shelley’s critique of Frankenstein’s unsympathetic, transnational, and ultimately 
catastrophic medical practice is not only the stuff of fiction. In 1800 the British physician, 
John Reid, leveled his own harsh critique at George Washington’s American doctors for what 
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he thought to be their excessive bloodletting of the President during his final illness. He 
added with nervous levity that a “British physician may be deemed not competent to 
ascertain the propriety of trans-Atlantic practice; the current of blood, in the inhabitants of 
the new world, may bear some proportion to the current of its rivers.”140 Just as American 
rivers have currents deeper and stronger than those of British waterways, Reid half-joked, so 
had President Washington more blood than British men, perhaps making necessary the 
copious bloodlettings (upwards of 80 ounces in twelve hours!) of Washington’s American 
treatment. Beneath Reid’s sarcasm, however, there is a real question about whether or not 
Washington’s American constitution was too different for British doctors to understand and 
treat: perhaps not even medical sympathy could make up for the constitutional differences 
between Americans and Britons, who, when Washington died in 1799, had only just been 
created as different national groups by the United States Constitution in 1789. 
In figuring Victor Frankenstein as a Romantic physician, Shelley imagines the most 
extreme form of Reid’s point: Victor’s practice of medicine is so unsympathetic that it 
produces not just a being with a profoundly different physical and national constitution, like 
Washington, but a being with no constitution at all, who undermines the human social order 
at all of its known levels. In the absence of medical sympathy, there is finally no living 
remedy for the Creature or his doctor: death is their only alternative. In its complex critique 
of a Romantic medicine that would apply materialist science without moral sympathy, 
Shelley’s Frankenstein becomes the period’s clearest and most enduring articulation of the 
lived relationship between bodily constitutions and the corporate constitutions of family, 
class, race, and nation. With her Creature—who comes to life in spite of his constitution-less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 J. Craik and E. C. Dick, “On the Death of General George Washington,” The Philadelphia Museum, 4(1808), 
pp. 154-156.	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condition—Shelley momentously suggests that human constitutions, both physiological and 
political, are perhaps only a fiction. But as the tragedy of Frankenstein confirms, this 
powerful fiction of human “constitutions” remained a necessary one for Regency-era Britons. 
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